

THE
CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION'

SĀDHU ŚĀNTINĀTHA

In Two Volumes

Vol. I

AMALNER

1938

Published by—SETH MOTILAL MANICKCHAND

alias

PRATAP SETH

President, Institute of Philosophy, Amalner.

Printed by—Mr. Anant Vinayak Patvardhan,

Aryabhushan Press, 915/1 Bhamburda Peth, Poona City.

To be available from :

Manager, Institute of Philosophy

P. O.—Amalner (E. Khandesh).

or

Manager, Oriental Book Agency,

15 Shukrawar, Poona 2.

ERRATA

Page 66 line 22 drop second bracket.

” ” ” 23 put a bracket at the end

PREFACE.

The present work was originally intended to be the second part of one complete philosophical treatise. The plan of the book was that the first part should be devoted to the exposition of all the principal religio-philosophical systems of India, and the second part to the critical examination of these systems. The materials of the first part were collected from the original works, published as well as unpublished, of most of the representative writers belonging to the different systems. I arranged them not historically but in accordance with the different conceptions of causality, which lead to the different philosophical conclusions. In the second part, I devoted myself to independent criticism of all those views. After both the parts had been written, I engaged myself in a thorough revision of them. In course of this revision, the second part became much bigger in volume and richer in content than it was originally intended to be. It was particularly so, because I thought that it would be helpful to the general readers, if the views to be criticised were reproduced in plain and non-technical language just before my analysis and observation on them in this part. As a result I found that this part of the book might be regarded as complete in itself and could be presented to the readers as a separate book. As my own humble contributions to the philosophical literature of the country are mainly contained in this book, I am going to place it in the hands of the readers first. No doubt it will be evident to the intelligent scholars that many of the discussions given here presuppose on the part of the readers an acquaintance with the theories which are represented at length in the other

volume, which I reserve for future publication.* In order to make up for this anomaly, I have added a brief resume of those systems in the earlier part of this book.

Here I take the opportunity of conveying my heartfelt thanks to some gentlemen who have been helpful to me in various ways in the preparation of this book. Among them I mention Dr. D.P. Thakkar (of Surat) a psycho-analyst and a semantician, who suggested some important changes in my language in some parts of the book. Srijut Govind Chandra Dev, a gold-medalist in philosophy (Calcutta University) and formerly a fellow of the Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, went through the whole of the book with great care, patience and earnestness, and refined my language in many places. The gentleman from whom I got the most substantial help, without whose generous help I could not produce the work in this form, is Professor Akshaya Kumar Banerji of Mymensingh. He kindly took the trouble of revising the entire book and offered many valuable suggestions and in many places recast my language (especially in some chapters of Vol. II.). In spite of his widely different outlook and divergence of views from mine on some important points, he gave his ungrudging help, and for this I shall ever remain in deep debt of gratitude to him. I am obliged to Professor Rasbehari Das, Ph. D. for his kindness in going through some portions and making some improvement in my language. I take this opportunity to thank Seth Motilal Manickchand alias Pratap Seth of Amalner for the privileges I received at the Research Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, where I stopped and studied long. I am also much obliged to him for being instrumental in the publication of the book.

Author.

*Māyāvāda or the Non-dualistic Philosophy is in the press.

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Sādhaka's nature is momentary consciousness, *Sādhya* is the annihilation of sorrow, *Sāadhanū* is to practise morality and to culture indifference to the world by contemplating it as it really is viz. momentary and sorrowful. The main practice is meditation where the aspirant should try to make his mind vacant or objectless (*Sunya-dhyāna*). By such practices ultimately the flow of consciousness is stopped for ever and the aspirant passes into *Nirvāṇa* or sorrowlessness (109-112).

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This book embodies the result of my experience as a spiritual seeker and a student of Philosophy. Hence it will not be out of place to lay before the readers some facts in connection with my spiritual journey and philosophical inquiries. This short account of the transformations of the beliefs and conclusions of a humble truth-seeker with regard to the ultimate Truth as the result of the most sincere, earnest and continuous search for it for a period of more than thirty years, may, I believe, provoke at least some other ardent truth-seeking minds to rethink the religious and philosophical problems in a new light.

I began my spiritual career at the very dawn of my youth. I practised 'Bhakti-Sādhana' (the practice of devotion, reverence and love to God with a sincere faith in His omnipotence, omniscience and mercy) for ten years, some forms of 'Yoga-sādhana' (the practice of 'Prāṇāyāma' or breath-control) for three years, and meditation according to the non-dualistic Vedāntic method (See last foot-note in Book I) for about twelve years. As the result of the continuous and strenuous practice of meditation, I was able to attain the state of trance, in which I could, according to my judgment, realise or intuit the object of my contemplation. In consequence of the prolonged concentration of attention and energy, I used to attain to a still deeper state of trance, in which, as I could remember or infer after waking, I became totally unaware of myself, the act of meditation and the said object. After long experience of these two types of 'Samādhi' state, a strong impression got hold of my mind that I had found the ultimate Reality.

During the major part of this long period of the incessant practice of meditation, I passed days and nights almost without break in sitting posture in a secluded spot, seldom lay on bed or took rest, had what might be called an apology for sleep only for an hour or two in the same sitting posture, took no physical exercise, had no conversation with anybody and paid little attention to the bodily health; the brain was in a strained condition on account of the incessant struggling effort at concentration. For this indifference to the physical necessities and excessive strain on the brain, I was attacked by a severe pain in the head. In order to divide and divert my attention and thereby to be relieved of pain I gave some attention to the study of philosophy. At that time I acquired some discriminative capacity, as the result of which the thoughts like the following agitated my mind.

Firstly, what I thought as Truth-realisation is not counted as such by those who, with different notions about Truth, attain to the same state of Samādhi.

Secondly, I have concentrated my attention on one idea and realised that, whereas those who do not entertain this idea about Truth do not realise it as the result of their Samādhi-practice ; their realisation is in accordance with their own thought. Thus the objects of realisation are found to vary according to the variation of the aspirants' ideas about Reality and objects of meditation.

Thirdly, in all the stages of the development of concentration, beginning with the withdrawal of attention from all objects other than the object of meditation and ending in deep meditation, I was busy within myself and there was no reference to any extramental or independent object.

Fourthly, the object upon which the mind is fixed in meditation cannot be regarded as the thing itself existing

outside independently of the thinking mind, because that object must necessarily be a mental image or concept.

Fifthly, where there is no conscious ego as the subject, as in the case with "trance without thought," no proof can be obtained that anything was actually realised at that state.

Sixthly, how is it that if there be really Truth-realisation in 'Samādhi,' different sincere aspirants belonging to different sects having attained to the state of Samādhi retain their respective sectarian notions about the nature of Truth and are not of one opinion about it.

Seventhly, if all those who attain the state of Samādhi realise the ultimate ideal of human life, why should there be so many divergences of opinion with regard to the nature of that ideal even among the greatest religious teachers of the world ?

Thoughts like these I could not reconcile with the notion about my immediate experience of true reality, and they forced me to change my conviction about Truth-realisation. I found that what I took as the experience of being face to face with Reality was not really connected with any independent Entity, but with an idea which was subjective, internal and personal. What was seen or intuited in the state of deep meditation was dependent on thought and experience, it was made of the form of thought and regulated according to the nature of thought. Thus I reached the conclusion that what passes for Truth-realisation is not really so, but it is the visualisation of our concept and purely individualistic.

In that state of Samādhi where subtle thought is retained, the character of the realisation is coloured by the pre-conception and pre-disposition of the mind, which

must necessarily contribute to the realisation. On the other hand, in the other type of Samādhi where all the thoughts subside, there cannot be ascertainment of the nature of any entity because ascertainment requires the presence of the power of discrimination, and if this power be retained that state would be lost. After waking from such Samādhi the different aspirants explain it in accordance with their previous beliefs about Truth. This accounts for the divergence of opinions about Truth among those who practise Samādhi and belong to different sects and sincerely adhere to it.

From such thoughts I was forced to conclude that the direct awareness of Truth by means of Samādhi could never be possible. During this period I was under the impression that Truth, though incapable of being known directly, could be positively known indirectly through logic, and that this true knowledge had been attained by the non-dualistic school of Vedānt whose conclusion I deemed at that time as the only true one about the nature of Truth. At that time I used to study mostly the philosophical works on non-dual Vedānt and got into the habit of regarding other rival philosophical theories as untrustworthy. After some time I got the eagerness to ascertain the fundamental reason of the divergence of these conclusions. I questioned within myself,—how was it that the real nature of Truth, so satisfactorily ascertained by the Vedāntic thinkers, was not only not recognised, but even strenuously refuted, by other systems of philosophy, which also must have given much thought on those identical problems? This led me to specially acquaint myself with the different standpoints of different philosophers and their modes and methods of representation and refutation. This study I continued for ten years. In order to form direct

acquaintance with all the different branches of the Indian philosophical thought, I had to make a close study of about a thousand original manuscripts from different libraries of different parts of India in addition to the available printed books. As the result of philosophical study I found that the divergence of conclusions among philosophers with regard to the nature of the ultimate Reality and its relation to man and the world was based on the different conceptions of causality.

A question may naturally arise here, as to why the reasonings of different philosophers, governed by the same logical principles, arrive at different conclusions with regard to the same ultimate Reality. We may refer in brief to some of the grounds for these differences. The philosophers accept the evidence of uncontradicted sense-experience as the primary source of valid knowledge with regard to objective realities, and when on the strength of such evidence a relation of invariable concomitance is ascertained between some objects or phenomena, they conclude that there is the cause-effect-relation between them. It is on the basis of such causal relations, that they proceed to the discovery and ascertainment of unobserved truths from the facts of actual experience. By analysis of the nature of the relation between certain observed objects, which are ascertained to be causally related,—such as between earth and the earthen pot, threads and the cloth, fire and smoke, etc.—different philosophers arrive at different conceptions about the ultimate connection between causes and effects in general. They base their arguments about ultimate realities mainly on their respective conceptions about the character of the cause in relation to the effect and arrive at different conclusions with regard to the ultimate cause or causes of the objects and phenomena of experience with the help of such arguments. Now if there be any metaphysical

reality, which is the ultimate cause of all the phenomena of sense-experience, then evidently the existence and character of that reality will not be conditioned by the ways in which it is conceived by us, though the conceptions that we form about it will necessarily be coloured by the modes of our discriminative ascertainment. But philosophers do not and cannot remain content with holding that the ideas which they form about the ultimate reality or the ultimate cause of the world of experience must be only conditional conceptions influenced and limited by their modes of reasoning, and not representing the character of the reality or the cause as it is in itself. They aspire to determine precisely the nature of the reality as it is in itself. Their speculative effort to achieve this end is, however, conditioned by their personal discriminative faculty, which is greatly influenced in the case of every man by the differences of temperament, education and environments. Though the reasonings put forward may be based on the unanimously accepted principle of causality, viz. that every event or non-eternal object must have a cause or sufficient ground for its production, and the materials for argumentation may be supplied by general uncontradicted observation, still on account of the fundamental differences of outlook due to the aforesaid influences, the applications of the universal principle and the modes of interpreting the observed facts differ, and therefore there occur wide divergences with regard to the metaphysical conclusions.

Let me illustrate the point. That particular effects, like pots, cloths, etc. are produced out of their material causes by conscious agents or makers is a matter of general observation. From this uncontradicted experience the universal conclusion is drawn by some philosophers that whatever is of the nature of an effect or produced object must be produ-

ced by a conscious maker. This principle is applied to the case of the effect-world as a whole, and God is inferred as the Supreme Agent or Maker or Efficient Cause of this world. In the deduction of this conclusion, invariable concomitance between a conscious agent and an effect is acknowledged and made the basis of the argument. But in the recognition of this invariable concomitance, these philosophers either ignore or fail to notice some important conditions and limitations of such invariable concomitance, since in actual experience only *artificial* productions from material causes are found to have their agents or conscious makers, and these agents or makers are always found to be embodied beings. The products of nature are not experienced as requiring any conscious agents to produce them, and bodiless beings are nowhere experienced as the makers of any objects. For ignoring these relevant factors of experience, the conclusion of these philosophers becomes vitiated. With the help of the same causal law and on the strength of the same experience, the philosophers of another school draw the conclusion that whatever is an effect must be produced by an embodied agent or maker, and arguing on the basis of this invariable concomitance between an effect and an embodied agent, they prove the existence of an embodied God as the ultimate Maker of this world of effects. In arriving at this conclusion they ignore the distinction between natural effects and artificial products. Another class of philosophers, finding on the one hand that the agents of actions or makers of objects are invariably experienced to be embodied beings, and on the other hand that the embodied beings are invariably experienced to be non-eternal and subject to origination and destruction, arrives at the opposite conclusion that there cannot be any eternal God as the ultimate Maker or Efficient Cause of the world ; because if God be a disembodied spirit, He cannot be an

agent, and if He be embodied, He must be non-eternal and hence the product of some other cause. Others again, deny the universal concomitance between an effect and a conscious efficient cause, because so far as natural phenomena are concerned, we experience no conscious producer or efficient cause necessary for their production. They confine the invariable concomitance between an effect and an efficient cause only within the limits of phenomena, which are definitely proved to be non-natural. Hence according to their view, there is no ground for proving any efficient cause of the natural world. Thus we find how the same experience is explained in different ways and leads different philosophers to widely divergent conclusions according to their difference of view-points. So we come to the conclusion that because the ascertainment of the nature of Reality is dependent on the character of intelligence or the faculty of reasoning, which is subject to various influences, and because for the determination of the truth of anything, human beings have no other means except intelligence, differences of conceptions about Reality due to differences of outlooks and modes of reasoning are inevitable. Hence if there be any Absolute Reality or ultimate cause of the universe, with any independent character of Its own, unaffected by the different conceptions formed about it, it appears to elude the grasp of all these systems of philosophy.

On this point some think that intelligence comes face to face with Reality in the state of Samādhi (trance-like absorption). But we meet with difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this view as well. Trance is of two kinds, one is with thought (सविकल्प), another is without it (निर्विकल्प). In the former case, the causes of difference do not disappear. In the latter case, when intelligence does not function or becomes suppressed, the capacity to de-

termine the nature of reality is lost, and when afterwards intelligence is restored, explanations of that suppressed state are given according to pre-conceived notions and previously accepted modes of reasoning. So due to differences of the training of the intelligence, differences in conclusions are sure to follow. Thus, the divergences of views about ultimate Truth, that we actually find among those extra-ordinary men, who claim to have reached the highest state of *Samādhi* and are generally revered as truth-seers are quite natural and inevitable. Accordingly, there is no justification for believing that the view or the so-called realisation of any one of them represents the true character of the Absolute Reality (if there be any), as It is in Itself.

After a comparative study of the dialectical works of the different religio-philosophical systems, I found that every system refutes all other systems and becomes refuted in turn by all of them. These refutations are essential parts of the systems, and not less important than the representations of their own views. They are, however, in most cases found to be technical and not unoften tainted by their respective sectarian view-points. But if we give deep thought to each presentation and examine it critically we can find many flaws over and above those shown in the works of the rival advocates. Thus leaving aside sectarian bias and dogmatic attitude, if we take the position of independent onlookers and with seriousness and sincerity examine carefully every system, we find that each of them is vitiated by various flaws and there is no single metaphysical conclusion which can be said to be free from logical fallacies.

The fundamental differences among these different philosophical systems as well as the logical inconsistencies involved in each prevented me from accepting the doctrine

of the Harmony of all views (समन्वयवाद). Besides, it has been mentioned before that if we ponder over the nature of the differences of conclusions in the different systems of Philosophy of Religion, we find them essentially connected with the different notions about causation. Leaving aside the different theories of chance-production (आकस्मिकवाद), we find the theory of momentariness (क्षणभङ्गवाद-प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद i.e. functional interdependence implying no real production) and also five other theories accepted by the systems that take the world as non-momentary. These five theories are:—(1) the theory of the *non-existent-effect* (असत्कार्यवाद = the theory of the effect being non-existent in its material cause before its production and after its destruction), (2) the theory of the *existent-effect* (सत्कार्यवाद = the theory of the effect being always existent, unmanifested or manifested, in the material cause), (3) the theory of the *existent-non-existent effect* (सदसत्कार्यवाद = the theory of the effect being existent in some form and non-existent in another form), (4) the theory of the *inexplicable effect* (अनिर्वचनीयवाद = the theory that the effect cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent or as both existent and non-existent in the material cause) and (5) the theory of the effect being inexpressible in terms of the above four categories (चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तवाद = the effect is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both, nor inexplicable as advocated by the particular sect, nor is the effect included in any fifth category). Among these six theories of causation, the establishment of any one of them means the refutation of the others; that is, these theories are so incompatible with one another that if we accept any one of these we must necessarily refute and discard the rest. So there cannot arise any occasion or question of compromise of these mutually exclusive concepts. Thus I found that the metaphysical conclusions which are rationally based on the divergent theories of causation

must be divergent and they can never be harmonised. (The doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths सर्वधर्मसमन्वय we have specially examined in Ch. X.)

In this manner I have reached the position that no conclusion about the nature of the ultimate Reality is defectless, and that there is no rational possibility of the harmony of all conclusions.

Now there are two ways open to me : either I have to embrace some conclusion knowing well that it cannot be ascertained by all the means at our disposal (viz. logic and intuition), or I have to reject each and every conclusion. In other words, either I am to prove false to my reason and conviction by accepting some doctrine which I understand as unsound and rationally unacceptable, or I am to remain true to my reason and conviction by boldly refusing¹ to accept any religio-metaphysical doctrine what-so-ever, since I find no doctrine which is or can be proved to be free from logical fallacies. Rationality and sincerity demand that I should court the latter position. This of course implies the frank confession that I could not find any clue to the solution of the riddle of the universe for which I started my enquiry. This position of the non-acceptance of any metaphysical doctrine, though evidently implying such a confession of inability to find out any ultimate Truth, has not however been a sad disappointment to me and has not therefore created any despondency in my heart, because I am convinced that this is the inevitable end of a sincere and unbiassed philosophical inquiry. Having freed the mind from all irrational and dogmatic conclusions about Truth, having removed the vain presumption of the intelligence that it can arrive at any rationally unassailable and universally acceptable conception of Absolute Reality at the root of the phenomenal universe,

and having created the sincere rational spirit of recognising this world as an insoluble mystery, (See our conclusion at the end of the book , philosophical speculation has reached its destined end and I am fully satisfied with this result of my philosophical enquiry.

The object of metaphysical pursuit is to hunt down fallacies and to reach a flawless conclusion. But if inspite of vigorous and sincere efforts, such a conclusion is unavai-
lable, we should not hide our failure and embrace with contentment a defective view as final. On the ground that none has been able to give a satisfactory solution, one has no logical right to accept an unsatisfactory theory as conclusive. We must maintain our intellectual integrity unimpaired. We should not, while we philosophize, turn away from truth, even when it destroys what seems to be valuable. Faith is a poor thing if it fears to encounter truth.

This is, in short, my readers, my spiritual journey which I began as a staunch believer and end as an inveterate agnostic or critic.

INTRODUCTION

TO

The Critical Examination of The Philosophy of Religion.

(a) Religion difficult to be defined.

The aim of the present work is to make a critical study of the Philosophy of Religion. For this, a clear-cut definition of religion may be necessary. But, as a matter of fact, to define religion is not an easy task. In the first place, there are historical religions with their numerous sects ; secondly, there are religious beliefs which are the results of free thinking of individuals, and lastly, there are religions of the type of animism; fetichism, nature-worship, ancestor-worship and totemism etc. from which sometimes the evolution of religion is traced. Such being the case, a definition of religion often fails to be applicable to the varied range of the term. But still it cannot be denied that we have some idea of religion and that the very mention of the term gives rise to some general idea in our mind. Where we fail to define our terms, we should rest content with describing them.

(b) Different forms of Religion.

It seems that what religion implies can best be understood if the common points of agreement among the varied professions of historical religions are taken into consideration. Historical religions are holding their sway upon races for centuries ; religious beliefs which are results of free thinking are too numerous and indefinite to be capable

of being systematically considered; and even if religion has been evolved from Animism,* and the like, for a critical study of religion, we may not consider them in as much as they are, roughly speaking, matters of the past or matters of undeveloped intelligence and primitive stage of culture. Though there is enough of sectarian differences among the advocates of historical religions, still if there are common points of agreement among them, then for the purpose of a critical study of religion, these differences may be overlooked.

(c) Points of agreement among Religions.

The study of History, Anthropology, comparative Philology, comparative Religion etc. furnishes us with a huge mass of materials to show that every race of men in every age and country and at every stage of cultural development had been under the influence of some sort of religious beliefs, sentiments and practices. A comparative

* “Animism, the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings. Through the medium of dreams, phantoms, and other agencies, primitive man is driven to believe in spiritual existence—that is, to refuse to identify life with matter in all cases. Thus attributing vaguely his own life to a spirit within himself, he proceeds by analogy to trace the changes and movements of the external world as being due to similar causes. He has not learned to differentiate conscious and unconscious existence, he cannot define personality, but he looks on all nature—rivers, mountains, winds, storms, rocks, stones, plants and animals—as being the abode of spirits. The drama of nature around him, its successions of repose and strife, lead him to think of these spiritual beings as capable of assuming various forms—mineral, vegetable, animal; his instinct for a unity in nature makes such a continuity of life, a transmigration of soul, appear a likely process; and this stage of thought, in which soul or spirit is attributed to all natural objects, is called *Animism*.”

study of these leads us to several points of agreement among them, which may be accepted provisionally as the essential elements of Religion.

(1) First of all, all religions agree in believing in some Supernatural Agency or Agencies, having power to control natural phenomena and human destinies. It is a common belief that the human affairs are not only related to and influenced by the visible natural environments, but that there are invisible Spiritual Agencies (be they one or many) operating behind these visible phenomena, exercising control over them and guiding human destinies. This belief appears to be inherent in the human mind or to be the product of the natural development of human consciousness. It is gradually refined and systematised with the growth of the power of observation, reflection and logical thought. At the highest stages this belief is developed into the conception of one infinite, eternal, omnipotent and omniscient God, who is the sole Creator, Preserver and Governor of this world. With regard to the true character of God, however, there are fundamental differences of opinions even among the greatest thinkers and founders of religious sects.

(2) Secondly, all religions agree in believing in the existence of a soul; we find that they are particularly concerned with what are considered to be the true interests of the soul. But the nature of the soul also has been variously conceived by different religious sects.

(3) Thirdly, every religion recognises some other-worldly interests of the soul. No human being is content with the circumstances in which he finds himself placed. Even when his physical and sensuous demands are satisfied, he feels some sort of discontent with his present

position. He feels some sort of bondage and limitation which he wants consciously or unconsciously to transcend. This idea gradually develops into the idea of Heaven or Salvation or 'Mukti' or absolute deliverance from all bondage and limitation. In different forms of religion, different ideas about the nature of 'Mukti' are found operating. Some sort of belief in the life after death also comes as a necessary concomitant of this other-worldly interest.

(4) Fourthly, some kind of belief in the moral order of the universe we live in, is also present in every religion. The actions that we perform do not exhaust themselves by producing only the actual physical consequences that we directly experience. Meritorious actions bring good results and vicious deeds produce bad results upon the doer himself sooner or later in some mysterious way. If these fruits are not reaped in the present life, they must be reaped somehow in after-life. The Moral law must be vindicated. Actions must produce their moral effects upon the agents themselves. This is a belief in the Law of Moral causation operating behind and exercising control over the Law of Physical causation.

The operation of this Law of Moral causation (the Law of 'Karma') is in most religions, associated with the ruling power of the Supernatural Spiritual Agency (or Agencies), who is (or are) believed to reward or punish the doers according to the merits or demerits of their actions.

(5) Fifthly, every religion takes for granted that man has got the power to control his natural impulses, propensities and feelings, and to regulate his thoughts, speeches and actions. This belief has given rise to various courses of physical and mental disciplines, various habits and practices among peoples of various grades of culture.

If any thing is fundamental and common to the various religions of the world, it is not any objective ideas or beliefs, but an attitude which may be described as appreciative or valuational. No religion is related to another save on the general ground that all are expressions of what man feels to be ultimate values.

(d) **The task of the Critical Philosophy of Religion.**

The purpose of the Philosophy of Religion is the systematic rational treatment of the aforesaid beliefs. The task of the Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion is to examine the validity of the arguments adduced by the representative thinkers belonging to the different well-established philosophical and religious systems.

This criticism of religion will be a criticism of metaphysics too. The problem of the existence of God is a purely metaphysical topic; and the belief in the law of 'Karma', the efficacy of religious practices, and the possibility of liberation have their metaphysical bearings in as much as they are connected with various conceptions of the self and its relation with ultimate Reality. All religion implies a philosophy, because religion always is based upon what amounts to a postulate concerning the nature of reality, namely the belief that there is a sympathetic relation between reality as a whole, or the ground of reality, and human values. With regard to the most authoritative source of the knowledge of the fundamental truths of religion (i. e. those concepts which are accepted as fundamental truths), all the great religious sects place implicit reliance upon Scriptures, which are either believed to have a supernatural origin or to be the embodiments of the direct intuitions of the truths by the holiest religious teachers of

the human race. Different sects, however, believe in the infallible authority of different scriptural books, which not unoften differ in essential points, and the persons regarded as the greatest spiritual guides of the world by one sect are not necessarily recognised as such by others. Nevertheless the recognition of Scriptures as the highest source of metaphysical knowledge is a point of agreement among all religious systems and has an important place in the Philosophy of Religion. All these elements of religion, the philosophers belonging to the different systems try to establish on a metaphysical basis by rational reflection and logical argumentation. Hence a criticism of religion cannot but be a criticism of metaphysics as well. In other words, in such a criticism, it will be impossible to dissociate religion from philosophy. Thus it is clear that our criticism of the Philosophy of Religion should be demarcated from a criticism of 'Theology' in the sense in which the word is generally understood by the sectarian religionists. It is difficult to understand how a discussion on a topic like God can be dissociated from philosophy proper. If the discussion is purely intellectual, it must necessarily come under the compass of philosophy; and even if it takes its stand on intuition, it cannot evade the responsibility of furnishing a rational basis for the validity of intuition itself. Consequently all theological discussions must be at the same time philosophical. From this it is clear that for our purpose, the distinction between Natural and Revealed theology will not be of much use. Theological dogma both is, and presupposes, rational metaphysics, unless it is but to pass for symbolism of moral maxims or of pious feelings.

Our attempt at a criticism of religion must also be demarcated from historical studies of religion. The critic whose task is to consider the speculative value of the funda-

mentals of religion has not much to do either with the evolution of religion, or with making generalisations from the varying phenomena that go by the name of religion. We made a generalisation from various religious beliefs in order to understand the essential factors of religion as such, and after that generalisation has been made, our sole task is to consider what can reasonably be said for and against these fundamental ideas of religio-philosophical thought.

(e) The plan of the present treatise.

In Book I, we have tried to give a brief exposition of the views of the principal religio-philosophical systems, so that the readers may form a general idea of the different efforts they made for a rational interpretation of the universe, the diverse methods in which they approached the problem of philosophy, namely the ascertainment of the true character of Reality, on the basis of the various theories of causation, and the variety of conclusions reached by the respective systems through those methods.

In Book II we have tried to make a critical estimate of the different schools of thought, and to bring out the logical difficulties associated with their conceptions about the ultimate Reality and their explanations of the world-system. By the perusal of both the presentation and the criticism of those views, the readers will be able to judge freely for themselves the merits and demerits of those theories.

(f) The position of the present writer.

In Book II, the readers will find that our mode of approach as well as our conclusions are fundamentally different from those of the philosophical critics who belong to

any particular school of thought. We find that philosophers have usually some positive conclusions about Reality which they try to substantiate by adducing arguments in their favour and by refuting the arguments of all other rival systems. We have not held up any positive conclusion as final and have not with a view to substantiate the exclusive validity of any particular theory brought forth arguments in its favour ; but we tried to show through searching criticism of every possible theory that no positive conclusion can be affirmed which is without logical defect.

The criticisms in this book, levelled against Indian philosophico-religious systems as they are, will none the less be applicable to the philosophical systems of the West as well. The fundamental conceptions about the ultimate Reality and the basic arguments for establishing them are essentially the same among the great thinkers of the East and the West, though the modes of approach and the forms of putting the arguments are found to be different. Hence I believe that there can be no plausible conclusion in Philosophy and Religion which has been left absolutely untouched in this book. (A few criticisms of Western thinkers have also been quoted.)

The readers are, however, to remember that by the refutation of any view of any school of thought, the author does not commit himself to any positive contrary view. Hence the adverse criticisms of the arguments of the Theists or the Idealists or the Realists should not be interpreted as the author's virtual acceptance of the position of the Atheists or the Materialists or the Nihilists. Similarly though he has arrived at the definite conclusion that no religio-metaphysical theory can possibly be without logical defects, his position is to be distinguished from that of the upholders of Scepticism and Agnosticism of the West or the East,

because he does not subscribe to the positive assertions associated with these views, which also are no less subject to criticism than the doctrines, on the refutation of which they are founded. This position of the writer is that of a sincere and earnest truth-seeker and an unbiassed and uncompromising rational critic, and he expects that his readers also will be actuated by the same spirit in going through and forming proper estimate of the arguments set forth herein.

BOOK FIRST

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

BOOK I

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTORY.

An analysis of the creeds of historical religions shows that the following are their fundamentals :— (1) Reverence for the Scriptures, (2) Faith in Supernatural Power, (3) Strict or restricted allegiance to the Law of 'Karma'* (4) Belief in the self and its capacity for spiritual self-discipline (Sādhana) and attainment of liberation (Mukti).

All critical studies must be based on the consideration of the pros and cons of a problem. In order to do justice to this demand of fair criticism, we propose to give in the First Book a brief survey of the said fundamentals of Religion, as understood and interpreted by different religious systems. Then in the Second Book we shall try to critically estimate their logical and philosophical values. Let us now proceed to the interpretation of the fundamentals of Religion.

* 'Karma' means action and its moral consequences. Thus the word 'Karma' covers two distinct ideas ; namely, the deed itself, and the effects of that deed in modifying the subsequent character and fortunes of the doer.

CHAPTER 1

REVERENCE FOR THE SCRIPTURES.

Each of the great religious systems has its own Scriptures. Its followers implicitly believe them to be the highest authority with regard to the ultimate truths of Religion. Philosophical thinkers have attempted to supply a rational basis of this belief. They have adduced various kinds of arguments to prove that the words of the scriptures (believed by them) are much more authoritative than sense-perception and inference based upon it, so far as the transcendental religious truths are concerned. Thus they assert that we can safely rely on them for the attainment of true knowledge about those truths.

The following are the reasons which the advocates of different religious systems adduce for the acceptance of scriptural authority with regard to religious truths:—

(a) According to one school of thinkers, scriptural authority cannot be questioned because the scriptures are either written by those who have realised Truth in the supra-normal state called 'Samādhi' (deep meditation and perfect absorption of thought), or they are the faithful records of the utterances of those who have intuited Truth during 'Samādhi'. In 'Samādhi', truths appear direct to the pure understanding without the medium of the senses and arguments.

(b) Others maintain that the scriptures are the direct or indirect productions of omniscient human beings, and not the work of those who are merely adepts in the practice of 'samādhi'; hence the scriptures are to be revered.

(c) Another set of thinkers hold that the scriptures should be recognised as faultless, because they are the productions of omniscient God. They believe that the final solution of the problems of religion does not lie within the competency of the finite human understanding, but is revealed to man by God Himself or by God through His chosen prophets or messengers or 'Riṣis'. The existence of God, His true character, His relation to man and the world, the nature of the soul, the highest end of human life, the most suitable means to the realisation of this end, etc. are all knowable only on the unquestionable authority of Revelation, which is embodied in the scriptures.

(d) Others* hold that the scriptures are independent of all agencies, human or Divine. According to them, the doctrines embodied in the scriptures are valid by their own rights, and these truths only revealed themselves to man. In the human society they have passed from generation to generation, from preceptors to disciples without any break. We can discover no beginning of this process and hence the Vedas which are the linguistic embodiments of these truths are to be regarded as eternal and without any authorship (अपौरुषेय).

* Pūrva – Mīmāṃsaka

CHAPTER II

FAITH IN SUPERNATURAL POWER.

This faith in Supernatural Power, though common to all systems of Religion, has assumed different forms among different religious sects. According to some, there is one ultimate supernatural Power creating and governing the world and He is an omnipotent and omniscient Personal Being. According to others, the ultimate Supernatural Being is impersonal and He is in some mysterious way the ultimate cause of the universe.

There are systems according to which the world-process is not the product of any ultimate supernatural Being, but still the existence of such a Being is admitted and He is conceived as the highest object of worship. According to this view, God (all-knowing Person *सर्वज्ञविशेष*) is not the agent or cause of the universe, but is the eternal ideal and object of worship of the seekers after Truth. There are other systems again in which one such Supreme Being (God) is not admitted either as the cause of the world or as the object of worship, but the existence of a plurality of 'Devatās' (deities) is admitted.* There are others again who believe in the existence of God

* The nature of the Devatās has been conceived in different ways by different religious schools. According to some, the Devatās are supernatural powers presiding over the different departments of nature and having influence upon human destinies. According to others, they are supernatural personal beings possessing definite bodily forms and having extraordinary powers over the affairs of the world. According to others again (*Pūrvamīmāṃsaka*), they have no definite bodily forms but are the conceptual embodiments of the Vedic Mantras.

as well as a plurality of deities who are regarded as subordinate to Him. There are still others who believe in the existence of an order of supermen possessing omniscience and supernatural powers. These, however, have no special significance in the explanation of the world-system, which is accounted for by reference to the material atoms which are governed by physical and moral laws.

Let us now expound in brief the grounds, which have led the first two sets of systems mentioned above, to the belief in the causality of one such Supreme Being, namely God.

By a careful consideration of the nature of agents or causes, it can be established that they can be divided into three groups:— (1) agents who are different from the effects they produce; (2) agents who are different as well as non-different from the effects they produce and (3) agents who are neither different, nor non-different, nor different as well as non-different from the effects they produce. Even the same agent may come under all of these three groups in relation to different effects he produces. The above classification of agents, being not a classification of agents as mere agents, but in their relation to the various effects they produce, it is impossible to characterize one agent as belonging to one of the above three groups, exclusive of the remaining two.

Let us illustrate the point. An agent may be quite different from the effect he produces, as in the case of the potter, the maker of pots. Here the potter is conceived as the mere efficient cause of the pot. An agent may be not wholly detached from the effects he produces, and consequently these effects are different as well as non-different from him, as in the case of the individual living being (जीव) who causes joy, sorrow and the like in himself. Here the

agent is both the efficient and material cause of the effect. Again, an agent may not be really modified by the effects he produces, as is the case with a person in dream. In dream, the dreamer does not journey forth to see the dream-objects, nor do the dream-objects enter into the dreamer from without, nor are they inferred or remembered; but they are perceived, being produced at the time of their perception. These effects are inexplicable; that is, they cannot be maintained to be different, non-different or different as well as non-different from the agent. Here though the agent is both the efficient and the material cause of the effect, the causal relation is only apparent, because the effect appears and disappears without producing any real change in the nature of the so-called agent.

When God is regarded as the cause of the world, He is unavoidably conceived as an agent of any of these three types. If God is taken as an agent of the first type, then He is merely the efficient cause of the world, and His relation with the world is necessarily one of difference. In case He is looked upon as an agent of the second kind, He is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. The world is accordingly conceived as His manifestation, which is different as well as non-different from Him. In case He is regarded as an agent of the third type, He would be taken as the apparent efficient and material cause of the universe. He is then conceived as the unmodified substratum of the universe, and the universe as inexplicably appearing in Him and being neither different nor non-different from Him. In the succeeding sections we shall try to establish these three different conceptions of God.

SECTION I

The Theory of God as the Efficient cause and atoms as the material cause of the world.*

To prove God as merely the efficient cause of the world, it has to be demonstrated that effects are produced from some material cause which is governed and regulated by one Omniscient Omnipotent Conscious Being different from the material cause and its effects. Now, to find out the nature of the material cause the analysis of the nature of causality is needed.

(a) The Theory of Non-existent effect (असत्कार्यवाद).

In order to ascertain what relation there is between the cause (material) and the effect, it has to be determined whether the cause contains the effect in its implicit form or the effect is a new thing altogether; in other words, whether the effect did or did not exist in any form before its production and whether it will or will not exist in any form after its destruction. To be assured of this, we have to depend on observation, analysis and inference. The thing produced may be thought of as being either as existent or as non-existent before its production or as both existent and non-existent or different from these three, or different even from these four. Of these, the third alternative is not tenable because the existent and the non-existent have contradictory attributes. It can in no way be possible that what is existent is non-existent, nor that both these are non-different. The theory that the effect is neither existent nor non-existent but is inexplicable in-

* Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika View.

volves contradiction. Though the affirmation of both existence and non-existence and the denial of both existence and non-existence are nowhere to be found, still the affirmation of existence is the denial of non-existence and the affirmation of non-existence is the denial of existence, hence when both are denied, there is contradiction. The view viz. the effect does not come under the four categories mentioned above, contradicts experience. So there cannot be such an effect. Nor can the nature of such an effect be proved. That whose nature cannot be proved must be a non-entity.

Now the doctrine of existent effect and that of non-existent effect remain to be considered. Of these the doctrine of the existent effect i. e. the view that the effect remains in the material cause before its production is unsound. When we observe the objects which are causally related, we find that before the origination of the effect the cause alone exists, and the presence of the effect cannot be traced in it. It is by the perception of the specific characteristics of an object that its presence can be detected. But before an effect is actually produced from a cause, we perceive no such characteristics, on the ground of which we can assert that the effect is present in any form in the cause. What we actually experience is that what was absent before has come into being from the cause which was existent from beforehand. Hence we conclude that the effect is non-existent in the cause before its production. Here non-existence is not the reason for production, but because there is no production of the existent, it is said that the non-existent is produced. Besides, up till the production of the effect, the 'prior negation' (प्रागभाव) of the effect is perceived. So it has to be admitted that at that time the effect was non-existent in the cause. Because the truth of this conclusion has become

established by perception, no conclusion inconsistent with it can be proved by inference. No inference which is contradictory to perception can be accepted as a proof. Since before the effects are produced, the prior negations of different effects are present in different causes, particular causes produce particular effects, and everything is not produced from everything. So the recognition of the view that the effect is, before its production, existent, is not necessary, but the theory of non-existent effect is to be accepted. The meaning of the non-existent effect is not that what is non-existent is effected, but that what is effected was non-existent.

(b) Inherence.

From the above we gather that what is an effect is non-existent in the cause before its production, and it becomes non-existent again after its destruction. So it should be asserted that the effect is a new thing altogether, and that the cause and the effect are distinct. But we experience that so long as the effect abides, it is not capable of separation from the material cause. To explain this inseparableness between two distinct entities, some intimate union has to be admitted. This is called the relation of *Inherence* (समवाय). This explains the co-existence (सामानाधिकरण्य) between the cause and the effect and also the cognition namely that the effect abides in the cause (विशिष्टप्रतीति). This is not due to the relation of Conjunction. The experience of conjunction and that of Inherence differ in an important point : the former refers to the external meeting of two distinct entities, the latter to the internal correlativity of two inseparables. The only difference between ordinary relationship and Inherence is this : It is after it is produced that the fire becomes related to the ball of iron ; while in the case of Inherence, it is during the process of

production that one thing becomes related to the other by the peculiar nature of the potency of its cause ; *e. g.* in the case of the action of cutting and the object cut. This Inherence should be taken as a different category from the terms it relates, because it gives rise to the idea that 'this subsists in that,' in regard to all the other five categories ; and as such it cannot but be regarded as something different from these latter.*

* According to this theory, the world-system can be interpreted in terms of two kinds of categories (classes of entities पदार्थ) namely positive and negative. Of these, the positive categories, which are altogether distinct from each other, are six in number, viz. substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), action or movement (कर्म), genus or universality (जाति=सामान्य generality), inherence (सम्बन्ध) and speciality (particularity विशेष=ultimate differentia). Substance has qualities and movement, and is the immediate basis of phenomena. Substance is of nine kinds—the five 'bhūtas' (called Earth, Water, Heat, Air and Ākāsha,) time, space, self and 'manas'. Time and space are all-pervading and eternal. Self is an all-pervading substance having the quality of knowledge. 'Manas' is the inner organ which links the self and the senses. It is non-pervading or atomic. Substance is divided into eternal and non-eternal. The substance having parts is non-eternal and the partless substance is eternal. The atoms of the four 'bhūtas' are eternal and the effects are non-eternal. Ākāsha, time, space, self and manas also are eternal substances.

Quality is of twenty-four kinds. They are dependent on and quite distinct from substance. Of these, number, measure (dimension), separateness (severality), conjunction, disjunction, heaviness (gravity), generated fluidity, remoteness (posteriority) and proximity (priority)—these are general qualities (common to more than one substance). Colour, taste (savour), odour, tangibility or touch (together with temperature), vicidity, natural fluidity (*e. g.* that of water), intelligence (knowledge), happiness (pleasure), sorrow (pain), desire, resentment (aversion), effort, virtue (merit), vice (demerit), *Samskāra* (manifesting itself in three ways, as continuance of movement in obedience to a given impulse, elasticity and memory) and sound—are the specific qualities (the qualities which do not remain in substances of different kinds and are cognizable through one sense).

The mutual dependence or mutual particularisation of two related terms is the relation between them, and because the relation cannot be regarded as any of the related terms it must be thought of as different from each of them. Though the terms and the relation are determined as mutually dependent, still they are conceptually distinct. If they were not so, then this dependence would signify nothing, nor could there be the possibility of the determination of anything. So inherence, while never becoming one with any of the related terms, stand for a relation between them. Hence, inherence, by not being dependent on any other relation, relates inseparably together such distinct entities as substance and quality, cause and effect, etc. Inherence is not the maker of a relation, but it is itself a relation. Wherever two entities inseparably connected are determined by direct perception or inference, there the inalienable and non-accidental relation between them is observed. This proves the efficacy of recognising inherence as something different from the things related. Without recognising this relation, the inseparableness or mutual dependence, such as between substance and attribute, cause and effect, cannot be explained. The inherence does not come into being in order to make two non-related things related; it is because this relation is

Action is of five kinds, viz. throwing upwards, throwing down, contraction, extending and going. Genus is of two kinds, being more and less extensive. Inherence is one. The relation expressed by Inherence subsists, for example, between the whole and its parts, the genus and the species, between a thing and its properties, between movement and that which is moved. Speciality resides in eternal substances and is innumerable. By virtue of it the speciality of atoms renders possible formation of the universe. Negation is of four kinds—prior negation (non-existence of the effect before its production) posterior non-existence (destruction), absolute negation and mutual negation (difference = reciprocal non-existence).

always present that by dint of it the cause and its effect, the substance and its quality, become united by a bond of inseparable union. The inherence, as a relation, is eternal. It does not mean that the two particular things, sharing the cause-effect-relation, are eternal; but their relation is eternal. It further means that the cause-effect-relation is natural and not produced by each other. If the substance and the attribute, or the cause and the effect were first separately existent and then became related or united by the relation of inherence, then alone their inherence could be called produced. Moreover, there is no operation of the cause for the production of inherence; so inherence is eternal. Everywhere the experience of inherence is of uniform nature, hence it is one. Parsimony of hypothesis (लाघव) also demands the recognition of its oneness.

By the above discussion, it is established that the effect is non-existent before production and after destruction; and during its existence, it is distinct from the cause and is related to the same by inherence which is also distinct from both the terms related.

(c) Universal genus of 'being' (existence)

We have found that things non-existent before production become existent after being produced from the cause, and existent things become non-existent by being destroyed. Hence existence and non-existence should be taken as attributes of things. As different things (substance, quality and action) become known uniformly as 'existent', and as there is no difference in the various notions of 'being,' existence or being must be regarded as a general attribute. Though substance, quality and action are different categories, still they are pervaded by the one attribute of 'existence', so existence is the genus

like manhood pervading all human beings. As existence serves to bring about only the inclusive notion and not notions of exclusion, it must be regarded as genus only, and not as an individuality. Without the acceptance of another separate category namely genus, there cannot arise the knowledge of uniform nature in manifold things. *Existence* must be accepted as objectively and eternally real, because the individuals of the past, present and future which are non-existent before their production, become existent by being related to it and it is cognised as something outside of ourselves. *Existence* pervades substance, quality and action through direct relation and pervades other categories through indirect relation. As inherence is one, it cannot have generality. If there is but one object, there can be no class, so existence cannot remain in inherence directly. And if further generality is admitted in generality and so on, then there will be no finality (अनवस्था). So existence cannot remain in a less pervasive genus. There is existence in substance, quality and action. They have in them also their respective genus and thus through their common support, existence and these genera come to be related. So they appear as existent. Because everywhere existence is perceived as the same and there is no proof about its manifoldness, and also for the sake of parsimony of hypothesis, *existence* should be looked upon as one. Though different from those in which it inheres, it does not appear independently as isolated from them nor does it appear with them as a distinct entity, but manifests itself in them inseparably. This inseparableness is due to inherence.

(d) Effect Defined.

Thus according to this theory, production (the property of being an effect) means (1) being in the relation of

inherence with the cause (कारणसमवाय); (2) being in the relation of inherence with the all-pervading genus called existence (सत्तासमवाय); (3) being the counter-entity of its prior negation (प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्व); i. e. to be the entity the previous absence of which was in the cause; the pot is the counterpart of its antecedent non-existence; and (4) temporal relation as specified in the first moment (आद्यक्षणसम्बन्ध)

(e) Atomic Theory

Now about the atomic theory. This theory recognises that many atoms by being conjoined become the producers in them of effects which are different from themselves. Let us prove this. It has been shown that the non-existent effects arise out of the existent causes. There cannot be the identity of the existent and the non-existent, hence the effect cannot be different as well as non-different from the cause, but the effects are altogether different from their causes. The material cause having not left its own nature becomes the producer in itself of effects which are absolutely different from it. The experience of distinctions in point of nature, capacity, efficiency, time, form and number between cause and effect proves their difference. Now, in our experience we find that the parts by being combined form the whole which is a new entity. It is observed that the substances with parts, namely the cloth etc., are produced by substances like threads through their conjunction. The cloth is a whole, threads are its parts. Again, the thread is in its turn a whole and fibres are its parts. The fibre, in its turn, is a whole, it has got its own parts. If we never could come to last parts, we could not conceive the idea of the whole, and so the whole would be dissolved into nothing. Where this division of the part and the whole comes to an end and any further division becomes impossible, there remains the indivisible, the

furthest limit of division. This is called the atom. If such atoms be not recognised, then the difference of measure between big and small things cannot be accounted for. This difference is caused by the smaller and larger number of parts ; number gives increase in size. So if the division of their parts be not accepted as having ended somewhere, then each one would have an infinite number of parts, and owing to this the greater or less dimension of parts would not be ascertained ; in that case all objects should be regarded as having the same magnitude. But if the division of parts reaches its limit somewhere, then the number of parts of the small thing is ascertained to be less than that of the big thing. This explains the difference of measure. This utmost limit of the possibility of division gives the conception of an atom, which therefore is an indivisible partless particle of an elementary substance (*bhuta*). As it is partless, it is without any material cause. Hence it is indestructible. The destruction of the effect-substance can be due either to the separation of its parts from one another or the arrangement of the parts in a different way or the destruction of the parts. If atoms are taken to be effects of any cause, then there would be an infinite regression, (अनवस्था), and no account could be given for creation and dissolution (मल्य). These ultimate material atoms are of four kinds. In accordance with the rule that the attributes, inherent in the material cause, produce in effects other attributes of the like nature, we can infer from the observation of the four classes of elementary material bodies with four kinds of specific attributes, viz. colour, touch, odour and taste, that there must be four classes of atomic substances having respectively these four kinds of qualities.*

* Among the five attributes of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound, the four attributes of colour etc. are respectively inherent in

By previous reasonings it has been shown that the partless atoms must be accepted as the ultimate material substances, by whose conjunctions all material effects are produced. Hence the possibility of the conjunction of two atoms must also be accepted; because without conjunction of the parts there cannot be the production of any whole. By the conjunction of two atoms, a separate substance which is different from the two atoms is originated. By a mere conglomeration (संघात) of imperceptible atoms (which are without magnitude and non-spatial) the production of the perceptible effects like pots etc. cannot be explained. But on the ground of experience the possibility of the production of a separate effect with attributes different from those of the conjoining causes must be admitted. Thus the production of a separate substance by the combination of two atoms is quite admissible. This substance produced from two primary atoms conjoined is the first produced whole. It is still minute (अणु) for it is without magnitude. Afterwards through the conjunction of three such double-atoms (द्व्याणुक binary), triple atoms (त्रयाणु triad) are produced. The number-two which belongs to two atoms produces

luminous matter called Tejah, watery or liquid matter called Ap (अप) odoriferous matter called Prithivi (पृथ्वी or solid) and volatile matter called Vāyu (वायु or gaseous). Sound is taken by the protagonists of the above theory as being inherent in Ākāsha (cosmic ether). Sound is the characteristic (specific) quality of the ether, which is the medium of the undulations. These four kinds of the material bodies are as effects non-eternal and the four kinds of atoms which are their ultimate parts and material causes are eternal. But with regard to the fifth element namely Ākāsha, they hold, that it has no atomic parts and it is all-pervading and eternal. As sound is produced everywhere, its inherent cause namely Ākāsha, is all-pervading. It is one, motionless, infinite and continuous substance. There is no proof of its having any part, so Ākāsha is not atomic; therefore it is eternal like space and time and does not inhere in any substance.

in dual-atoms the quantity of smallness and shortness. The number of plurality in those atoms produces the quantity of bigness and length. As the effect of many-ness (बहुत्व) in dual-atoms there is bigness (महत्त्व) in triple atoms. Triple atoms are the first among gross substances which are produced, so they are perceptible. In this way (substance gives birth to substance; attribute produces attribute) gradually gross, grosser and grossest wholes (अवयवी) are produced. The entire material world of effects is in this process produced from the innumerable material atoms, which thus constitute its material (inhering) cause.*

* " The cosmogony of the Vaisesika system depends upon its theory of the atoms. It is also dominated by the wide-spread Indian conception, that periods of creation and destruction of the universe follow one another in regular order; and on each occasion the evolution and decay of the universe are effected in the same way and by the same causes...

During the period of dissolution, by which, however, the three infinitely great and therefore eternal and unchanging substances, ether, space, and time, are unaffected, no combination of the four elements of gross matter takes place, nor any union between the numberless individual souls and the atoms. But the souls retain their merit and demerit in a latent condition in the shape of dispositions. When the retributive force of merit and demerit with all its inevitable consequences, which here also, just as in the other systems of Indian Philosophy, is the power that urges the universe on its course, is again aroused, the period of dissolution comes at once to an end. The souls therefore unite afresh with the atoms; and by this means a movement is started in the atomic elements which marks the beginning of a new creation of the material universe. This movement first originates in the atoms of the air, giving rise to double atoms, and through them to the gross material air which rushes forth and fills space. Thereupon within the elements of air the atoms of water combine together, whence in the same way the great ocean of the universe is produced. Within this ocean again the earth atoms come together, and form after the rise of double and triple atoms the solid mass of the firm earth. Finally, the element of fire comes into being, its atoms also

Having shown the effect-world, its material cause and the nature of the relation between them, let us turn to prove the efficient cause of the effect-world.

The Prime Efficient Cause-God

Wherever there is the quality or nature of being an effect (कार्यत्व), there is the characteristic of being produced by a doer or maker (कर्तृजन्यत्व). Owing to this invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति), it is possible to infer the doer of the

combining in the same way within the water. Its origin is effected within the water, which in a certain sense represents the guard that restrains the destructive force of the fiery element, in order that its destroying power may be prevented from interfering with the organic course of the evolution of the universe. After the material universe has thus come into being, empirical existence begins afresh for the souls. These unite with bodies in accordance with the consequences of their work, still unexhausted from the preceding world-cycle; and in a new series of existences heap up for themselves merit and guilt, and earn reward and punishment until the cycle comes to an end....

The process of the dissolution of the universe goes on, then, in the following manner. The affections disappear which are evoked by the action of merit and demerit in the individual souls, and which form the bond between body, the senses, and the external world. The motive force therefore is restrained which maintains the cycle of existence. The bond is consequently broken which exists by the power of merit and demerit between the material atoms and individual souls. The four atomic elements are now dissolved in regular succession, the earth in water, the water in fire, the fire in air. The process of the dissolution of the atomic elements is effected in the reverse order to that of the formation of the material products from the atoms, affecting first the triple atoms, and after their destruction, when only double atoms remain, seizing in turn upon these, so that finally each of the four elements maintains its existence in the form of isolated atoms."

(R. Garbe's "Vaiśeṣika"—Taken from *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* Vol. 12.)

earth etc., on the strength of the logical ground or the middle term (हेतु), namely the quality of being an effect. In other words, what is an effect (कार्य) is necessarily produced by a doer (कर्त्ता); hence the doer of the earth etc., is inferred. That doer must be the eternal omniscient omnipotent God.

To explain :—We find that the doer of an effect possesses direct knowledge about the material cause and knows beforehand that such an effect can be produced from such a cause; and also he has the will to create the pre-conceived effect from that cause and makes efforts for its production. Now in the present case the doer of the world must be conceived as possessed of the direct knowledge of atoms and the definite idea of the world that should be produced from them, and as endowed with such will and effort, as may be required for the production of this vast complicated world out of those atoms. But the knowledge of these supersensuous innumerable materials and of the enormously vast world with countless varieties of objects, and of the plan and process of their production, and also the power of will and effort necessary for bringing about their production, are not possible for any human being, however extraordinarily wise and powerful he may be. Moreover, before the actual production of the world the existence of any created being is out of the question. Thus an all-knowing, almighty, eternal and self-existent Agent must be recognised. He must be bodiless and His knowledge, will and effort must be eternal and without any limit. Whoever is embodied falls into the category of effect, and his knowledge, will and effort must be non-eternal and limited. Thus the necessity of recognising the eternally self-existent, omnipotent and omniscient, bodiless but active God as the efficient cause of the world is established.

would be no rule with regard to the cause-effect-relation of entities. In that case anything could be produced from anything without any regularity, and no anticipation or prediction could be made as to what effect should follow from what cause. For example, the pot could not in that case be uniformly expected to be produced from the earth, or the golden ornament from gold. To avoid this disorder, it has to be admitted that before production also, the particular effect remains in some way related with the particular cause. But this relation cannot be conceived as possible, unless both the cause and the effect are existent, though the effect may not be present in the form in which it appears after what is called its production. There can possibly be no relation between two entities, one of which is existent and the other is not. Moreover, the conception of an entity being a cause implies even to the most ordinary understanding that it has the potency to produce some effect. Here it may be asked, is the potency or the productive energy of the cause to be supposed as present indefinitely without any reference whatsoever to any particular effects, or is it to be regarded as related to particular effects, that may possibly be produced from it? If the first alternative be accepted, then there would be disorder, there being no order as to what would be produced from what. If the second alternative is granted, then the theory of the Pre-existent-effect should be recognised.

Hence, though we cannot actually perceive the effect in the cause before its production, it is a logical necessity to admit that the effect is in some way existent in the nature of the cause, even before it appears with its perceptible forms and attributes through the process of production. How then can we reconcile this conception of the Pre-existence of the effect with the absence of its perception and

the efficacy of production ? This is the question we have to discuss next.

(b) Relation between Cause and Effect.

According to this theory, the effect exists before production in the cause in an unmanifested state. That is to say, its special features and attributes, as we notice them after production, remain undifferentiated and hence unified with those of the cause before production. Accordingly at that stage its existence is veiled, potential and undetectable. Afterwards due to the operation of agencies, which act as efficient causes, that veil which obstructed its manifestation is removed and the effect becomes actually and perceptibly manifested. Its distinguishing features and attributes are then differentiated and exhibited, and it becomes an actual effect. When the effect is destroyed, it goes back to its cause, its distinguishing features and attributes disappear, and it remains in the unmanifested state again. During its existence as a distinct entity also, it is not dissociated from its material cause. Though differentiated, still it remains essentially related to, inseparable from and identified with the cause. Hence the effect, so far as its essence is concerned, is identical with the cause from which it comes forth. Thus the effect is nothing but the actual manifestation of the cause in a form in which it had the potentiality to manifest itself. So the cause should be taken as modifying itself into the effect, and the effect should be regarded as the modification of the cause. Modification (परिणाम) means the sequence of one phase of an object by another and implies the identity of the object inspite of the variation of its aspects. Hence, the effect is only an aspect or a mode of its material cause. Therefore the relation between the cause and the effect is difference-non-difference. Where there is absolute difference there is no notion of inseparable-

co-existence (सामानाधिकरण्य), and where there is absolute non-difference, there also no such cognition takes place. So if the effect were not both different as well as non-different from the cause, they would not be inseparably co-existent. This difference-non-difference may be taken mainly in three senses :—(1) the difference (negation of non-difference) of the cause and the effect is their essence (स्वरूप) and the non-difference of them is their relation of identity. (2) The difference of the cause and the effect is their essential positive quality and their non-difference implies the absence of absolute difference between them. (3) Both difference and non-difference are the essential qualities of the cause and the effect and are equally positive in character like colour and taste. Difference and non-difference are not contradictory because they do not belong to the very same aspect, but to different aspects of the cause and the effect. Effect is non-different from the cause with regard to substance and it is different from it with regard to specific features or particularisations.

(c) Prakriti as Modified Cause.

From the analysis of the nature of the relation between cause and effect, it is evident that the effects, before their production, are present in the cause in the potential or unmanifested state, that in production the cause modifies itself into the diversities of those effects, which were potentially present in it, and that the diverse effects, when produced, though differentiated from one another and from the cause in respect of their forms and attributes, are still inseparably related to and identified with it in respect of their substance. Hence when from the nature of effects we are required to infer the nature of their cause, we have to bear these requirements of causality in mind.

When we are to infer the cause of this vast world of diverse effects we should conceive the nature of the cause in such a way as to fulfil these conditions. Where there are inseparable connections among the effects, there must be unity in their cause. The diversities of the world, though having various points of difference, are interconnected. These differences are limited and measurable, and not absolute and unmeasurable. Their inter-relations and inter-actions imply their underlying unity. In the absence of such a unity, the bewildering diversities of effects could not have formed a unitary world-system, just as in the absence of an underlying principle of unity, the root, the trunk, the branches, the leaves and the fruits, inspite of their differences, could not have constituted one whole tree. Hence the ultimate material cause of the world must be conceived as one Entity, which can have the potentiality of all the diversities of the world within itself and which is capable of modifying itself through progressive stages into all these diversities. Moreover, the effects which are pervaded by one general characteristic are found to be the outcome of one material cause which contains the same element as its effects. For example, gold is the cause of various ornaments and contains the same element as the ornaments do. In other words, effects are pervaded by the nature of their material cause.

According to this principle, if we can discover some universal character in the entire mental and physical world, this must be present in the subtle state in its ultimate material cause. By analysis of all material objects and mental faculties, it is found that the properties of inertia, activity and self-manifestation are present everywhere. Everything has naturally a tendency to remain in the state in which it is. At the same time everything has a tendency to move or act or change for the manifestation of what

is latent in it, — for the realisation of its potentiality. Everything has also the state of self-manifestation, — becoming what it was capable of becoming. (Inertia, lethargy, indifference, conservation, etc., are all the different forms in which the property of inertia is found to exist in the physical and mental world. Movement, change, forwardness, sorrow, restlessness, reformism etc., are the various forms in which the property of activity appears. Similarly, realisedness, manifestedness, calmness, fulfilment, enjoyment, etc., are the various forms in which the property of self-manifestation is found). These three properties are found to be combined with each other in all objects. They are found in different degrees of predominance in different objects. These three are called Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. Since these three elements being combined constitute the universal character of every object, gross or subtle, material or mental, they must constitute the nature of the ultimate material cause also. As Sattva, Rajas and Tamas have a place in all products, it is a necessary inference, from the principle that the product is simply the material cause in a definite stage of evolution, that they must have already existed in that first cause. It is through the unequal combinations of these three elements that the divergences of effects, which are the modifications of the ultimate cause, take place. In the ultimate cause they should have equal combination, so that it would be a state of complete unmanifestation.

Thus it is concluded that the ultimate cause of the world is an entity which is constituted of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, combined in equal proportion, and which is therefore the potential state of the entire diversified world.

Moreover, activity is always seen to arise from some power. Power means the unmanifested state of the effect.

which is yet to manifest itself and there cannot be power without a support, the support of its power is established as unmanifest.

From this analysis of the nature of cause it can be inferred that the ultimate cause of the world must be of the nature of Power or Energy, in which all things exist in the unmanifested state, and nothing has yet been manifested.

Thus in accordance with this line of thinking we come to the conclusion, that the ultimate material cause of the world must be one undifferentiated unmanifested self-existent Energy, which has the inexhaustible store of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas equally combined with each other in its nature, in which the entire world exists in the potential state, and which modifies itself in progressive stages into the vast diversified world of mental and material objects. This is the conception of Prakriti.

The purport of the above we may put in another way. Prakriti as the ultimate cause of the world can be proved on the following five grounds :— (1) all effects are the manifestations of their subtle state which is nothing but an energy (शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेः), (2) there is the manifestation of all effects from their cause (कारणकार्यविभागात्), (3) at the time of dissolution all effects become merged in their cause (अविभागाद्वैश्वरूपस्य), (4) all effects are limited (परिमाणात्) and (5) the different effects are experienced as having the same nature (समन्वयात्).

Let us elucidate the fifth reasoning. Here we infer the nature of Prakriti as constituted of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas on the ground that all the objects of the world have these three constituents in common.

Sattva, Rajas and Tamas can be variously interpreted. We have given one interpretation of them in the preceding exposition. Here we should take up another interpretation, namely, that they mean pleasure, pain and stupor respectively. These three can be taken subjectively as well as objectively. Pleasure, pain and stupor not only exist as subjective and individual experiences, but have their objectively real correlatives in the external world. As they are found to be present in all the diversities of effects constituting the world, they can be inferred to be the constituents of its ultimate cause namely Prakriti, where they exist in a subtle form and in equilibrium.

It may be objected that pleasure, pain and stupor are mental states, and they cannot be accepted as the constituents of the material things. But this objection is not sound. The faculties of experience and the objects of experience cannot be made of essentially different constituents. If they were of different stuff, there could be no relation between them. The sense of seeing and that which is seen must be of the same essence. We can know that we have got the sense of seeing, because colours are seen by us; and we can know that colours exist, because we see them. Thus the sense of seeing and the colours are so constituted that one cannot be conceived except in terms of the other. This implies that they must be of the same essence. That is the case with all special senses and their objects.

Now, what we call the subjective faculties and the objective materials are all really belonging to the category of 'objects' or *drīṣya* with reference to the conscious selves *puruṣa*, which alone are the ultimate subjects or seers *draṣṭri*. All these mental and material objects appear before the selves as agreeable *iṣṭa*, disagreeable *aniṣṭa* and as stupefying (i. e. as producing a sense of stupor, in

which agreeableness and disagreeableness cannot be discriminated). It is because the conscious-self receives them as agreeable, disagreeable or stupefying, that they can be illuminated and evolved and can play their parts in the presence of this self. If they are not so received, they are as good as nothing to it. This is true of the subjective faculties as well as the objective materials, though the latter are received through the former and their agreeableness, disagreeableness and stupefyingness also become exhibited through their relation to the former. Hence it is legitimately inferred that agreeableness, disagreeableness and stupefyingness are the universal essential characteristics of all that constitute the objective world, consisting of the subjective faculties as well as their objects. They are called *sukha* (pleasure), *dukkha* (pain), *moha* (stupor). These three positive elements which are irreducible to one another, being present in the nature of all effects, presuppose their presence in a subtle and unmanifested form in the ultimate material cause. Therefore the ultimate cause namely Prakriti must have these three constituents in its nature. Prakriti, in spite of its unity and indivisibility, is composed of three different substances, termed *gunas*.

It may be asked why 'Prakriti' is accepted as the prime material cause, and not atoms. According to the doctrine of pre-existence of the effect, the effect present in the unmanifested state in the cause comes out in production, and again, when destroyed, passes into the same unmanifested condition. This is what is meant by production and destruction of the effect. But the gross world beginning from dual-atoms and ending in the grossest possible things can neither abide in nor enter into individual atoms in unmanifested form. So the atoms cannot be the said cause. Because of the measured character of the world beginning

from the empirical cosmic intelligence (महत्तत्त्व) to earth, its entrance into its material cause can be explained only if Prakriti, and not the atoms, is taken as the prime material cause. Besides, because there is the identity of the effect in its cause, Prakriti should be recognised as the cause. The effect cannot have their identity in the atoms. Besides, intelligence and the like require power to produce their own effects, and this power is nothing but the identity of Prakriti in intelligence and the like. Besides, the effect issues out of the cause, that is, the cause is the unmanifest state of the effect. Because the effects abide in the cause by entering into it, so the cause whence all effects issue is Prakriti which is unmanifest in nature.

(d) Cosmogony.

From 'Prakriti' evolves *Mahat* (महत्तत्त्व), the empirical unindividuated cosmic consciousness. It is the empirical consciousness which is the first or most fundamental, and, therefore, the most pervasive of evolutes. From the unindividuated consciousness evolves the individuated self-consciousness or Ego (*Ahamkāra* अहं)-the dynamic ego or the ego in ceaseless mutation. This Ego evolves the *Tanmātras* (elements which have reached the absolute limit of simplicity as such), the cognitive senses, senses of action and 'manas'. From *Tanmātras* or five subtle elements (non-particularised sound, touch, colour, taste and smell) are evolved five *Mahābhūtas* or gross elements having particularised sound, touch and the like.*

* (a) "The common acceptance of these terms is misleading as it has led to the identification of the *mahābhūtas* with the most striking things in the world, viz., ethereal space, the aerial regions, fire, water and earth. But ether is not composed of sounds, or air of thermal variations or the earth of odours. In fact, every attempt to understand the nature of the Sāṃkhya elements must fail unless the

The necessity of recognising God as the efficient cause established.

Among those who adhere to the theory of pre-existent effect and trace the source of the world to an unmanifested

student bears steadily in mind that it is the world of experience that is analysed and that introspection is the method employed for the purpose.

It may be objected that this study of perceptual experience ignores weight and impenetrability and the geometrical properties of material things. But shape, magnitude and position are given according to Sāṃkhya with colour and with thermal sensation through touch in so far as these are limited or defined, though of course fuller notions are obtained by the use of the organs of action. And perceptions of weight and impenetrability are, as we have seen, so overlaid with subjective factors as to render them rather inexact source of information. Besides, whatever they yield of philosophical import may be had through the special senses as well, because it is about the contending principles of mutability and inertia, which appear also in varying degrees in colour, sound, etc. These principles come indeed, to the fore in pervasiveness, mobility, radiation, fluidity and hardness, and so they are regarded as additional expressions (*dvitiya rūpas*) of the elements. But special stress is needed on them only where the object is to discover the laws of motion and rest or to control the forces of nature, while for the purpose of philosophy the simpler conception of *mahābhūtas* is adequate. There is, however, no real surrender of concreteness in it, but only a shifting of emphasis in keeping with the scope of the enquiry. When the emphasis is laid on other features as they are so often in physical science and in our ordinary concerns, the same realities are called *vyavaharika bhūtas* or elements of practical life."

(Taken from Dr. Jajneswar Ghosh's Introduction to "The Sāṃkhya Sūtras of Paṇcasikha and other Ancient Sages"

(b) Let us show in short the difference in the division of categories accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas. The Vaiśeṣikas recognise four kinds of atoms (with odour, taste, colour and touch) as ultimate cause, whereas the Sāṃkhyas regard three varieties of eternal

Prakriti, there is one view* which holds that Prakriti manifests and evolves itself spontaneously into the world of

matter called 'Gunas' as ultimate cause. The Sāmkhyas do not accept the presence of the attribute of odour etc. and the generalities like earthness in Prakriti. Intelligence (*buddhi*) is taken by the Sāmkhyas as the material cause of 'ego' from which ('ego') are produced 'manas', the senses and five 'tanmātras'. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, intelligence (which is knowledge) is not the cause of any essence inner or outer rather it is produced through the conjunction of self with 'manas' and senses. Ego is nothing but a form of knowledge which is an attribute (non-eternal) of self. *Manas* is atomic hence eternal. So it does not require 'ego' for its cause. The five sense-organs (ज्ञानेन्द्रिय) are elemental; so their ultimate essences are five elements and not ego. The so-called senses of action (कर्मेन्द्रिय) are considered by the Vaiśeṣika as particular parts (अवयव) of body like other limbs (अङ्ग) so they are not senses. Now about Tanmātras. Tanmātras or fine elements (in Sāmkhya view) do not correspond to atoms (in Vaiśeṣika view) because these tanmātras are not indivisible, atomic and eternal. The Vaiśeṣikas think that among the five Tanmātra those which are eternal have no need of cause and those which are non-eternal have not also need for material cause, ('pariṇāma' as change of form is not recognised by them). The non-eternal tanmātras are produced in their own support in some cases through tanmātra of similar kind and in others through conjunction of heat. In all cases tanmātras are without material cause and are supported in something else (by the relation of inherence. The inherent cause can be both of similar and dissimilar kinds from the effect, whereas material cause can only be of similar kind from the effect). According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the five elements are not produced from Tanmātra, but are the supports of sound and the like or their inherent cause.

The Sāmkhya division of categories is not like the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas acknowledge seven categories viz. Substance, quality, action, genus, particularity, inherence and negation. The Sāmkhyas partly accept the first three categories and discard altogether the other four. The Sāmkhyas do not take quality and action as absolutely distinct from substance but as modification or another form of sub-

*The Sāmkhya-View.

effects in the presence of innumerable changeless indifferent pure consciousnesses (Puruṣas or selves). It does not recognise any logical necessity for recognising one self-conscious efficient cause namely God for bringing out the effects out of that ultimate material cause. But others generally find it difficult to maintain how an unconscious entity like Prakṛiti can move and act and produce a system of effects without a conscious mover and regulator. If Prakṛiti is induced to act by the self, then the independence of Prakṛiti will be contradicted and there will be the loss of indifference and unchangeability on the part of Puruṣa. As the constituents of Prakṛiti are material in nature, they cannot of themselves act and thereby disturb their homogeneity leading to their inequality. In our experience we find that inertia is the property of matter and that it cannot spontaneously move or transform itself or regulate its movements and transformations without the operation of some conscious agent. On the ground of such observed concomitance between the modification of unconscious matter and operations of conscious agents, these philosophers establish the existence of God as the conscious agent determining the modification

stance. Of the nine substances the Sāṃkhyas recognise fire, earth, water, air, ākāśa, self and manas. Time and space are not taken as independent substances but as qualities of eternal matter regarded as a unity. In Vaiśeṣika view ākāśa is all-pervading and eternal. According to the theory of the Sāṃkhyas, ākāśa is an effect of tanmātra, it does not pervade its cause (the tanmātra of sound) and the cause of tanmātra (viz, ego, intelligence). According to the Sāṃkhyas, self is mere consciousness without attribute. The Vaiśeṣikas regard self as unconscious and endowed with attributes. Both take the self as eternal, all-pervading and many. The Sāṃkhyas consider the self as mere witness, whereas the Vaiśeṣikas do not accept any witness-consciousness at all.

of Prakriti and thus operating as the efficient cause of the world. Because Prakriti is unconscious it cannot have the power of freely producing its effects, nor can there be any design or purpose in the multifarious effects produced from it ; hence there must be some Being endowed with intelligence and will to manifest the world of effects out of the material cause and to produce a harmonious world-system with design and purpose.

APPENDIX A

The Problem of Change

"A careful and systematic study of the problem of change led in ancient India to the formulation of three broad theories viz. Ārambha Vāda (आरम्भवाद), Parināma Vāda (परिणामवाद) and Vivartta Vāda (विवर्तवाद).

The आरम्भवाद or the Doctrine of Origination (genesis) is the view of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika to whom the effect is entirely a different thing from the productive material.....the parts, by reason of combination, result in the formation of the *whole* which is a *new* entity, pure and simple.

· But what is the bearing of this doctrine on the problem of Change? The question is whether change is predicable of the whole (अवयवी) or of the ultimate particles or of both.

The Vaiśeṣika says that the particles change and that the resultant whole also consequently changes. This is of the nature of chemical change and is due to the influence of "tejas" (तेजः). The constant change going on in the world is in the end reducible to this type. In other words, if x represents the whole consisting of parts represented by, say, a, b, c and d , we might say that the change of a, b, c, d , into a', b', c', d' , by the assumption of new qualities would necessarily involve the destruction of x and of the origin of a new whole, called y (the atoms remain the same, but their qualities change). This theory therefore assumes a double series of change — one in the parts and one in the whole. But why does a &c. change into a' , etc.? It is not natural, of course; for this would violate the postulate that no motion is inherent in a thing. To explain this change the Vaiśeṣika assumes the contact of a &c. with the particles of "tejas" which penetrate into the body by means of pores. (according to Vaiśeṣika, every substantial product is

porous and pervious), break the contact of the atoms and produce in them a change of qualities. The atoms, as thus changed, are united again and form a fresh whole. This "tejas" is not only what we ordinarily call fire. It is ultimately the Solar Energy which therefore stands at the root of all physical and chemical changes in the world.

But the Naiyāyika does not agree in this. He holds, against the Vaiśeṣika, the solidity of a substantial product and its impenetrability by heat particles which act upon the body as a whole and produce in it change of qualities. Thus though the substance is constant, from its origin till its destruction, it is subject to change so far as its qualities are concerned.

The Vedāntist does not admit with the Vaiśeṣika, that difference of size (परिमाण) is the cause of difference of substance; hence the *dharmi*, say, the jar, remaining the same, its former "rūpa" (रूप) is destroyed and is replaced by a new "rūpa"; similarly the animal organism remaining the same, its leanness (काश्य) is due to falling off (अपत्रय) of particles and its fatness (स्थौल्य) may be explained as due to accretion (उपचय) of new particles. Thus the body of A when one year old would be identical with his body in his 80th year, although there may be an entire change of particles and difference of size. In other words it is the *same* body in different states (अवस्था).

The problem of change has received a good deal of attention and careful treatment in the hands of Sāṅkhya and especially of Yoga. Parināma (परिणाम) means disappearance of one "dharma" followed by the appearance of another, within the same subject or *dharmi*. The word is used to indicate the process when it refers to the subject, and the result of this process when it refers to the predicate, *dharma*. In popular usage and in later literature this word is found synonymous with *Vikāra*.

This Parināma is threefold, according as it concerns *dharma* (धर्म), *lakṣana* (लक्षण) and *avasthā* (अवस्था). The definition of "parināma" given above is that of *dharma parināma*. *Lakṣanaparināma* is the name of the change in regard to *lakṣana* or time—sequence, i. e., past, present and future. The grammatical tenses correspond to this *parināma* in nature. The *lakṣana* too is not conceived as an ultimate unit and is further analysable into what we may call "avasthā" or states, viz. new or old. Each such state is supposed to be ultimate and momentary. This kind of *parināma* is not really expressible in language. This being the case the evolution of Nature may be supposed to consist of a series of such successive moments. In this ceaseless stream of *parināma* everything is being carried away from the future through the present into the past. But the future (अनागत) and the past (अतीत) being nothing but Unmanifest *Prakṛiti*, every *parināma* is a passage from the Unmanifest into manifestation and return into the Unmanifest. This represents a circle, of which one half, viz. passage from Unmanifest into manifestation, i. e. from the future into the present, stands for what is known as *viśvāśvarināma* and another half i. e. return from manifestation into the Unmanifest, i. e. from the present to the past for *sadvāśvarināma*. This is true of all the three kinds of *parināma*.

Thus the triple *parināma* represents a series of three circles not mutually exclusive but really concentric, "*dharma parināma*" being the outermost and the "*avasthā parināma*" the inmost of the group. But *dharma* and *avasthā* are relative concepts merely and are identical. The author of *Yoga-bhāṣya* (योगभाष्य) clearly states that the change of *dharma* in a *dharmi*, of *lakṣana* in a *dharmi* and of *avasthā* in a *lakṣana* is the same process, being characterised by modification of the substance and involving a transition of states (अवस्था). (Balarāma points out that the three *parināmas* are really cases of *avasthāparināma* or they are all to be labelled as *dharmāparināma*.)

since all the mutations are in the Dharmi as their permanent abode.)

This change is incessant and uncaused. It pervades the whole realm of Nature. It is said that nothing that is made of gunas is ever, even for a single moment, at rest and this for the simple reason that gunas are by nature fickle. Even in the state of Dissolution when the manifested Universe is resolved into Prakriti, this change or mutation still continues—this is सद्दश परिणाम. It is only Puruṣa or the Self which is truly immutable, being beyond Prakriti.

Now a dharma or state, unless it is present, must be either past or future; but in all these states the dharmi of which these are affirmed, is constant. A dharma is a particular Śakti pertaining to a substance and is inferred to exist in it from its action, viz. from the production of a particular effect. It is subject to mutation, but is never annihilated (cf. Conservation of energy). The present or उदित (actual) dharma is one which is described as “स्वव्यापारमनुभवन्” and “सव्यापार;” this is the object of our immediate consciousness, and is differentiated on the one hand from the past or शान्तधर्म which has ceased to be active (रुत्वा व्यापारानुपगतः) and on the other from the future (possible) or अव्यपदेश्य धर्म which has not yet commenced to operate. Of these dharmas the present only is felt as distinct (विशिष्ट) from Prakriti by reason of its manifest character, and one might say that this alone exists. And we know that the Buddhists actually denied the others. The past and the future dharmas are not directly known. The truth in the matter seems to be that these dharmas rest in Prakriti as in union with it and are not distinguishable, not only from one another but even as dharmas. Their essence is the essence of the Dharmi.

Hence it follows that the dharmas are two-fold, according as they are manifest (अभिव्यक्त) or unmanifest (अनभिव्यक्त) and the Dharmi is the substance which persists (अन्वयो) in them both and consists of a double nature viz. it is a सामान्य

as well as a विशेष i. e., as a सामान्य it persists in and is identical with शान्त and अव्यपदेश्य dharma and as a विशेष it persists in and is the same as उदितधर्म. In other words, every effect or manifest product, in so far as it is a manifestation, is an individual (विशेष) and considering its past and future unmanifest condition is identical with the universal Being or Prakriti (सामान्य). The relation of cause and effect being identity in difference (तादात्म्य) every effect has an individual character (derived from its difference from cause) and stands by itself, distinct from everything else in creation and has also a Universal character (derived from its identity with cause) by virtue of which it is perceived as one with everything else in nature."

[Taken from " The Problem of Causality—Sāṅkhya—Yoga View"—by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gopināth Kavirāj.]

SECTION III.

The Theory of God as the efficient and material cause of the world.*

In the view explained at the close of the previous section, it has been found that Prakriti, being by itself unconscious and of composite nature, cannot be conceived as self-regulating and self-illuminated. Its manifestation and modification presuppose a conscious mover and regulator, who should therefore be regarded as the efficient cause of the world-system evolved out of this Energy. But if this conscious Being and the unconscious primordial Energy be conceived as two absolutely different entities, the essential and inalienable relationship between the two can in no way be rationally explained. If both of them be self-existent, then there could be no reason why there should be the eternal relation of the mover and the moved, regulator and the regulated, the illuminer and the illumined between them. Hence it is necessary to conceive this Energy as the Power (शक्ति Śakti) of the conscious Being, so that the existence of the former should be regarded as completely dependent upon that of the latter. In this way the conclusion is arrived at that the ultimate Reality behind this universe is one Absolute Self-conscious personal Being, who through the modification of His power creates and preserves this universe and at the same time retains His immutable transcendent character by dint of which He regulates and illumines it. Here we find the conception of one personal

* Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Chaitanya, Vallabha; Vir-Shaiva, Srikantha-Shaivism, Kashmiri-Shaivism (Pratyavijnā) and Shākta Tantra.

God who is the efficient as well as the material cause of the world.*

* Cosmogony :—During the time of dissolution, all individual living beings remain merged in God. At that time God becomes out of His own will united with the homogeneous state of Gunas. Prakriti having the nature of three Gunas is dependent on God. At the beginning of creation, God beholds (ईक्षण) Prakriti, so there is agitation (क्षोभ) in Gunas, hence the production of the world in regular order. (The following stages of evolution are analogous to the Sāṅkhya-view). From the agitation of Gunas there is manifestation of intelligence (महत्) at first, from महत् there is the production of अहंकार (ego), from the Sattva portion of अहं 'manas' comes out, from Rajas portion of अहं ten kinds of external organs are produced, from the Tama portion of अहं the five तन्मात्र (Tanmātras) are manifested, from the Tama portion of अहं with the help of five तन्मात्र there is the production of five elements (पञ्चभूत).

APPENDIX B.

I.

Among the advocates of the present view viz. God is both material and efficient cause of the universe, there are many who are Vedántists i. e. who, in order to ascertain the nature of ultimate Reality, rely mainly on scriptural authority of the Vedánta (the latter part of the Vedas). In the Vedánta it is written that Brahman the all-pervading self-luminous Reality is the cause of the universe and also He is immutable. Now how to think about such causality? According to Mādhva, Brahman is the efficient cause of the world and not its material cause. Material cause is the modified cause and it is against scriptures to speak of Reality as having transformations. Hence, according to Mādhva, Brahman is the efficient cause alone. Another attempt to avoid mutability in Brahman is found in the philosophy of Śankara and his followers who regard the world as illusory and Brahman as the substratum of that illusion. This view will be discussed in the next section. There are other philosophers who do not recognise the above-mentioned views. They are the advocates of the view that Brahman is really the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. In what follows we give a short account of some schools (also the Shaiva-views) which do not regard the Vedas as authoritative.

Nimbārka Vaisnava School

God, who is known by the scripture alone,* is in nature existence—consciousness—bliss. He has infinite, inconceivable natural energies and good qualities and is the cause of production, preservation and destruction of the world. He is the material and efficient cause of the world which is His effect. Effects are always of the nature of their material cause and hence are non-separable from it. Though God is the material cause of the world, still He does not suffer transformation because the modification of His energy and not of His essence is admitted. To explain, modification is of two kinds—one is the modification of essence (स्वरूपपरिणाम), another is the modification as the projection of energy. (शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणाम). Of these two, the second type of modification of Brahman is admitted. The omniscient, omnipotent Brahman evolves the world through the projection of His own power which is supported in Him. God is the support of things which are regulated and have dependent existence. Of these, there are two kinds; one is immutable, another is mutable. The first group is devoid of the transformations of birth etc. and is eternal. They are 'Jivas' (the individual living beings). The second group suffers transformation and is eternal as a flow. It is unconscious Prakriti. These living and non-living entities,

* There may be six sources of valid knowledge namely verbal testimony (शब्द), inference (अनुमान), analogy (उपमान), perception (प्रत्यक्ष), tradition (ऐतिह्य) and implication (अर्थान्विति). Of these, implication and analogy are included in inference, tradition comes under verbal testimony because they are the sayings of those who have known things truly (आप्त). Perception and inference are not independent sources of valid knowledge because it is sometimes observed that they deviate from truth. Though both these are sources of valid knowledge in so far as they follow verbal testimony, still the latter is the main source of valid knowledge. By words of the Vedas it is proved that Brahman is the ultimate Reality of the universe.

identified with God have both difference and non-difference from Him.*

Let us elucidate this theory of difference as well as non-difference. The effect is, in its gross state, different from its cause, in being dependent on it and in being particularised by this dependent existence. It becomes the object of perception because its name and form become manifested in its gross state. But in the unmanifested state, the effect, though not objectified by perception exists in a subtle form, in the cause. Thus, the effect being non-separable from its cause is non-different from it in its gross and fine stages. Moreover, the effect is non-different from its cause, because it is of the nature of the cause, supported in it and dependent on it for its existence. And in these two states, the effect is naturally different from its cause, because it is particularised by dependent existence. In the present case, though the living and the non-living are different from God as they are particularised by dependent existence, yet by

* Bhāskarāchārya also advocates the theory of difference as well as non-difference. There is nothing in this world which is either non-different or different. All things are non-different in the form of universal existence, but in the form of individual, owing to mutual distinction, they are different. There is no contradiction between the cause and the effect because the effect is produced from the cause, remains in the cause and becomes dissolved in the cause. If there is any contradiction between cause and effect, then these would not take place. In the form of the effect there is manifoldness and in the form of the cause there is non-difference.

According to Bhāskarāchārya, God Who is known through the scriptures as the modifying cause of the world, has two energies—one is the energy of being experienced (भोग्यशक्ति) and the other is the energy of being experiencer (भोक्तृशक्ति). The former energy attains to the unconscious modification in the form of Ākāśha etc. (which has both natural difference and non-difference). The latter energy remains in the form of conscious beings (whose difference is adventitious and non-difference natural.)

being of the essence of God, they are not separate from Him. Hence they are different as well as non-different.

Nimbārka having observed that both difference and non-difference of the material cause and the effect are real, accepts both difference and non-difference of Brahman and the world, and so His effect namely the world is, according to him, real. God by being even one is present in many—One is many and many is One—this is the conclusion of the theory of difference as well as non-difference.**

Rāmānuja Vaisnava School

Brahman is all-pervading; the living and the non-living are pervaded by Brahman. Having their seat in Brahman, the individual living beings and unconscious things remain in an inseparable relation with Him.*

** Having accepted the difference (भेद) of the world from Brahman, to regard the world again as a qualification (निश्चित) of Him (as the Rāmānujists do) implies superfluity of hypothesis (गौरव); so, the Nimbārkaists observe, it is better to recognise the natural difference and non-difference of the world from Brahman (and not qualified), because there is parsimony of hypothesis (लापरव) in this view.

* According to this theory, the six substances (द्रव्य) namely, conscious beings (चित्), unconscious things (अचित्), God (ईश्वर), knowledge as an attribute (धर्मभूतज्ञान), time (काल) and eternal glories of God (नित्यविभूति) are of different natures. That which has state (अवस्था) is called the substance. What is different from it, is called the non-substance (अद्रव्य). By 'state' is meant the attribute which is adventitious (आगत्युक्त) and inseparable (अपृथक्स्थित) from the entity in which it comes into being.

The philosophers like the Naiyāyikas, in order to interpret the inseparableness of terms, admit that there is a relation of 'inherence' which connects the two, but the advocates of this school, maintain that no such relation is to be admitted and the mere cognition of the natural inseparability of terms is enough. And because of the absence of such a relation, attributes (non-substance) unconditionally qualify the substance and constitute its essence.

The unconscious has two states—the subtle and the gross. By its connection with the unconscious, the conscious also is designated as subtle and gross. Because both the conscious and the unconscious, gross as well as subtle, abide in Brahman, Brahman is conceived as qualified by them. Brahman as qualified by the conscious and the unconscious in their subtle form is the cause, and Brahman as qualified by the conscious and the unconscious in their gross form is the effect. At the time of dissolution, all conscious beings and the material world, having left their gross form, remain in Brahman in a subtle form; that is, become unified with Him. The state in which the knowledge of different things as separate from their substratum is not possible, is called the state of unification. At the time of dissolution, there is that unification of all living beings and the world with Brahman qualified by subtle living beings and subtle unconscious things. This qualified Brahman is the material cause of the world, and the world is His effect.

To explain,—material causality of Brahman may be of three kinds—(1) He may be modified in His essence as is found in the case of earth from which the pot comes into being; (2) He may be illusorily manifested as an effect as is the case with the rope appearing through ignorance as the snake; (3) He may become qualified by conscious beings and unconscious things, subtle as well as gross, as is the case with the boy becoming a youth (another state). The third alternative should be accepted.*

* According to the Rāmānujists, material cause is defined as the support of the state called the effect. Because the relation of 'inherence' is not admitted and also because the relation of the support and the supported is admitted, material causality is taken as the attainment of another state but not as the production of another substance. Before the production of any effect-substance it remains in the cause in the form of substance, but does not remain in the state of effect. Though it is recognised that the state which was non-existent becomes existent, still the production of a separate substance (अवयवनिर्द्वय) is not accepted.

Before the production of the world as an effect, Brahman with all things in their subtle forms remains ; so He should be taken as different from this gross form and these gross effects should be regarded as the attribute of Brahman, their material cause. That attribute should be regarded as Brahman's body. All living beings and the world, though really different from Brahman, are the modes (property प्रकृति) or attributes (विशेषण) of Brahman ; hence they are called the body of God. The conscious and unconscious things are the body of Brahman and Brahman (the organic unity) is the embodied Being behind them. Because they are established as inseparably connected as the body of Brahman, they become His modes, and because Brahman qualified by them is the embodied Being behind them, It is a Reality having modes. As Brahman has always the conscious and the unconscious as His body, so Brahman having that mode is in one aspect the cause of the world and in another aspect, the world-effect. In both states, Brahman who has His modes is one, because the knowledge of modes is included in the knowledge of that which has modes. That is, though there is manifoldness of the living and the non-living which are modes of consciousness, still there is oneness of consciousness which has modes. The transformations belong to the body of Brahman and not to His essence. The attributive is the direct support of transformations and the substantive is its indirect support. As in the assertion " the boy is turned into a youth " the substantive namely the nature of the self is without transformation, and in the attributive viz., the body, there is the

So the difference between the cause and the effect is considered with reference to the relation of the previous particular state. In other words, production does not mean manifestation of or 'inherence' with the cause, but is taken as a particular state of the material cause. "It is nothing but a co-relation (सामानाधिकरण्य) of the material cause with its own state known as the effect, because the state remains in its support as identical with it. The effect is thus taken as different from its cause.

direct relation of stages like boyhood, and owing to this, the words like 'the boy' 'the youth' are applied to the self; similarly in the case of Brahman, the two words namely the material cause and the effect are applied. Here the substantive has no transformation, while the attributive has. Though there is naturally differentiation in the shape of attributes namely the conscious and the unconscious, still on account of their being eternal attributes of Brahman and being inseparably connected with Him there is non-differentiation. Though the entire range of animate and inanimate creatures is naturally different from Brahman, Brahman qualified by them is one and non-dual. Reality is by nature unchangeably eternal but it is changeably eternal by being qualified by the bodies, the conscious and the unconscious. The self-conscious Reality as qualified is non-dual.*

* Mādhva does not accept with Rāmānuja that Brahman qualified by conscious beings and unconscious things is the material cause of the world. Because the qualified is non-different from both the attributive and the substantive Brahman will suffer transformation in case the substantive alone or both the attributive and the substantive are taken as the material cause. The assertion that the attributive is the material cause amounts to the assertion that Brahman is the non-material (efficient) cause. As against Mādhva's objection the Rāmānujists observe that according to the scriptures the qualified Brahman is the material cause. According to the scriptures, the cause of the nature of earth is constituted by three elements (त्रिवृत्करण—according to which objects of the visible world, which are all compounds, contain three 'bhūtas'—earth, water and fire in varying proportions), and therefore the effect—the pot is of the nature of three elements. Hence the qualified alone is the cause and the qualified alone is the effect. The parts of the elements in the cause are the cause of the parts of the effect. Similarly in the present case also, both the cause and the effect are constituted by Brahman with conscious beings and unconscious things, and the parts in the cause are the cause of the parts of the effect. Hence Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world, and not merely its efficient cause.

Bengal Vaisnava School

Brahman made known by the scriptures is non-dual Reality and is self-manifest and qualified in nature (not unqualified or attributeless). The Lord endowed with inconceivable (अचिन्त्य) powers (energies) modifies Himself as the universe by His own sweet will. He Has inconceivable energies through which He preserves His oneness uninterruptedly and becomes manifest as many. Owing to its being the cause of real effects, the energy of God is real and is not magical in nature.

God has infinite energies. Of these, we are familiar with three only. These energies are respectively called स्वरूप, तदस्था and माया। The energy by which Divine things alone are manifested, is called स्वरूप or चित्। The energy through which limited and imperfect 'Jivas' are manifested is called तदस्था or जीवशक्ति, and the energy by which the ele-

Rāmānuja does not agree with Nimbārka in maintaining that the world is both different and non-different from God. In the very same thing, observes Rāmānuja, the natural difference and non-difference from one entity cannot exist because such difference and non-difference are contradictory in nature. 'Jiva' is not a portion of Brahman whereby it can be different as well as non-different from Him. Brahman is an entity without division, so He cannot have parts. Jiva should be accepted as the attribute of Brahman. As the rays of fire and of sun are called their parts, or as the body is called the part of the embodied, so Jiva is called part of Brahman. But there is natural difference between Jiva and Brahman as there is natural difference between the soul and the body. According to Rāmānuja, the conscious Reality has three differences, namely difference from entities of its own kind, differences from entities of a different kind and internal differences. God is different from 'Jivas' who are of His own kind being conscious in nature, He is different from the unconscious Prakriti which is of different kind being unconscious in nature, He is different from the infinite good qualities seated in Himself. So there is no identity between Brahman and His attributes which are distinct from Him. Brahman is the whole which includes all these attributes as parts of Him, so there is unity.

ments and elemental world are created is called माया। स्वरूप-शक्ति is called the internal energy (अन्तरङ्गाशक्ति) and माया is called the external energy (बहिरङ्गा) of the Lord, because through the former, Lord manifests Himself as consciousness which is His proper nature, and through the latter, He assumes a material shape which is not strictly speaking His intrinsic nature. Nevertheless His material shape is not unreal. A combination of all these energies constitute the supreme energy (पराशक्ति) of the Almighty. As God has three natures namely existence, consciousness and bliss, so His internal energy which forms His essence has got three different aspects namely सन्धिनो, सन्वित् and ह्लादिनी। The energy by which, Lord being Himself existence in nature*, becomes the support of His own attribute of existence and imparts to others (substance, action, time, स्वभाव and 'Jiva') the existence and the capability of being the support of existence, is called सन्धिनी. By this energy He permeates (अनुगत) all time, space and things. Through the energy called सन्वित् which follows from the nature of the Lord as consciousness, He becomes self-conscious and imparts to others the power of being conscious and it is through this attribute that He makes the knowledge (धर्मभूत ज्ञान) of the individual living beings considerably pervasive, in spite of their being atomic in nature. Similarly, it is through His energy called ह्लादिनी which follows from His nature as bliss, the Lord experiences bliss and makes others share or participate in His bliss.**

* As pothood is the condition (निमित्त) of the experience of all sorts of pots, so there should be some cause of the experience of all these things which are treated as existent. That cause is existence. That existence is what is called God.

**Here let us state the view of inconceivable difference as well as non-difference (अचिन्त्यभेदामेदवाद) advocated by Jiva Goswami of Bengal. It is experienced that the effects and their material cause are different in one form and non-different in another, so it cannot be denied that

Vallabha-Vaiṣṇava School

God is existence, consciousness, bliss, pervading, imperishable, all-powerful, independent, all-knowing and

they are both different and non-different. Hence, as there are many arguments in favour of both these views, we should accept the truth of both. But at the same time when by argumentation we find many faults in both those views and there is no finality (निवृत्ति) in argumentation, difference and non-difference cannot be said to be a matter of dialectical thought, so both of them should be recognised as inconceivable. By 'inconceivable' is meant what is not an object of argumentation.

In this world, everything that is known as a cause has in it the capacity or power to do its own function, but through discrimination, a thing can never be understood either as different or as non-different from its energy. The relation of a thing with its energy is similarly not capable of being determined by discrimination, still it can never be denied that there is such an energy. We all accept the existence of that energy. When we all admit such an inconceivable power in things which come out of Brahman, it must be accepted that Brahman, the cause of all causes, from Whom all sorts of things endowed with inconceivable energy arise, has infinite energies conducive to creation, preservation and dissolution of the whole world. Hence though Brahman is itself without transformations, still He has in Himself energies conducive to innumerable transformations, and yet at the same time, there is no possibility of ascertaining through thought or discrimination whether all these energies are either different or non-different from Him. So Brahman has inconceivable powers. His energy, His knowledge, His strength and His activity are His intrinsic attributes (and not imaginary or false or adventitious.)

By the reasoning which proves the non-difference of the material cause and its effect, the non-difference of God and the world is proved. But the complete non-difference of the unconscious world from conscious God can in no way be suggested. Therefore difference also has to be accepted. Their difference and non-difference are alike capable of being supported by arguments. But one thing cannot be understood as different as well as non-different from another, logic fails to grasp this. As such they are inconceivable and it cannot be established by mere argumentation, but still it should be accepted. In other words, as

possessed of supernatural attributes as opposed to natural ones. The world is produced by 'Māyā.' This Māyā is the direct energy of God and is existent as well as non-existent in nature. God's capacity to manifest Himself in the shape of this world is called Māyā. Māyā, the energy of God, is another form of God. God, without depending on any other agency, has made through His own energy this world of the nature of His own self. God is an independent Actor and as such not bound by any condition with regard to His activities. As a spider spins thread for the sake of creation out of its own being, similarly, God projects three *Gunas* for the sake of threefold creations from His own being. What comes forth in the form of the existent is called 'Sattva', what comes out merely in the form of consciousness is called 'Rajas', because there is predominance in it of the power of activity over existence ('Sattva') and bliss ('Tamas'), and from the portion of bliss 'Tamas' is created. Being created by God, they are of the nature of God. And these three 'Gunas' cannot exist in God in their created form before their actual creation, but they were, even then, undoubtedly in God in a potential form. Thus before creation, God was, in a sense, attributeless. These 'Gunas' are created for the sake of production, preservation and destruction respectively and it is due to Māyā, that the Lord comes to possess these Gunas. For the sake of mere sport the Lord assumes different forms high and low, and by concealing His own blissful nature

God is modified in the form of the world, it must be admitted that the world is non-different from God and it should also be granted that the unconscious world is different from God. As God is full of inconceivable energies, so by the strength or glory (गुणवत्) of His inconceivable energy, there can remain in Him both difference and non-difference from the world which is His effect; this, of course, is inconceivable and as such not a matter of dialectic. This is अचिन्त्य भेदाभेदवाद. (as distinguished from भेदाभेदवाद whose adherents hold that difference as well as non-difference can be proved by argumentation).

becomes manifest as many individuals and by veiling His blissful and conscious natures manifests Himself as manifold unconscious things, and by having made His own limitless bliss limited, becomes many regulators (अन्नर्यानी) of the different souls.*

God is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The world is of the nature of God and the effect of Him. God Himself has made Himself in the form of the world. By getting modified even, God is without transformation. Modification means the change of the thing in another form. This modification is of two kinds. One is modification involving a change of the nature of the thing modified e. g. the transformation of milk into curd. Another modification implies no change of the thing modified, for example, the transformation of the earth in the shape of pot. God's modification is of the second type. In this mundane state even, the world is of the nature of God. So this world is not illusory or different from God, but it is real.

God is immovable and at the same time moving. God is, in a way, the support of everything, hence the support of all contradictory attributes too. In fact, God is an object of indubitable knowledge which cannot be understood by argumentation. God is beyond all reasoning.

* According to Vaiṣṇava philosophers, 'Jiva' (self) is atomic, hence it is different in every body and innumerable. All of them recognise Jiva as part of Brahman (अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्). But the word 'part' is understood differently by different schools. According to Nimbārka, Jiva has natural difference and natural non-difference from God. According to Rāmānuja, Jivas are inseparable attributes (विशेषण) of Brahman, having natural difference from Him. According to Mādhva, the Jivas are neither the attributes of Brahman, nor naturally non-different from Him, but are altogether different from Him. He observes that they constitute different parts of God having slight similarity (विभिन्नांश) and not His own part (स्वांश) nor His natural part (स्वरूपांश). According to Bengal School, Jivas constitute the principal energy (पराप्रकृति) of God. According to Vallabha the word 'part' means natural non-difference.

II.

Shaiva and Shākta Tantra

The Lingāyat and Srikantha Shaivas (of Southern India) are the advocates of the doctrine of qualified non-dualism (विशिष्टाद्वैत) like the Rāmānujists. The view of Kashmiri Shaivas is different from all the above-mentioned views. These views are :—

(1) That the world is quite distinct from God as its efficient cause (Mādhva, Pāshupat Shaiva and Baladev), (2) that the world is the attribute or body of God, it is quite distinct from God, but it is unified with God by the relation of inseparability (Rāmānuja and Rāmānanda), (3) that the world is dependent on God for its existence and in a subtle form, it constitutes the energy of God which manifests itself as the world of conscious and unconscious entities (Nimbārka and Bhāskara), (4) that the world is the modification of Brahman endowed with energy (Chaitanya and Vallabha), (5) that the world is inexplicably real (Jiva Goswāmi), (6) that the world is inexplicable i.e. illusory (Shankara). These views are not accepted by the Kashmiri Shaivas. They recognise the theory of reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब).

Kashmiri Shaiva School

The ultimate reality of the things which fall in the category of the known is luminosity or manifestation (प्रकाशात्मक). Though luminosity is of the nature of the illuminator of itself and of others, still without an egoistic sense, it cannot establish itself as the illuminator of things or of its own self. This luminosity is consciousness, the Supreme Self (Shiva). It is ever-complete (पूर्ण). Without the relation with consciousness nothing can get established. Hence time and space also cannot differentiate it. So what embraces the whole world should be accepted as ever complete. Because the world is manifested by being permeated by con-

consciousness ("pot is manifest" "ego is manifest") consciousness is the support of the world. Hence it is the material cause of the world. The world is not an origination (आरम्भ) absolutely different from the Supreme Self, nor is it a modification of the same. Because the Supreme Self is ever-complete, neither of these two can be conceived. In earth which is not ever-complete, the origination and transformation of the pot are recognised. In the material cause which is ever-complete, there cannot be any effect-substance.

The world-appearance in the Supreme Self is like the reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब) of a town in a mirror. The reflection is manifested as one with the mirror, and is not manifested as differentiated from it. The mirror and such other things as take reflection become manifest in the form of the reflected without shaking off their own essence. Such is the case here too. The world is manifested as one with consciousness, and does not become manifest as separate from it, so it is a reflection of consciousness. And consciousness is manifested in the form of the world without leaving its own essence, so it embraces in its bosom the world which is its reflection. Because the Supreme is ever-complete, the world becomes supported in it as its reflection. So the world is the attribute of the Supreme Self as its reflection. Really reflections have for their essence their own support, so the whole world has for its essence consciousness. This is the conclusion established by the Scriptures (Shaiva-Āgama).

The reflection in the mirror is not illusory like the shell-silver (शुक्तिरजत) because it is manifested and not cancelled. The cancellation such as "here there is no reflection" is not experienced, and reflection is not capable of remaining separate from the locus in which it is reflected as is the case with the real face. Hence the thing called reflection is a third category which is distinct from both the real and the unreal and is manifested by the glory of the thing in which it is reflected. Such is the reality of the world.

This reflection does not require, like other reflections, anything external which becomes reflected. In this case the efficient cause is God's independent energy. By that alone the manifestation of reflection is possible. It is a fact, that owing to the individual living being's (knower's) independence of will (संकल्प), fancied towns and the like which are of the nature of reflection are manifested in imagination. Thus the manifestation of the world is not a case of absolute origination nor is it a case of modification, but it is a manifestation of the Supreme Self due to His independent will, as in reflection. The reflection in a mirror is nothing but a play (विलास) of the energy of cleanliness of the mirror; in the same way, the entire world, which becomes manifested in the Supreme Self as reflection, is the sport of His energy.

So it comes to this, that One conscious knower brings into existence as well as preserves various objects, non-different from Himself in His own bosom through His own independent will. His own nature is altogether undisturbed. This consciousness is called God. God manifests things merely by His will and without the help of extraneous materials. In the Mind which is mere luminosity, which is beyond the universe and at the same time is of the nature of the universe, which is full of absolute Joy, everything becomes manifested as non-different, and really there is no other knower or known besides Him. These varieties are the manifestations of one and only one Reality and differences are the self-manifestations of the non-different reality. The homogeneous Reality has two forms, namely, the ego and the non-ego and they are non-different from His own Self, so there is no duality (त्रिकद्वैत-प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शन).

The Shākta-Tantra shares the above view of reflection (प्रतिबिम्बवाद); in some Tantra-works the modification of conscious Energy (परिणामवाद) is accepted.*

* "Metaphysical idealism may be grounded in one of two different, though not mutually exclusive, ways. We have seen that—if exis-

tence is to be comprehensible—we must presuppose a principle of unity, a something “which holds the world together from within.” If it be asked what this is, if a nearer determination be demanded, it is convenient to use the analogy with the unity which psychology discovers in the human consciousness. Just as it is evident that the different states and elements of my consciousness are united in an inner inter-relation, so that they belong to one and the same ego, so the states and elements of existence may be conceived as united in one all-embracing ego. In existence, as much as in individual consciousness, we get the relation between a unity and a multiplicity, and perhaps we may be able to get a clearer idea of the cosmological relation if we conceive it as analogous with the psychological relation. This was the path struck out by Kant’s speculative successors in Germany (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), and it has also been adopted by later thinkers in search of a solution. The other way starts from the fact that, if we want to convince ourselves that any other beings have a conscious life, analogy alone can supply us with a basis for this assumption. It is argued as follows: As our expressions, movements, and actions are related to our psychical states, so the expressions, movements, and actions of other beings are related to similar states in them. Immediate observation of the psychical states of other men will always remain without the bounds of possibility. But now may we not be justified in extending this conclusion by analogy? Why should we stop at animals? Since there has proved to be such close continuity on the material side of existence with regard to its elements and laws, why should we not assume that the psychical side of existence is also continuous, although beyond our own conscious life it can never be the object of immediate observation? And since we are only in a position to make quite clear to ourselves what it is to be a psychical being, while, on the other hand, the material can never be anything but an object for us, can never become immediately one with our own subjective ego, we shall gain the most comprehensible solution of the riddle of existence if we conceive the psychical to be the innermost essence of existence, and the material as an outer, sensuous form of this inner life. This interpretation reveals to us the nature of what the ‘thing-in-itself’ is; it is no longer an *x* but a something that is in its essence akin to that which we know immediately in our own breasts. Leibnitz adopted this line of thought in his day with great clearness and of set purpose; in modern times it has been followed by Schopenhauer, Beneke, Fechner, and Lotze. But this thought made its first appearance in the history of human thought in the philosophy of the Vedanta (the Upanishads) which replied to the question: What is Brahma, the principle of being? It is Atma, it is the soul within thy breast, it is thou thyself.’

(Hoffding’s “The Philosophy of Religion”)

SECTION IV.

The Theory of God as the illusory efficient and material cause of the universe*

INTRODUCTORY.

According to this theory, Reality is non-dual and attributeless pure Consciousness. It is immutable, and hence its manifestation as the universe is unreal. This attributeless Reality is ultimately ascertained through self-evident Scriptures (the Vedānta). In the Vedas we have an infallible authority. This we prove as follows: Faith is admitted by all to be indispensable to man if he is either to know or to do anything. It is through faith that we accept the laws of thought and all self-evident truths. It is faith that enables us to act, for if we were to wait till we could get complete knowledge we should never act at all. Now faith is simply surrender to an acknowledged authority: whence it follows that authority of some sort is involved in the conduct of life. Authority means recognised, established power, witness, statement, command, etc., accepted and obeyed without any questioning. The Veda claims to possess such authority, it claims to be the perfect rule of faith and practice. Is it to be accepted as such? Yes. You ask, Why? The question is illegitimate, for

* The non-dualistic School of Vedānta (Shankara and his followers).

if reason could sit in judgment on the claims of the Vedas, the Vedas could not be authoritative. The believer first grants its authority, that renders it authoritative for him and enables him to feel its authority. It is true that it is begging the question, but in the nature of the case that cannot be helped. As the scriptures inform us about extraordinary objects incapable of being known through sense-perception, inference etc., their self-validity is inferred. The scriptures produce in disciplined minds the knowledge of the transcendental Reality non-negated at all times. So they are the only valid source of knowledge with regard to this Reality. The ascertainment of the validity of scriptures is not dependent on logic; but logic is to follow scriptural testimony. Hence, about the nature of Reality, the verdict of the scriptures is final, and logic, though not capable of independently ascertaining Reality, shows by rational arguments that the verdict of the scriptures is in accordance with the fundamental principles of thought and is most adequate to furnish reasonable explanation for the facts of experience.

Let us try to give a rational demonstration (very brief) of the above theory. In this discussion we shall take up the following steps :—We shall show that Existence or Being is the non-dual substratum of the universe. Then we shall prove the identity or sameness of this existence and pure Consciousness. To show that consciousness is non-dual, we shall have first to prove consciousness as the one changeless witness of all changes, and then as the only self-luminous entity. Here our purpose is not merely to prove the non-dual Existence-Consciousness, we have also to show that the appearances which constitute the universe are illusorily identified with that consciousness. So the next step is to analyse the nature of causation and demonstrate

the necessity of recognising some inexplicable power or principle to account for the appearance of the diversified world upon the substratum of that pure Existence—Consciousness. Afterwards we shall show that that inexplicable cause is Ignorance which produces false appearances on the substratum, and that it is due to this Ignorance that the attributeless, changeless, differenceless Existence-Consciousness appears as the material and efficient cause of the universe.

Being or Existence the non-dual Reality.

We experience everything as existent. Because there is such uniform perception, as “the pot is existent” “the cloth is existent” and so on, in relation to all perceived objects, and because in such perception absolutely no distinction is experienced between the existence perceived in connection with any one object and that in connection with any other, we must recognise the presence of one all-pervading Existence underlying all objects of the universe. The universality and necessity of the concept of existence involved in knowledge must imply the presence of an element of universal and necessary existence in the objects known. Now, what is this Existence? Is it of the nature of a relation or an attribute or a substance? This existence cannot be called the relation with space and the like, because that also is experienced as existent. Existence is not a pervading attribute like genus, because the categories like genus also (where genus of existence cannot reside owing to infinite regression) are experienced as existent. As the perception of existence in the categories like substance, quality and action is the same as in genus and negation (where genus of existence cannot inhere), Existence should not be taken as an attribute called genus.

Where there is uniform perception, its object should be regarded as uniform. There the difference of relation (viz. direct and indirect) and the difference of objects (viz. inherence of existence and the co-existence of existence through common support—see page 37) should not be admitted. So it should be accepted that one all-pervading substratum (and not an attribute) having uniform relation (relation of identity) with all objects of knowledge is perceived as existence. Existence has no differences in it, because it is identical with all the categories and consequently nothing can serve as its distinguishing mark. The non-difference of all categories with existence proves that the felt differences among categories must be illusory. The identity of an all-permeating existence with things of contradictory natures cannot be real. As there is no distinguishing element or attribute in existence, it should be taken as attributeless. Though it cannot be perceived in its essential nature, still it becomes perceived as 'existence' by being conditioned.*

* Having searched for unity in all these diversities (1) some (the Naiyayika-Vaiśeṣikas) recognise that unity is due to the universal pervading genus inherent in individuals and the highest pervading genus is existence (सत्ताज्ञानि). The existence of an entity, say the pot, is due to its relation of *inherence* with the genus of universal existence (unmodified and different from effects). (2) Others (the Buddhists) found unity as illusory. The existence is the intrinsic characteristic of an entity. According to this view, existence is momentary and so capable of being interpreted in terms of efficiency (अर्थक्रियाकारत्वि). The Buddhists do not recognise the reality of a real independent eternal Universal as the Naiyayika-Vaiśeṣikas do, nor do they regard the individual as consisting of a twofold aspect viz. the generic and the specific (सामान्यविशेषात्मक) as the Sāṅkhya-Pāṇjals and some other philosophers do. (3) Others (the Sāṅkhya-Pāṇjal and many Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sects) accept that one non-dual existence embraces diversities and manifests itself as various.

Witness Consciousness.

Now in order to prove non-dual consciousness we show consciousness as the witness of mental states and modifications.

All existent effects are but the modifications of one universal self-existent entity (Prakṛiti in Sāṃkhya and Pātañjal views and God in those Vaiṣṇava and Śhaiva views). According to the Jains, Being is not the same in all things; nor is it of a persistent and unalterable nature; Being, they say, is subject to production, continuation and destruction (उत्पादव्ययधौव्ययोगित्व. This theory they call the theory of the 'Indefiniteness of Being', अनेकान्तवाद). (4) The protagonists of the view under discussion (the Neo-Vedāntists) assert that the existence of an entity is nothing but the appearance in it of the substratum Existence which is one, permanent, without beginning, change, or end.

If existence would be of the nature of any finite entity, then as a thing cannot change its essentially identical nature, so it would always be existence. If such were the case, then there would not have been its production and destruction. Because of its existence always, it would have been experienced even before its production and after its destruction. Efficiency is not existence, because even when there is non-apprehension of it, there is the cognition of existence. If efficiency of efficiency is admitted, then there will be infinite regression, and if not admitted, then all will be non-existent. Besides, efficiency is experienced as having existence so it is not existence. Existence is not the universal genus. The doctrine namely universal existence modifies itself and is the material cause of the world is not sound. It is not experienced that existence has got differentiating attributes. Besides, shell-silver and dream-visions which are illusory become experienced as existent, whereas modification implies the same essence of that which is modified and that into which it gets modified. It will be shown that existence or Being is consciousness which is constant and is the witness of modifications and as such beyond modification or alteration. Hence the conclusion which the Vedāntists reach is that unity is not due to some finite object, nor is it due to some momentary attribute, nor is it due to some permanent attribute (genus of being) altogether different from individuals, nor is it due to some modifying ultimate non-dual substance from which the universe is both different

(a) The experience of waking, dream and dreamless sleep and their remembrance are well-known. Both the

and non-different, but it is due to the existence which is the unmodified substratum of the universe which cannot be said to be different or non-different or different-non-different from the substratum. Hence the Vedāntists do not recognise anything other than Existence; Existence alone appears in the forms of different objects, but these are not real forms actually assumed by Existence. The said unifying Principle (impersonal) can be reached through the analysis of our knowledge. This we shall show presently.

Here let us state the different views about knowledge or consciousness. According to Naiyayika—Vaiśeṣikas knowledge becomes known by another knowledge and is not self-luminous. It is a function of the self in conjunction with *manas*. The Buddhists assert that knowledge is not non-self-luminous nor is it known by another, but it is self-luminous. Self-luminosity means that it is the object of itself; knowledge has no support, it is momentary and has beginning. The Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas are of opinion that knowledge is self-luminous, it is the illuminator of itself and others; it is supported in self and has production and the like. According to the Jains, knowledge is self-luminous but has no production and the like; it is with attribute, it has the attribute which falls in the category of the known (such as the attribute of *Jiva's* ever going upwards etc.). According to Sāṃkhya-Patanjali's knowledge is a function of Intelligence, which, though by itself non-self-luminous, is illumined by the self-luminous self or *Puruṣa*; this self has no known attribute, but it has individuality (there are many selves or consciousnesses). According to the Vedāntists knowledge consists in the modification of the non-self-luminous mind, which is illumined by the changeless attributeless self-luminous non-dual consciousness, which itself is not an object of knowledge. Self-luminosity does not mean that it is the object of itself, but means that it is itself luminosity; it does not become illuminated by itself or by others. The self-luminous consciousness is not momentary; it has no beginning; but it is beginningless and changeless. Consciousness is without support, bereft of production, void of attributes and is without particularisation. It is manifested as witness-consciousness or the unmodified seer of all objects inner and outer.

presence and the absence of the three states should be known by the one and the same knower. The negation of one's own self and the negation of one's transformation cannot be known by the same entity. Hence a higher consciousness which is beyond those states must be accepted. This is the witnessing consciousness.

(b) This consciousness is the unmodified knower of mental states or modifications.* These states are not self-luminous. In that case one state would not be the object of the knowledge of another, hence their comparison and the apprehension of their difference and manifoldness would not be possible. The states are variable and mutually exclusive. So these states cannot be known by anyone of them or by each other. Even a stream of consciousness cannot be conceived without unity as its background. That something (mind) which is identified with the states cannot witness them, because at the production and destruction of every state it also gets transformed. So some consciousness which pervades all these, but is at the same time without states, should be accepted. Otherwise we cannot explain remembrance, difference of these states and their production and destruction.

* According to the protagonists of this view, attribute and substance are not quite distinct entities. They do not accept the relation of *inherence* (*inherence* is an independent category, hence it cannot be a relation which must necessarily be dependent on related terms) and in place of *inherence* they recognise the relation of *identity*. The terms of the relation of identity are not quite distinct. What is called an attribute belongs to the nature of the substance with which it is identified. Now apprehension, impression and remembrance should reside in one support. The support of these attributes, because of its identification with changing attributes, must be a modified substance. Hence mind is not an internal organ which is a mere link between the self and the senses, but it is the support of knowledge which is its attribute or modification or state.

(c) The person who has continuous knowledge (stream-cognition धाराज्ञान) about some object, say the pot, remembers after that cognition that so long he experienced only this thing and did not know any other. Thus, the remembrance of the ego relating to a continuous period of time, that of the stream-cognition and that of the ignorance of other objects are felt facts of experience. And if they were not experienced at the time of the stream-cognition, then the above-mentioned remembrance would not have been possible, because remembrance must have for its object what was experienced. Without the experience during that time of the same object as that of remembrance, the said remembrance cannot be explained. In order to explain this continuous stream one persistent consciousness which objectifies ego and ignorance (and so is not contradictory to ignorance), and is, therefore, beyond ego and mental function (only produced knowledge is contradictory to ignorance) must be accepted.

(d) In order to perceive the cause-effect-relation between two mental modifications (say between the knowledge of the dancing and the knowledge of joy) a consciousness related to both the knowledge of priority and posteriority is necessitated. Otherwise the invariable sequence (अस्यवादि) between the two will not be ascertained. That consciousness beyond ego is witness.

(e) This consciousness is not merely the witness of inner objects, but it is the illuminator of outside objects too. Before the contact of our sense-organs with extramental objects they remain unknown to us. This unknownness is not co-present with objects. When we know the object we find that ignorance is no more, while the object abides. So unknownness in the object is caused by some

other. That to which unknownness is due should be such an entity as is contradictory to knowledge, because it becomes driven out by knowledge. That entity may be supposed to be positive or negative. But it is not sound to accept it as negative. As unknownness of extramental objects becomes somehow known to us it can never be due to negation of knowledge. Negation of knowledge can never be known. Knowledge of negation requires the knowledge (remembrance) of its counterentity (whose negation is known). In the present case this knowledge is not possible, because the knowledge of knowledge contradicts the knowledge of its negation. If there be no knowledge of knowledge, then there is no question of the knowledge of the negation of knowledge. Hence it should be admitted that that unknownness or veiling is due to some positive entity. This is ignorance. It is not merely subjective, but objective also. The unknownness is perceived as attributive to external objects, and knowledge becomes valid by informing that unknown object. This is also corroborated by our experience of illusory objects. In illusion the inexplicable apparent objects are produced outside from their material cause, ignorance, which occupies the same space as the effect. Now that extramental object with unknownness is not self-luminous. Otherwise they would not be objectified by knowledge, nor could their difference be known, nor could there be doubt about them. So they should be illumined by some other entity. That illuminator cannot be outer lights etc., because the latter belong to the same category. They cannot be known by senses or mind, because at the rise of knowledge the unawareness is destroyed. What eliminates a thing cannot illuminate it. In that case, both unknownness and knownness would abide at the same time. So those objects must be illuminated by a consciousness higher than ego. (1) As

these objects are not self-luminous ; (2) as they cannot be known by mind before they are referred to it through sense-contact ; (3) as without a prior consciousness of the unknown object, the knowledge of the difference of the known from the unknown cannot be explained ; (4) nor could we know the object as a cause of the production of knowledge ; (5) nor could the desire to know objects be explained, (such desire is possible if that object is both known and unknown)—therefore the extramental things with their unawareness must be illuminated by a consciousness which is beyond mental modification. Thus the witness-consciousness reveals the unawareness of the object and the temporal cognition (mental modification) removes its unawareness, and hence is the significance of our knowledge of the object as an unknown entity. (The above discussion also proves that the perception of any entity is possible only if there be consciousness beyond body, beyond mind).

Consciousness is Self-luminous.

This consciousness should be taken as self luminous (स्वप्रकाश). Every concrete knowledge involves two factors :- one subject and another object. The object is invariably illuminated by the subject for otherwise objectivity would not be possible. So the subject which illumines the object should be taken as self-luminous. We may infer self-luminosity of consciousness by observing that with it the object becomes illuminated. The very notion of consciousness implies that it is self-luminous. Without such a self-luminous consciousness as the subject of all these objective worlds inner and outer, the knowledge of their varieties and changes could not be possible. It remains the same even in the states of dreamless

sleep, swoon and trance. As we finally reach consciousness as the illuminator of all, and as we experience no doubt about consciousness, it is self-luminous. If it be conceived as illuminated by any thing else, then the flow of knowledge would go on without end, and hence the fallacy of infinite regression would be unavoidable. Owing to this, these three faults would occur, namely (1) The futility of the antecedent cognition after the occurrence of the subsequent one (*प्राग्लोप*) (2) The fault of non-ascertainment of the manifestation of the object through one or other among the series of cognitions (*अविनिगम्यत्व*). (3) The fault of accepting many knowledges of which we have no experience (*प्रमाणापगम*). Every case of infinite regression must have these three faults. Hence for the very possibility of knowledge, there is the logical necessity for the recognition of a self-luminous entity, and this entity is consciousness.

Consciousness is non-dual.

This consciousness is non-dual. If the existence of more than one consciousness be supposed, then in order to be aware of the presence of these consciousnesses, either a higher consciousness must be admitted, to which these consciousnesses may be objects of knowledge, or it should be admitted that this consciousness by knowing itself knows its difference from the other consciousnesses. But neither of these conclusions can be allowed. The first is unacceptable, because what falls into the category of the known will be non-self-luminous and dependent and cannot be regarded as consciousness ; the second is unacceptable, because in non-difference there cannot be the subject-object relation. Hence consciousness must be regarded as non-dual.

Identity of Existence and Consciousness.

We have arrived at two ultimate notions, viz. Existence and Consciousness. Both have been proved to be non-dual. The truth is that these two notions do not indicate two realities, but the same ultimate Reality. The sameness of the two is evident from the following points of identity in their character. Like Existence, consciousness becomes manifest by being identified with the knower and the known in the form 'I manifest' 'pot manifests.' Like Existence it is self-established, it is not the essence or attribute of things, it is all-pervading and differenceless.

If Existence and consciousness were different, then in the absence of any principle of unity that could connect them together, they would remain eternally unrelated to each other. That would mean that consciousness could not be the ground of the manifestation of existence and consequently Existence should remain eternally unmanifested. Hence it must be admitted that consciousness and Existence are not separate entities, but it is the same ultimate reality, which as the ground of all existences is called Existence and as the ground of manifestation is called Consciousness. Moreover, the very notion of self-existence involves the notion of self-illumination. Existence which has to depend upon something else for its self-manifestation cannot be regarded as existing by itself, and hence it would be imperfect existence demanding some superior Being for its being what it is. But as it is impossible to conceive any entity beyond pure Existence, the capacity for its revealing itself must also be essentially inherent in it. This means that the notion of consciousness is essentially involved in the very idea of pure self-existence. Hence it is proved that Existence and consciousness are not two realities but one.

Existence-Consciousness with another inexplicable Principle is the material cause of the World.

Existence-Consciousness should be regarded as the material cause of the world. We find that effects like pot and other earthen utensils are pervaded by and identified with earth which is its material cause. In the present case also all things become existent and known by being pervaded by Existence-consciousness; and they become identified with it, because they have reference to the same space and time as Existence-consciousness, as is corroborated by 'pot is existent' 'pot is manifest.' So it is the material cause of the world.

Now let us show the necessity of recognising another inexplicable principle as material cause. By the analysis of causation we find that the effect cannot be said to be absolutely different from its material cause, because they are never experienced as existing separately. In case of such difference there could not be an inseparable co-existence (सामानाधिकरण्य) between the cause and the effect. *Inherence* is taken as absolutely different from terms it relates, so the perception of non-difference is not possible through it. The inseparable co-existence of the cause and the effect cannot be explained by accepting absolute non-difference: further, the production of the effect from the cause would be without any meaning in that case. So to explain co-existence difference as well as non-difference has to be accepted. Difference and non-difference cannot be taken as both real in the same sense. In order to call difference and non-difference non-contradictory, difference which is based on non-difference should be taken as of less essence than non-difference. If they are of the same order of reality and still remain together, then there would not be contradiction.

anywhere in the world. As difference is of less essence, it should not be called real. It is due to this abiding of unreal difference with real non-difference that there is co-existence between cause and effect.

In other words, though there is difference between cause and effect, this difference does not really differentiate the existence of the effect from the cause. In places where there is no such cause-effect-relation, there the difference between these two things distinguishes their existence. As effect is dependent on cause and there is co-existence between them, the nature of their difference should be distinct from that of the difference of other places. Hence the difference between cause and effect should not be taken as real as in other cases. Owing to this difference having oneness of existence, there is identity between cause and effect. Because the difference between the cause and the effect does not produce any real differentiation in the essential nature of the cause, that difference is regarded as inexplicable (i. e. incapable of being defined as either existent or non-existent) or unreal. If the effect and its difference were real, then that difference would differentiate the existence, so the existence of the effect would be different from the existence of the cause; hence the identity of the nature of non-different existence from cause would not be possible. Hence effect and its difference should be regarded as inexplicable.*

* There are different theories as to what the true nature of the effect in relation to the cause is. According to the theory of modification (परिणामवाद), real transformation of the causal substance into various forms is admitted, and hence the effect produced is merely a particular form (रूपान्तर) of the material cause and is not substantially distinct from it. According to the theory of absolute origination of effect (आरम्भवाद), the effect is a newly originated substance out of the material cause, in which it was not existent. According to the doctrine of aggregate of momentary atoms (संचातवाद), the effect is

We have found that the world has no separate existence from Existence-Consciousness. So Existence-Consciousness which is the ultimate end should be regarded as material cause. If Existence alone were the cause, then there would not be the element of inexplicability. Without this inexplicability, there would not be the cause-effect relation, identity or co-existence between the world and Existence-Consciousness. Thus to account for the inexplicability of the effect and its difference, an inexplicable cause has to be accepted. Without inexplicable cause as the material, the invariable pervasion of inexplicability in the effect cannot be explained.

Theory of Illusion.

Now we shall prove that that inexplicable principle is Ignorance. This leads us to the discussion of Error. There we shall find out an inexplicable effect and ignorance as its material cause. Here let us take a well-known example, such as the experience of silver in shell. Some say that non-existent silver is perceived here; others assert that it is existent as an idea projected outside, and not an outside object; others are of opinion that silver is empirically existent (not apparently existent) in the shell; others take it as existent in a distant region. Among the last some say that somethingness ('this' portion) of shell-silver is perceived and silver is remembered. Owing to non-discrimination between the two knowledges we approach towards shell-silver. Others say that

nothing but the momentary atoms themselves appearing in the particular form of an aggregate, and hence it is neither a newly originated substance nor any modified form of the cause. According to the theory of illusory evolution (विवर्तवाद), the effect is only an illusory appearance of a form, which is neither a new substance nor an actually modified form of the cause and which is neither non-different nor different from it.

distant silver is perceived (qualified cognition). Some others opine that the said silver is not merely non-existent nor merely existent, but it is both.

Now we shall show in brief the flaws in all these theories and prove that shell-silver is apparently existent in the place of shell i. e. it is inexplicable. The first theory is wrong, in as much as it recognises the non-existence of what is perceived. The theory that shell-silver is a mental modification is contradictory, in as much as it treats outwardly manifested silver as inward. The theory which advocates the presence (phenomenal) of silver in shell cannot be justified by our experience, in as much as it goes against our cancellation of the shell-silver. The knowledge of the phenomenally existent silver cannot be condemned as error or illusion. The theory that error is a non-discrimination of two cognitions makes many assumptions contradicted by experience, such as the assumption of error as a blend of two cognitions, that of the knowledge of silver as a case of remembrance which is indirect knowledge, that of the loss of remembrance, that of activity due to non-discrimination caused by the loss of remembrance. The view that we perceive distant silver involves assumptions, such as the recognition of the existence of a thing at a place where it does not exist, the sense-organs having the knowledge of things previously experienced, even though they are separated by the distance of space and time, and that defect has the capacity of producing perception of an entity with which the senses are not in contact and which (silver) had not been previously perceived in the place (shell) where it is seen and finally the perception of non-existent relation. The theory of shell-silver as both existent and non-existent is not sound. It is not the rule that existent things become

perceived. There are many things which exist, at the same time they are beyond the ken of our senses. It is not also the rule that what is non-existent becomes cancelled. Cancellation presupposes attribution and the non-existent cannot be attributed. Hence perception and cancellation should be explained in the following way: Owing to difference of the object from non-existence, there is its perception (and not because it is an existent) and owing to its difference from existence, there is its cancellation (and not because it is non-existent). So in order to explain the perception of shell-silver, activity towards it and its cancellation, it should be acknowledged as distinct from the existent as well as distinct from the non-existent and also distinct from both existent and non-existent. This is called inexplicable. It is not phenomenal like pots and other things of our empirical world. The shell-silver and the like are negated during the time of our empirical activity, so they are not empirically existent. At the time of their perception they are not negated; so their apparent existence cannot be denied. In the case of pots etc., at the time of empirical activity they are not negated; so their empirical existence cannot be denied. Thus the shell-silver is apparent and not phenomenal. Such inexplicable apparent silver is called false. The non-existent or the existent or the existent-non-existent cannot be taken as false. So the said silver will fall in the category of false entity. Because of the cancellation of the perceived silver, it must be different from the true silver. So it is false.

Inexplicable appearance has Ignorance as its Material cause.

Now, this inexplicable entity which is occasional and distinct from the non-existent must have some material

cause. A positive effect cannot be produced by efficient cause alone. That material cause, we show below, is ignorance. Without ignorance there cannot be illusion ; so ignorance is its cause. Cause is of two kinds—material and efficient. Ignorance is not the efficient cause of illusion. If it would be so, then at the expiry of ignorance even, there would remain silver in shell. Hence ignorance should be taken as the material cause. It is well-known that by the elimination of material cause the effect becomes eliminated. The illusion which is due to the ignorance of anything becomes eliminated by its knowledge: the knowledge of that thing by eliminating that ignorance eliminates that illusion. The illusion of silver which is due to the ignorance of shell is eliminated by the knowledge such as ‘this is shell’. So the ignorance about shell is the material cause of that illusion. Ignorance is not the determining cause of merely the production of shell-silver, but it is the cause of its abiding also. Hence like the earth which is the cause of the production and abiding of pot, ignorance is the material cause of shell-silver. Defects are not invariably present in all cases, so they are auxiliary only.

The material cause of that inexplicable shell-silver must be inexplicable or false. If it were due to some real cause, then illusion would not be illusion ; but it would be real, because it is the rule that effect becomes of the same nature as the cause e. g. the pot is of the essence of earth. If the material cause be real, it would never be destroyed ; so the effect which is of the nature of the cause would not be eliminated, because without the elimination of the material cause the effect cannot be eliminated. Hence ignorance is inexplicable. It is without beginning. No cause of ignorance is apprehended. For the sake of parsimony of hypothesis and the avoidance of infinite regression ignorance should be accepted as beginningless.

Now we find that inexplicable effects are the products of ignorance. It is due to ignorance that substratum does not manifest itself as it is, and false appearances (having less essence than the substratum) are manifested on the substratum as illusorily identified with it.

If we look to the phenomenal or empirical world from the view-point of the substratum (Existence-Consciousness), we find that it is distinct from Existence which is not negated in all times and distinct from the non-existent like hare's horn ; hence like illusory appearance it is inexplicable.

As the cause of these inexplicable phenomenal appearances, some inexplicable principle has to be inferred. Existence-Consciousness alone cannot account for these. Existence-Consciousness is non-dual, self-luminous and the final limit of all. So it cannot modify itself partially or wholly. What is the witness of all modifications cannot be itself modified. The real non-difference between consciousness and unconsciousness is not possible, so the notion of non-difference through co-existence implies that the unconscious world is illusorily identified with the substratum-consciousness (here one term must be false). If consciousness's identity with the unconscious be of the same essence as the consciousness, then at the time of the abiding of the world the unconscious would not be, because the world cannot be conscious and unconscious at the same time in the same sense. Two contradictories. viz. difference from consciousness and non-difference from it, having the same essence, cannot abide together at the same time. So real identity between consciousness and the unconscious is not possible. What cannot be designated as existent or non-existent cannot have real identity with transcendental Existence. So along with Existence-consciousness (Brahman)

which is the substratum of the world, there must be another modifying principle. The principle should be such as (1) is not produced from any thing, (2) has the capacity of manifesting itself as false things. (That is called false which is inexplicable, illusorily identified with the substratum and is of less essence than the substratum), (3) has no independent existence, (4) is unconscious, witnessed and supported in the substratum, (5) through which its support does not get modified, (6) by which the transcendent nature of the substratum is partially veiled and it is made to appear as a plurality of effects, (7) through which the substratum (in which there is absolute negation of the appearances) of more essence (पारमार्थिक) manifests as endowed with appearance of less essence (व्यावहारिक) illusorily identified with it. These conditions are fulfilled in the case of Ignorance. So cosmic Ignorance is inferred as the root material cause. So both Brahman and Ignorance are the material causes of this illusory world. If the world be the effect of consciousness alone, then unconsciousness (जडत्व) in the world becomes accidental. Because the world is both real-unreal, it must have the material both real-unreal. The world owes its existence to the substratum Brahman as well as to Ignorance, which veils and apparently distorts Its nature. Ignorance is an inexplicable agency, incapable of being described as either absolutely real or absolutely unreal, and though it is eternally related to Brahman and thereby producing the illusory world, it and its productions being not on the same plane of reality with Brahman do not affect Its non-duality and Its changeless attributeless character.

Godhood.

It is due to Ignorance that there arise Godhood and finite-self-hood in non-dual Existence-consciousness through

the identification with universal and individual minds respectively. Ignorance being beginningless, the Godhood and finite-self-hood in Brahman also are without any beginning. Godhood means non-dual substratum Existence-Consciousness appearing as conditioned by cosmic Ignorance and its manifestations. Ignorance is not innate in (i. e. is not the essence or attribute or modification of) the substratum, but illusorily identified with it. Hence God is the illusory material and efficient cause of the world.

To conclude : the Pure non-dual Existence-Consciousness conceived as the direct seer and illuminer of the whole universe superimposed on Itself is the witness of the whole. The same Reality conceived as the cause of, immanent in, and preserving order in, the world of things superimposed upon It by Ignorance is God. That Reality again, conceived as particularised by and identified with the limitations of differences of individual egos, minds and bodies appears as the innumerable finite selves.

CHAPTER III.

The Law of Karma.

Let us now discuss the nature of the Law of '*Karma*', which also has been mentioned as one of the fundamental beliefs of the religionists in general.

It is maintained by some that Karma belongs to and exists in the self and is the cause of the differences of enjoyments and sufferings, propensities and capacities etc., pertaining to different individual selves.

Pleasure and pain etc., are fundamental facts of universal experience. They being occasional, must be regarded as effects, demanding causal explanation. These effects are many ; and so, it is held, their causes also should be many and not one. If one and only one cause be accepted to account for the various effects, their variety itself would remain unexplained and would have to be regarded as accidental. This means that the variety of effects and their successive orderly productions which are alike veritable facts of experience, and for the explanation of which we feel the necessity of referring to causes, have to be accepted as occurring without any sufficient ground. But this cannot be. Accidental production of effects is a contradiction in terms, inasmuch as it implies a denial of the law of causation. What is occasional must have some cause. If it were not so, then it would ever exist or never exist, but it could never be occasional.

Nor can it be maintained that the variety of effects is due to the different powers (शक्ति) of one cause ; for power and one having power being non-different, the doctrine of

the production of various effects from one cause would appear in another form. It may be said that from one cause many effects are naturally produced. But in that case, as during the existence of a thing, it is impossible to conceive of it as having lost its nature, so at every moment there would be the production of many effects from one cause. Therefore the origin of multiplicity and successive-ness in the effects from one or uniform cause without any auxiliary condition is an untenable hypothesis. Even if the origin of different effects from one cause be admitted, different co-operative causes must be recognised in order to explain their different natures and their productions at different times. At any rate multiplicity of causes for explaining the varieties of pleasure and pain etc., cannot be avoided. Hence, the cause of many effects must be manifold. Thus, it is known that the immediate experience of the said diversity of effects namely pleasure and pain etc., of every individual (self) must be due to the diversity of causes.

Now what can these causes be ? It is a fundamental belief among the exponents of morality and religion that the enjoyments and sufferings of every individual are caused by his own actions. This is called the Law of Karma. In some cases we may trace the causal relation between the actions performed and the enjoyment and suffering that follow. But in many cases we experience pleasure and pain etc., which cannot be causally related with the actions performed immediately before or even in the present life. It is a matter of everyday experience that inspite of his best efforts, one man cannot reap success and wherever he goes failures follow him; on the other hand, another man with the least effort achieves all-round success. Moreover, there occur in our life events which cannot be accounted for by

any scientific explanation understood in its ordinary sense. In order to explain the varieties of such enjoyments and sufferings, the advocates of the Law of Karma maintain that the actions performed long ago or even in previous lives leave their consequences behind in some subtle forms which act as causes producing these enjoyments and sufferings etc. It is also maintained that there is an inexorable law of the relations between particular kinds of actions and their particular forms of consequences. Such consequences, producing effects long long after the actions are performed, may be called the moral effects of these actions. The law of this inexorable relationship between actions and their moral effects is generally known as the Law of Karma. So the recognition of the Law of "Karma" is a logical demand, necessary for the interpretation of the various facts of life.

Now, where do these "Karma" or moral consequences of past acts reside? Pleasure and pain are not objective; had they been so, then one object would not have been the source of pleasure on one occasion and of pain on another to the same individual, and the same object would not have been pleasant to one and unpleasant to another. Hence as pleasure and pain reside in the self, it is more proper to hold that their causes, the "Karma," also reside in the self, than to hold that they reside in the object. Besides, if the "Karma" are treated as remaining in the object, then like other objective entities, they would have been the same with reference to all individuals and would not have been uncommon, and thus the difference of pleasure and pain of different individuals would not have been capable of being interpreted by the Law of "Karma." Therefore, though we generally take pleasure and pain to be due to external objects, their real cause is an internal entity, namely the

various Karma. Karma (अदृष्ट) should reside in the eternal self and not in non-eternal body and other organs. If it were not the case, there would be such faults as what has been done will not produce results to the doer (कृतनाश) and the results of actions not done will have to be reaped (अकृताभ्यागम). But this is against Karma-Law. Hence it is necessary that Karma should be seated in self. "Karma" may be either potential or manifest. Conscious efforts give rise to potential "Karma" and these remain in the sub-conscious region of the self for a time and afterwards cause pleasure and pain.*

The advocates of the Law of "Karma" consider this world as a place where to work out the results of "Karma" and to attain liberation by getting rid of "Karma". Hence they believe that it is "Karma" which gives rise to difference in the status of various creations. According to them

* This is generally the view accepted by many schools of Indian Philosophical thought. But the Buddhists differ. The Buddhists resolve the human being into a number of elements called *dhammas* which possess no permanent existence. They say that on account of this transitoriness no one of these can be considered as the individual, the ego, the self. The ego is merely a collection of various elements constantly renewed, which are combined into a pseudo-personality. It is merely name and form which passes through the various modes, classes, stages, grades and forms of existence by means of a connection of cause and effect. Behind the action there is no actor and although actions bear their fruit, there is no one that experiences that fruit. When a being dies, a new being is born and inherits his Karma, what transmigrates is not a person, but his Karma. There is nothing but the act and its fruit; organs, thoughts and external things are all the fruit of acts, in the same way as pleasant and unpleasant sensations. (Buddhists hold that the whole universe, with all its variety is the work of acts—the combined mass of the acts of all beings.) Thus the deed and the fruit roll on and on, each from its cause like the beginningless round of tree and seed. (For the exposition of Buddhist Doctrine see Appendix next chapter.)

the mundane existence is without a beginning. The inequalities of pleasure and pain etc. cannot be explained by recognising the beginning of "Karma." The 'Karma-theory,' it cannot be objected, is vitiated by the fallacy of infinite regression, because an infinite regression which is a fact cannot amount to a fallacy, as is the case with the tree and its seed. The doctrine of beginninglessness of "Karma" implies that there has never been a first "Karma," in the true sense of the term. (The doctrine of Karma is the solution of the riddle of the origin of suffering and the diversity of human conditions.)

Among the advocates of the law of "Karma," there are theists as well as atheists. In the above discussion no reference has been made to the agency of God in the application of the law. Some theists argue that if the omnipotence of God is taken for granted, then the independence of the individual living being is lost; and if there is no independence of the individual, then virtue and vice carry no meaning; and at the same time if the independence of individuals is admitted, then it will conflict with the idea of Godhood. To evade these difficulties, they recognise something besides the omnipotence of God and the independence of individuals which, they hold, would balance the conflict between the two. This, they say, is "Karma".

If there be no law guiding our experience of pleasure and pain, then God alone, being the giver of all experiences, sweet and bitter, would be guilty of being partial and cruel, because in that case one would be forced to hold that Almighty God, without any extraneous considerations, has made, out of his own caprice, some happy and some unhappy. Moreover, such a view makes the scriptural distinction between good and bad deeds meaningless; because

from this it follows that our pleasure and pain are not the results of our own deeds, but mere acts of the Divine will. Thus, the law of "Karma" is invoked to prove on the one hand that God is not partial and cruel, and on the other hand to recognise the independence of individual living beings by supporting the idea of merit and demerit. Man is thus believed to be, on the one hand, the builder of his own destiny, and on the other hand, dependent upon the supreme spiritual Governor.

Others* maintain that the recognition of the law of "Karma" in the above sense would amount to a denial of God's independence and grace. So leaning more on God's independence and emphasising His grace, they do not accept it *in toto*, but still they do not deny it altogether. Thus, they are the advocates of the Law of Karma in a restricted sense. Some of them hold that the diversities of pleasure and pain to which the individuals become subject on account of their birth are not the results of any past karma, for they do not believe in any previous life. For these they regard the omnipotent will of God as the sole ultimate cause. The actions performed in the present life should however produce consequences which should determine their future enjoyments and sufferings. Others again hold that the consequences of these actions also are not inevitable, for they can be condoned by God's grace. In this way the application of the law of Karma has been different in different systems of religion**

* The religious sects of the West.

** God by giving rewards and punishments in conformity with the acts of individuals does not lose His Godhood. Due to dependence on the instrument or means, the independence of the agent is not lost. But according to some Shaiva-sects God is the independent creator of the world. That action of creation is not dependent on the Karma of beings. If it be objected that if creation is not dependent on Karma, then simultaneously every effect would have occurred, to this they reply that independence of God is of such a nature that it cannot be objected to. Even if other views are maintained, still the same objection would hold good and to escape this, it should be asserted that the regulating energy is of such a nature that its independence cannot be questioned.

CHAPTER IV.

The Self and its capacity for spiritual self-discipline (*Sādhana*) and attainment of liberation (*Mukti*).

The ultimate aim of all "sādhana" is to free the self from its bondage (बन्ध), so the discussion on spiritual practice implies a discussion on the nature of the self and the cause of its bondage. Hence we proceed to consider different conceptions of the self and spiritual practice and liberation.

I

The Conception of illusory self and Nirvana.

Some regard the self not as a permanent entity, but as a continuous stream of momentary consciousnesses*.

* According to this Buddhist theory, *Existence* (सत्त्व) is efficiency (अर्थक्रियाकारित्व). The proof of the existence of anything consists in its activity to produce any effect and serve any purpose. Whatever is incapable of producing any effect and serving any purpose is proved to be non-existent (e. g. hare's horn). To exist therefore really means to be in the process of changing into effects. Existence accordingly consists in always 'becoming', and never being in any stable condition. Hence a thing that exists does not and cannot remain the same in any two successive moments. Hence it is not sound to accept any stable thing in the world, every thing is momentary. If any stable thing is admitted, then it should be asserted that it produces action simultaneously or successively. But it is not possible for a stable thing to produce actions simultaneously. In that case we would experience past, present and future actions at a time because a thing can not shake off its innate nature. If it is asserted that stable thing produces actions successively, then it would be simply futile to acknowledge the stability of any thing. Efficiency (production of action) is accompanied by succession and non-succession, because there is no

But during the stage of bondage, there is (1) the consciousness of a permanent self, (2) there is the feeling of attachment to and detachment from pleasant and unpleasant objects respectively and activities following from them. All karma is performed under the influence of greed after some desired object, with hatred of that which is not wanted, and of infatuation or delusion of mind that causes one to

third possibility. Now if a stable (non-momentary) thing be efficient, then it would have the two contradictory attributes viz. productivity of successive actions and its absence. If that productivity and its absence are explained as due to the delay of assisting causes, then it would help by being helped by another help and thus there would be the fault of infinite regression. If they are not of any help, then they cannot be assisting causes. Thus as the stable things can have no efficiency, gradual or simultaneous, the recognition of the stability of things would imply their non-existence. That is, because efficiency is of the essence of existence and because a stable thing can not be efficient, hence a stable thing can not have any existence. So every thing is momentary. Hence if the self be existent, it is necessary that it will be destroyed every moment.

The self may be thought of as stable or momentary. Stable self may be possessed of consciousness or be consciousness itself. Possession of consciousness may mean that consciousness remains in self through the relation of *inherence* or that consciousness is the modification of self. Consciousness as self may be modified or be the witness of modifications. The advocates of the above view, having refuted inherence and modification come finally to the conclusion that self or consciousness is momentary. There is no continuous self pervading these instantaneous knowledges. Owing to uninterrupted continuity of change there is the false notion about a permanent self. They classify all mental phenomena in four groups—feelings, ideas, will and pure sensation. There is no soul, no thinking substance behind them. Because of resistance to their movement, the positive things having the two attributes, namely form and forward motion, are supposed as being supported in some substratum; but joys etc. are void of motion, so their falling down is impossible; hence to assume support for them is superfluous. Desires etc. are produced successively; so they do not require any self as their support.

believe that satisfaction will result when the object is attained, (3) there is consciousness of the association with the genus, the attribute, the action, the name and the substance, though in truth there is no such association, and (4) there is the illusory notion that there are truly real objects (inner and outer.)

These defects are removed by following practices which emphasise an opposite attitude. The method is contemplation which is fourfold :—viz. meditations (1) on the momentary character of things—"all is momentary" (सर्व क्षणिकं) (2) on their painful character—"all is sorrow" (सर्व दुःखं) (3) on their particularity—everything is particular having no qualification or relation (सर्व स्वलक्षणं) (4) on their hollowness—"all is void" (सर्व शून्यं) (1) By the thought "all is momentary," the notion of stability is done away with. (2) By the thought "all is sorrow," the evils of attachment, resentment and activity are shaken off (3) By the thought "all is particular" (the denial of all association) the evils of connection with the genus and the like are brushed aside. (4) By the thought "all is void" the delusions that there are real objects, inward and outward, are removed.

As a result of these meditations, when pure knowledge shines, these delusions disappear, the aspirant is saved from karma and rebirth, and ' *Nirvana* ' is attained.*

* The Buddhists do not accept God. So they do not suggest the practice of devotion. As they do not recognise any permanent self, they do not suggest the practice of discrimination, such as, " the self is really one with the attributeless non-dual consciousness," or " the self as witness is separate from Energy and its modifications," or " the self as having the attributes of knowledge, attachment, sorrow etc. through the relation of *inherence* is distinguished from non-self." They do not accept the *Vedas* as authority, so the perform-

'*Nirvana*' means the elimination of the flow of intelligence like the extinguishing of a flickering lamp. By the cessation of the last consciousness the stream of individual existence becomes like a fire without fuel, and passes into *Nirvana* without attachment. This is liberation, the Supreme End.

ance of Vedic actions is not regarded by them as duty. There is no theological dogma, no personal God, no praise or prayer, no rite or ritual, no religious ceremony in the system established by Buddha. The Buddhists do not recognise any permanent self of limited size (atomic or of the size of the body), so they do not hope to go to some other higher region. They do not accept any all-pervading self, so the annihilation of its inherent attributes or its aloofness or the manifestation of self's eternal joy is not accepted by them. In meditation they try to wipe out the conceptions of the mind and also the emotions and feelings of the heart, and only nothingness remains. This nothingness when temporary is a trance; when permanent *Nirvana*.

APPENDIX C.

I

"The fundamental idea of Buddhism—a plurality of separate elements without real unity. ... One fundamental principle, *viz.* the idea that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind and Forces. These elements are technically called "*dharma*s". The connotation of the term *dharma* implies that—(1) every element is a separate (वृथक्) entity or force. (2) There is no inherence of one element in another, hence no substance apart from its qualities, no Matter beyond the separate sense-data, and no Soul beyond the separate mental data. (3) Elements have no duration, every moment represents a separate element; thought is evanescent, there are no moving bodies, but consecutive appearances, flashings, of new elements in new places (क्षणिकत्व). (4) The elements co-operate with one another. (5) This co-operating activity is controlled by the laws of causation (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद). (6) The world-process is thus a process of co-operation between seventy-two kinds of subtle, evanescent elements, and such is the nature of *dharma*s that they proceed from causes (हेतुप्रभव) and steer towards extinction (निरोध).

(Stcherbatsky's "The Central Conception of Buddhism").

II.

Discussion of Dependent Origination.

On ignorance depends Karma; on Karma depends consciousness (the act of being conscious—mind-consciousness, body-consciousness, eye-consciousness etc.); on consciousness depend name and form; on name and form depend

the six organs of sense (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind); on the six organs of sense depends contact (the act of coming in contact); on contact depends sensation (the pleasant, the unpleasant and the indifferent sensation felt by the body or by the mind); on sensation depends desire; on desire depends attachment; on attachment depends existence; on existence depends birth; on birth depend old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair. Thus does entire aggregation of misery arise.

But on the complete fading out and cessation of ignorance ceases karama; on the cessation of karama ceases consciousness; on the cessation of consciousness cease name and form; on the cessation of name and form cease the six organs of sense: on the cessation of the six organs of sense ceases contact; on the cessation of contact ceases sensation; on the cessation of sensation ceases desire; on the cessation of desire ceases attachment; on the cessation of attachment ceases existence; on the cessation of existence ceases birth; on the cessation of birth cease old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair. Thus does this entire aggregation of misery cease.

EXPOSITION.

Dependent Origination—Inasmuch as it is dependently on each other and in unison and simultaneously that the factors which constitute dependence originate the elements of being, therefore did The Sage call these factors Dependent Origination. (Pali paticcasamuppada).

On ignorance depends karma:—Ignorance is the want of knowledge concerning misery, the origin of misery, the cessation of misery, the path leading to the cessation of misery....“ How can we tell that these karmas are dependent on ignorance ? ” Because they exist when ignorance exists. For, when a person has not abandoned the want of knowledge concerning misery etc., which is called ignorance, then by that want of knowledge concerning misery he

seizes on the misery of the round of rebirth with the idea that it is happiness and hence begins to perform the threefold karma which is its cause ; by that want of knowledge concerning the origin of misery and by being under the impression that thus happiness is secured, he begins to perform karma that ministers to desire, though such karma is really the cause of misery ; and by that want of knowledge concerning cessation and the path and under the impression that some particular form of existence will prove to be the cessation of misery, although it really is not so, or that sacrifices, alarming the gods by the greatness of his austerities and other like procedures are the way to cessation, although they are not such a way, he begins to perform the threefold karma. ... As, therefore, karma exists when ignorance exists but not when it does not exist, it is to be understood that this karma depends on ignorance.

On consciousness depend name and form :-By "Name" are meant the three Groups beginning with Sensation (i.e. Sensation, Perception, and the Predispositions); by "Form," the four elements and form derivative from the four elements.*

* "The amount of the earthy element in the body of a man of medium size is about a bushel, and consists of an exceedingly fine and impalpable powder. This is prevented from being dispersed and scattered abroad, because it is held together by about half a bushel of the watery element and is preserved by the fiery element and is propped up by the windy element. And thus prevented from being dispersed and scattered abroad, it masquerades in many different disguises, such as the various members and organs of women and men, and gives the body its thinness, thickness, length, shortness, firmness, solidity, etc.

The watery element is of a juicy nature and serves to hold the body together. It is prevented from trickling or flowing away, because it rests in the earthy element and is preserved by the fiery element and is propped up by the windy element. And thus prevented from trickling or flowing away, it gives the body its plumpness or leanness.

... When Name has a desire to eat, or to drink or to utter sounds, or to make a movement, then Form eats, drinks, utters sounds, makes a movement. ... "No heap or collection of material exists for the production of Name and Form; nor are Name and Form sprung from any such heap or collection of material; and when Name and Form cease, they do not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass; and after Name and Form have ceased, they do not exist anywhere in the shape of heaped-up material. ... All the elements of being, both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent; and having come into existence pass away. ... Those groups which came into existence in the past existence in dependence on karma, perished then and there. But in dependence on the karma of that existence other groups have come into being in this existence. Not a single element of being has come into this existence from a previous one. The groups which have come into being in this existence in dependence on karma will perish, and others will come into being in the next existence, but

The fiery element has heat as its characteristic, and has a vaporous nature, and digests what is eaten and drunk. Resting in the earthy element and held together by the watery element and propped up by the windy element, it cooks the body and gives it its beauty of complexion. And the body thus cooked is kept free from decay.

The windy element is characterized by its activeness and its ability to prop up, and courses through every member of the body. Resting in the earthy element and held together by the watery element and preserved by the fiery element, it props up the body. And it is because the body is thus propped up that it does not fall over, but stands upright. And it is when the body is impelled by the windy element that it performs its four functions of walking, standing, sitting, or lying-down, or draws in and stretches out its arms, or moves its hands and its feet.

Thus does this machine made of the four elements move like a puppet, and deceives all foolish people with its femininity, masculinity, etc."

not a single element of being will go from this existence into the next. Moreover just as the words of the teacher do not pass over into the mouth of the pupil who nevertheless repeats them ; and just as holy water drunk by the messenger sent for the purpose does not pass into the belly of the sick man and nevertheless in dependence on this water is the sickness allayed ; and just as the features of the face do not pass to the reflection in mirrors and the like and nevertheless in dependence on them does the image appear ; and just as the flame does not pass over from the wick of one lamp to that of another and nevertheless the flame of the second lamp exists in dependence on that of the former ; in exactly the same way not a single element of being passes over from a previous existence into the present existence, nor hence into the next existence : and yet in dependence on the groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousnesses of the last existence were born those of this one, and from the present groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousnesses will be born the groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousnesses of the next existence. ... Another grasps the dependence of name and form by considering the round of karma and the round of its fruit as follows :

“Behold ! in a former karma-existence, infatuation-ignorance, initiatory karma, longing desire, approximating attachment, and thought-existence, these five factors were the dependence for conception into this existence ; rebirth-consciousness, the descent of name and form, the sensitiveness of the organs of sense, the contact experienced, the sensation felt, these five factors belonging to the originating-existence of the present life depend on the karma of a previous existence ; when the senses have matured, then infatuation-ignorance, ... thought-existence, these five factors of a present karma-existence are the dependence of rebirth in the future.” “I have said that on consciousness depend name and form. This truth, Ananda, that on consciousness

depend name and form, is to be understood in this way. Suppose, Ananda, consciousness were not to descend into the maternal womb, pray, would name and form consolidate in the maternal womb?" "Nay, verily, Reverend Sir". Suppose, Ananda, consciousness, after descending into the maternal womb, were then to go away again, pray, would name and form be born to life in the world?" "Nay, verily, Reverend Sir." "Suppose, Ananda, consciousness were to be severed from a child, either boy or girl, pray, would name and form attain to growth, increase, and development?" "Nay, verily, Reverend Sir". "Accordingly Ananda, here we have in consciousness the cause, the occasion, the origin, and the dependence of name and form.

On desire depends attachment :—The following are the four attachments; the attachment of sensual pleasure, the attachment of heresy, the attachment of fanatical conduct, the attachment of the assertion of an Ego. ... Now, as the round of rebirth is without known beginning and it is impossible to say which corruption first arises, no absolute order of sequence can be laid down; but in any particular existence the order most commonly followed is for the heresy of the assertion of an Ego to come first and be followed by a heretical belief either in the persistence of existences or in their annihilation. Then he who believes that the Ego is persistent adopts the attachment of the heresy of fanatical conduct to purify his Ego, and he who believes that the Ego is annihilated, being reckless of a future life, adopts the attachment of sensual pleasure. Thus the sequence of originating in any particular existence is for the attachment of the heresy of the assertion of an Ego to come first and after it the attachments of heresy, fanatical conduct, and sensual pleasure.

On attachment depends existence :—"Existence" is so called because it is an existing. It is twofold; karma-existence, and originating-existence... karma-existence is in brief thought and the elements covetousness etc., which go under

the name of karma and exist conjoined with thought. ... Moreover all karma conducive to existence is karma-existence. ... Originating-existence, however, is in brief the groups which have come into existence through karma. ... By the meritorious karma etc., intended in the proposition, "On ignorance depends karma," meritorious and demeritorious factors of being only are meant; but in the present case, in the proposition, "On attachment depends existence," inasmuch as originating-existence is included, all elements of being, whether meritorious or demeritorious or indeterminate are intended.

On existence depends birth:—By existence is here meant only karma-existence. For that and not originating existence is the dependence of birth. Moreover it is its dependence in only one of two ways, namely, as karma-dependence or as proximate dependence. If it be asked in this connection, "But how do we know that existence is the dependence of birth?" we answer, "Because differences in respect of meanness, greatness, etc. are apparent, even when the external dependence remains the same. For even when the external dependence, such as the seed, blood, food, etc., of father and mother are the same, differences of meanness, greatness, etc. in the progeny are observable, and that even in the case of twins. And these differences are due to a cause, for some do not have these differences; but these differences can have no other cause than karma, from the non-existence of any other instrumentality for the purpose in the sequence of beings who show these differences. Thus they have only karma-existence as their cause. Karma is indeed the cause for the difference in beings as regards meanness, greatness, etc. Therefore has The Blessed One said:—"Karma allots beings to meanness or greatness." Therefore is it to be understood that existence is the dependence of birth.*

* "The Buddhists say that this subjective effect (karma-result) continues after death into the next life. The following illustration

"Suppose, Ananda, there were utterly and completely no existence at all for any one in any mode, as, namely, existence in the realm of sensual pleasure, existence in the realm of form, existence in the realm of formlessness; if there were nowhere any existence, pray, on the cessation of existence would there be any birth?" "Nay, verily, Reverend Sir."

may tend to make the general idea of the perpetuation of character (karma) without identity of substance seem more reasonable.....A swallow's egg cannot hatch out a lark because of the difference in heredity. The countless influences that affected the ancestors of that egg, and the numberless actions performed under those influences are in some mysterious way stored up in that egg, and must bear their own fruit and none other. Therefore a swallow's egg cannot hatch out a lark, because a lark is the result of an entirely different set of conditions; as we might say, its karma is different. But of course the Buddhists do not mean heredity when they use the word karma. 'Karma' expresses, not that which a man inherits from his ancestors, but that which he inherits from himself in some previous state of existence. But with this difference the Buddhist doctrine and the scientific doctrine of heredity seem very similar.

Not all deeds, however, are fruitful and perpetuate existence. Karma is like heredity in that it is an informing principle which must have an embodiment. Just as the informing principle of an egg would never find expression without the accompaniment of yolk, albumen, and other material constituents, so karma embeds itself in objects of desire in order to form that factitious entity which goes by the name of man. If karma be performed in a state of pure passionlessness, that is, without attachment to anything, then it is barren. The fruitful karma will be quickly undermined and not suffered to bear the full fruit it otherwise would have done. Like a tree whose nourishment has been poisoned, the being who performs such karma will cease to be...Thus a being without karma is as arbitrary a conception as a chicken without heredity, that is, one formed by creative fiat independent of antecedent conditions. (Introductory Discourse on Karma and Rebirth in Henry Clarke Warren's "Buddhism in Translations.")

Thus does entire aggregation of misery arise :—Here it is to be understood that karma and existence form the round of karma ; ignorance, desire, and attachment form the round of the corruptions ; and consciousness, name and form, the six organs of sense, contact, and sensation form the round of fruition. And it is through these three that this Wheel of Existence is said to have three rounds ; and as long as the round of corruptions is uninterrupted, because its dependence has not been cut off, the Wheel of Existence is incessant ; and inasmuch as it turns over and over again, it revolves. ... This Wheel of Existence constantly and continuously rolls onward, without known beginning, without a personal cause or passive recipient and empty with twelve-fold emptiness. ... Inasmuch as ignorance is the imprisonment of him who seizes it, and the deliverance of him who lets it go, it is the chief but not the beginning. Thus is to be understood the clause : *The Wheel of Existence is without known beginning*. Now inasmuch as the factors of being, karma etc., exist by reason of their own causes, ignorance etc., therefore is this same Wheel of Existence wanting in any other cause for the round of rebirth, such as Brahma etc., conceived of under the names of Brahma, Great Brahman, The Chief, The Victorious One, and is also wanting in any Ego passively recipient of happiness and misery, conceived of as " This I that talks and feels." Thus is to be understood the phrase : *Without a personal cause or passive recipient*... Inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, belongs to no Ego, is comprised in no Ego, possesses no Ego, similarly with reference to Karma and the rest,—therefore is it to be understood of the Wheel of Existence that it is *empty with a twelvefold emptiness*.

On the cessation of desire ceases attachment :—In looking upon Form and the other Groups as having a nature resembling bubbles of foam and the like, the meditative priest ceases to look upon the unsubstantial as substantiality... To particularize :—In looking upon subjective Form as im-

pure, he comes thoroughly to understand material food abandons the perverse mistaking of the impure for the pure, crosses the torrent of sensual pleasure, breaks loose from the yoke of sensual pleasure, is freed from the depravity of sensual pleasure, severs the myriad bonds of covetousness, and does not attach himself by the Attachment of Sensual Pleasure. In looking upon Sensation as misery, he comes thoroughly to understand the nutriment called contact, abandons the perverse mistaking of misery for happiness, crosses the torrent of existence, breaks loose from the yoke of existence, is freed from the depravity of passion for existence, severs the myriad bonds of malevolence, and does not attach himself by the Attachment of Fanatical Conduct. In looking upon Perception and the Predispositions as not an Ego, he comes thoroughly to understand the nutriment called karma, abandons the perverse mistaking of what is no Ego for an Ego, crosses the torrent of heresy, breaks loose from the yoke of heresy, is freed from the depravity of heresy, severs the myriad bonds of dogmatism, and does not attach himself by the Attachment of the Assertion of an Ego. In looking upon Consciousness as transitory, he comes thoroughly to understand the nutriment called consciousness, abandons the perverse mistaking of the transitory for the permanent, crosses the torrent of ignorance, breaks loose from the yoke of ignorance, is freed from the depravity of ignorance, severs the myriad bonds of an affectation of fanatical conduct, and does not attach himself by the Attachment of Heresy.

Thus does this entire aggregation of misery cease :—

“And what, O priests, is the noble truth of the path leading to the cessation of misery ?

It is this noble eightfold path, to wit, right belief, right resolve, right speech, right behavior, right occupation, right effort, right contemplation, right concentration.

And what, O priests, is right belief ?

The knowledge of misery, O priests, the knowledge of the origin of misery, the knowledge of the cessation of misery, and the knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of misery, this, O priests, is called "right belief."

And what, O priests, is right resolve ?

The resolve to renounce sensual pleasures, the resolve to have malice towards none, and the resolve to harm no living creature, this, O priests, is called "right resolve."

And what, O priests, is right speech ?

To abstain from falsehood, to abstain from backbiting, to abstain from harsh language, and to abstain from frivolous talk, this, O priests, is called "right speech."

And what, O priests, is right behavior.

To abstain from destroying life, to abstain from taking that which is not given one, and to abstain from immorality, this, O priests, is called "right behavior."

And what, O priests, is right occupation ?

Whenever, O priests, a noble disciple, quitting a wrong occupation, gets his livelihood by a right occupation, this, O priests, is called "right occupation."

And what, O priests, is right effort ?

Whenever, O priests, a priest purposes, makes an effort, heroically endeavours, applies his mind, and exerts himself that evil and demeritorious qualities not yet arisen may not arise ; purposes, makes an effort, heroically endeavours, applies his mind, and exerts himself that evil and demeritorious qualities already arisen may be abandoned ; purposes, makes an effort, heroically endeavours, applies his mind, and exerts himself that meritorious qualities not yet arisen may arise ; purposes, make an effort, heroically endeavours, applies his mind, and exerts himself for the preservation, retention, growth, increase, development, and perfection of meritorious qualities already arisen, this, O priest, is called "right effort."

And what, O priests, is right contemplation ?

Whenever, O priests, a priest lives, as respects the body, observant of the body, strenuous, conscious, contemplative, and has rid himself of lust and grief ; as respects sensations, observant of sensations, strenuous, conscious, contemplative, and has rid himself of lust and grief, as respects the mind, observant of the mind, strenuous, conscious, contemplative, and has rid himself of lust and grief, as respects the elements of being, observant of the elements of being, strenuous, conscious, contemplative, and has rid himself of lust and grief, this, O priests, is called "right contemplation."

And what, O priests, is called "right concentration ?"

Whenever, O priests, a priest, having isolated himself from sensual pleasures, having isolated himself from demeritorious traits, and still exercising reasoning, still exercising reflection, enters upon the first trance which is produced by isolation and characterised by joy and happiness ; when through the subsidence of reasoning and reflection, and still retaining joy and happiness, he enters upon the second trance, which is an interior tranquilization and intentness of the thoughts, and is produced by concentration ; when through the paling of joy, indifferent, contemplative, conscious, and in the experience of bodily happiness—that state which eminent men describe when they say, "Indifferent, contemplative, and living happily"—he enters upon the third trance ; when, through the abandonment of happiness, through the abandonment of misery, through the disappearance of all antecedent gladness and grief, he enters upon the fourth trance, which has neither misery nor happiness, but is contemplation as refined by indifference, this, O priests, is called "right concentration*."

* "But again, O priests, a priest through having completely over-passed all perceptions of forms, through the perishing of perceptions of inertia and through ceasing to dwell on perceptions of diversity, says to himself, 'Space is infinite,' and dwells in the realm

This, O priests, is called the noble truth of the path leading to the cessation of misery."

"Accordingly, Malunkyaputta, bear always in mind what it is that I have not elucidated, and what it is that I have elucidated. And what, Malunkyaputta, have I not elucidated? I have not elucidated, Malunkyaputta, that the world is eternal; I have not elucidated that world is not eternal; I have not elucidated that the world is finite; I have not elucidated that the world is in-

of the infinity of space. ... But again, O priests, a priest through having completely overpassed the realm of the infinity of space, says to himself, 'Consciousness is infinite,' and dwells in the realm of the infinity of consciousness. ... But again, O priests, a priest through having completely overpassed the realm of the infinity of consciousness, says to himself, 'Nothing exists,' and dwells in the realm of nothingness. ... But again, O priests, a priest through having completely overpassed the realm of nothingness, dwells in the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception. ... But again, O priests, a priest through having completely overpassed the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception, arrives at the cessation of perception and sensation, and before the clear vision of wisdom all his depravity wastes away."

"And moreover, O priest, I have taught the gradual cessation of karma. Of one who has entered the first trance the voice has ceased; of one who has entered the second trance reasoning and reflection have ceased; of one who has entered the third trance joy has ceased; of one who entered the fourth trance the inspirations and the expirations have ceased; of one who has entered the realm of the infinity of space the perception of form has ceased; of one who has entered the realm of the infinity of consciousness the perception of the realm of the infinity of space has ceased; of one who has entered the realm of nothingness the perception of the realm of the infinity of consciousness has ceased; of one who has entered the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception, the perception of the realm of nothingness has ceased; of one who has entered the cessation of perception and sensation, perception and sensation have ceased. Of the priest who has lost all depravity, passion has ceased, hatred has ceased, infatuation has ceased."

finite; I have not elucidated that the soul and the body are identical; I have not elucidated that the soul is one thing and the body another; I have not elucidated that the saint exists after death; I have not elucidated that the saint does not exist after death; I have not elucidated that the saint both exists and does not exist after death; I have not elucidated that the saint neither exists nor does not exist after death. And why, Malunkyaputta, have I not elucidated this? Because, Malunkyaputta, this profits not, nor has to do with the fundamentals of religion, nor tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, the supernatural faculties, supreme wisdom, and Nirvana; therefore have I not elucidated it.

“ And what, Malunkyaputta, have I elucidated? Misery, Malunkyaputta, have I elucidated; the origin of misery have I elucidated; the cessation of misery have I elucidated; and the path leading to the cessation of misery have I elucidated? And why, Malunkyaputta, have I elucidated this? Because, Malunkyaputta, this does profit, has to do with the fundamentals of religion, and tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and Nirvana; therefore have I elucidated it? Accordingly, Malunkyaputta, bear always in mind what it is that I have not elucidated, and what it is that I have elucidated.

Thus spake The Blessed one ” (Tathagata-Buddha).

(Collected together from Mr. Warren's Translations of many Pali-Works—The Harvard Oriental Series).

The Conception of self as medium-sized and of 'Aloka-Ākāśa' as the goal.

There are others who consider that the self is stable eternal consciousness and is of the size of one's own body.*

* According to this Jaina view, the nature of existence is not efficiency nor is it immutable. *Existence* is called substance (द्रव्य). That which having left one state always attains another state is a substance. The state of the substance is of two kinds—one is coherent (सहजाद्यी=गुण), the other is successive (क्रमभाद्यी=पर्याय). In some state the thing (substance) is somewhat produced and in some other state, it is somewhat lost, and by some modification, there is duration of the thing. As for example, the thing is produced in the form of the pot, is lost in the lump-form and endures in the form of the the earth. These three states come to be at the same time, but they are not of one form. If different times of production and disappearance are admitted, then the thing will be lost. But the thing does not leave its thinghood, hence it is eternal, and it always changes its states, hence it is non-eternal. Thus existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. Production (उत्पत्ति), disappearance (अपत्ति) and duration (व्यतिथि) are inseparable and interdependent. If disappearance as independent of production, is accepted, then there will be destruction of the thing without any remainder. If mere production independent of disappearance is accepted, then there will be production of the non-existent, or owing to the absence of the cause, there will be no production. If duration as independent of production and disappearance is accepted, then the thing will be devoid of transformations. But it is contradictory to direct experience, because things are perceived as being modified. Thus everything has infinite aspects of the nature of production, disappearance and duration, hence they are of manifold natures.

The nature of a thing is not uniform. If it is absolutely existent, then everything will be of the same nature and if it is absolutely non-existent, then it will have no nature at all. Hence everything is

It has the innate nature of rising to higher and higher regions. But in its mundane state its natural upward movement is obstructed by Karma. Karma veils self-consciousness and binds it. To explain,—the defilement of the self takes place owing to its connection with atomic eternal matter called '*Pudgala*'. *Pudgalas* (having the qualities

existent in its own form and non-existent in the form of the other. The pot which is characterised according to the difference of its own substance, own place, own time and own nature is existent in the form of its own substance etc. and the very same pot is non-existent in the form of another substance etc. In a pot everything besides pot remains in the form of negation. To assert one's own existence and to reject other's existence is the thinghood of things. If one's own existence is not asserted, then there will be the absence of that thing and if other's existence is not rejected, then everything will be of a uniform nature. So the pot is not of one nature. Take the case of a man. The same person has many natures e. g. fatherhood, brotherhood etc. Though these aspects appear as if contradictory, still they are not really so, because these aspects are not non-relative, but relative, and the relations conditioning these aspects are also different. Hence, it is the very nature of a substance to possess without involving contradiction various aspects. Everything has infinite distinctions conditioned by its relation to infinite things. If it were not so, then all these infinite things would become one but this does not happen. These things are not one but different, hence everything has infinite otherness in relation to infinite things, therefore its nature is not capable of being expressed through a uniform predication. This is अनेकान्तवाद the theory of the Indefiniteness of Being. To quote H. Jacobi :—"Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins contend, but is of a complicated nature; therefore every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and, if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we are bound to go astray. Hence it is usual in explaining notions to state what the thing under discussion is with reference to substance, place, time and state of being".

All things i. e. substances are divided into lifeless things (अजीव) and living (जीव). The self is, according to this view, not the substance in which knowledge *inheres* as its attribute, nor it is the

of touch, taste, odour and colour) are particular types of atoms (innumerable) by whose combination (atoms are not constant in their nature, but are subject to change or development परिणाम) all material things are ultimately produced. There are two states of *Pudgala*, gross and subtle. Gross matter consists of those things which we perceive, while the subtle are beyond our perception. Subtle matter, for instance, is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of Karma. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into Karma pours into the self. The subtle matter thus caught by the self (with passions) enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it. This is the bondage of the self. In other words, the modifications of the self such as attachment and the like, become cause of the gathering of fresh Karma, which is nothing but modifications of *pudgala*—substance. Owing to this, there is interpenetration (अवगाह or अनुगम) between the self and Karminic particles of matter. This interpenetration may be compared to that between the red-hot iron and fire. This is bondage. To shake off bondage, detachment (वैतराग) should be practised. A radical destruction of false knowledge and consequent false activity,—which are modifications of the self, arising from its conjunction with the body and *manas*—constitutes the main spiritual practice. The highest goal is to get rid of Karma and meanwhile to acquire no

witness-consciousness, but it has the attribute of consciousness which is different as well as non-different from the self. The self pervades the whole body because throughout the body consciousness is experienced. The self pervades big or small bodies through expansion and contraction of itself (loose or dense conjunction of parts, or through the passing off of old parts or arrival of fresh parts). According to this theory, the whole (अवयवी)—substance is not separate from part-substance (अवयवद्रव्य), but it is the essence, combination and a particular modification of parts (अवयव).

new Karma. When a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance with the rules of right conduct, his actions produce Karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated. The prevention of the formation of new Karma is accomplished by austerities (*Tapas* like fasting, confessing and repenting of sins, modest behaviour, doing services to others, studying, overcoming all temptations, contemplation ध्यान) which, moreover, annihilate the old Karma more speedily than would happen in the common course of things. When through moral, devotional, and ascetic practices, the bondage of Karma, the main impediment to liberation, is shaken off, there arises in the self its natural upward movement. As a result of this, the self rises higher and higher till it reaches the region of pure Akāsha, called '*Aloka*' which is situated at the top of our limited ākāsha, and thence it does not return. The self is then permanently relieved of wandering on the earth (mundane existence) and becomes the enjoyer of infinite, imperishable and unveiled happiness, untouched by all sorrow. This is liberation, the Supreme Ideal. *

* Some philosophers belonging to this school of thought give another version about the nature of self and its liberation. The self, according to them, is essentially consciousness, eternal, stable and all-pervading. It is, however, perpetually self-transforming and thereby giving rise to infinite attributes. Its essential unity is not in the least affected by these transformations and attributes. It remains as the one Substance underlying all these changes and attributes. This self is however regarded as eternally bound up with the world, which is the ground of its bondage. The relation between the Jiva and the *Pudgala* (The Jains, unlike others, regard karma as physical) as well as the sequence of agency and action (कर्तृकर्मप्रवृत्ति) is beginningless and is due to beginningless ignorance (not a cosmic principle). On account of this, Jiva possesses attachment, resentment and delusion. When the Jiva knows that the self is inherently dissociated from the evils of attachment, resentment and delusion, and

III

The Conception of all-pervading selves as having the attributes of knowledge, sorrow etc. and as becoming deprived of them in liberation.

Others are of opinion that the self is an all-pervading changeless entity having the special quality of knowledge and the like which are not its modification.*

meditates on the infinite energy and purity of the self which are its essence (infinite consciousness, Joy and strength are inherent characteristics of the Jiva—the self), then for him the sequence of agency and action sustained by ignorance, though beginningless is eliminated. And as soon as this is eliminated, the bondage of karma vanishes. Through this pure knowledge all the veils due to the self's relation with karma are annihilated, delusion is destroyed and liberation full of infinite Joy is attained.

* According to this Naiyayika-Vaisheshika view, what are called the states of the self are taken as attributes altogether different from the self. (modification as change of state is not recognised by them, they acknowledge change of place of atomic substances.) These non-eternal attributes become inseparable from the self owing to the relation of *inherence*. Whenever knowledge is produced in the self, the self becomes manifest and when knowledge is not produced, then the self remains unmanifest. Through its conjunction with *manas* (the inner instrument—the organ of thought) it becomes conscious i.e. becomes inherently related to consciousness. As every action is dependent on instrument (करण) different from the actor, *manas* is inferred as the instrument of the act of knowledge. Both self and *manas* are eternal substances; but the self is all-pervading, while *manas* is atomic. *Manas* is atomic because (in their view) different perceptions or other psychological processes do not take place simultaneously. On account of its minute size as an atom the organ of thought can unite at any given instant only with a single sense and can only convey the idea of a single object. So there is no mind which is the support of knowledge as its modification. The first knowledge (प्रत्यक्ष) is known by an after

Owing to false knowledge about the self and the non-self, the self acquires attachment and aversion towards objects, and so there is activity (प्रवृत्ति) on the part of the self. As a result of this activity, which is virtuous or vicious, the self, in order to cognise objects, becomes embodied. This association of the all-pervading self with the body is the cause of its cycle of births and deaths. This association is the source of all sufferings of the self. The continuous mundane existence (संसार) is an unbroken series of causes and effects, constituted by false knowledge, attachment and aversion, activity and suffering. This mundane existence is without beginning. Suffering cannot be said to be the first member of this series. There can be no suffering without birth. Birth cannot be the first member of this series, because it is not possible without 'Karma.' Virtue and vice cannot be the first members, because these cannot exist independently of attachment and resentment. Attachment and resentment likewise cannot be the first members, because these too cannot exist without false knowledge

knowledge (अनुव्यवसाय apperception—the object with its knowledge is known through apperception), both being supported in the self which does not thereby get modified. (It is for this reason that they do not feel the necessity of recognising witness-self).

Prabhākara's views about self and liberation are akin to the Naiyāyikas, though *Sādhana* is different (performance of Vedic karma with knowledge). Prabhākara also hold with Naiyāyikas, that the self is in itself an unconscious entity and knowledge is produced in it through its conjunction with the *manas*; whenever there is the production of knowledge, there is manifestation of the object and the self never becomes an object of knowledge, though due to the production of knowledge in it, it is illumined. The difference of the two views is this that according to the Naiyāyikas, the self becomes illuminated through another knowledge called apperception, but the Prabhākaras observe that knowledge by being produced in the self illuminates itself, its object and its own support—the self.

False knowledge cannot be the starting-point of the series because there can be no false knowledge unless there is a body. Thus this mundane existence consisting of the uninterrupted series of causes and effects, extending from suffering to false knowledge, is without a beginning. As no member of this series can be said to be either the antecedent or the consequent of the other members, the series must be beginningless.

The aim of all spiritual practice is to get freedom from this bondage. Freedom from all sorrows is to be attained by the destruction of false knowledge. This destruction is possible only by the intuition of the self, and the cause of this intuition is hearing of the scriptures, intellectual analysis of their meaning and meditation. All the objects of valid cognition (including the embodied self) except the pure self and liberation should be looked upon as things to be shunned. Knowledge of the self as non-different from the body becomes the cause of mundane existence and the true knowledge about the self (as intrinsically bereft of pleasure and pain) brings about the cessation of mundane existence. By the discrimination of the characteristics of the six categories (the substance etc.) the distinction of the self from the not-self is intellectually cognised. But this by itself cannot lead to liberation. The wrong knowledge, to be driven out, requires supersensuous intuition of the self. The method of this intuition is meditation. When a person, after knowing indirectly the nature of the self through the scriptures and through intellectual discrimination stated above, thinks intensely and with concentration over it, his meditation ripens thereby. Meditation gives direct knowledge of the self only when the *Sādḥaka* (one who practises meditation) is wholly absorbed in the object of contemplation. This is the

mature stage of meditation. When meditation on the self by the "*Sādhaka*" reaches this stage, he gets proper knowledge of the self and becomes illumined, And this acquisition of truth (intuition of the self as it really is) ejects wrong knowledge (the notion of the self in the non-self and the egoistic feeling namely these are myself and mine).

Once wrong knowledge is dispelled, it does not arise again. This happens because these two are contradictory in nature and cannot abide together. In the absence of wrong knowledge, all sorts of attachment vanish. This is due to the fact that attachment is the effect of wrong knowledge, and when its cause is absent, its effect cannot be present. As a result of the attainment of knowledge, the defects of a person disappear and consequently his virtue and vice become extinct. Though through previous impressions (संस्कार) there is activity, and due to this there is production of 'karma', still there is no production of 'अदृष्ट' (unseen results of karma), because the false knowledge which is the cause of 'अदृष्ट' is no more.

To explain,—the results of "Karma" are of three kinds—(1) Some of them are not reaped in this life, but are stored for the lives to come. They are called stored-up karma (सञ्चित). (2) Some of them are reaped in this body and are, in fact the cause of this body. They are called fructifying karma (प्राग्भूत). (3) But in this body new "Karmas" are being done, and they will give rise to certain results which we are likely to experience in lives to come. A portion of these may form a part of the fructifying Karma, and the residue, the stored-up karma for the next life. These are called current Karma (क्रियमाण). Of the new "Karmas" done in this life, those which are done after the intuition of the self are not capable of producing their results, because false knowledge which is the cause of the results of "karma" is now absent.

“Karma” done in this life, before illumination, has become as good as stored-up karma. Of stored-up karmas, inclusive of karmas done before the acquisition of the knowledge of the self, some are virtuous and some vicious. Among these, those that are vicious are eliminated by the fire of contemplation and those that are virtuous are eliminated by the joy due to the intense contemplation of Truth. Knowledge cannot destroy the fructifying karmas ; they are destroyed by being experienced. The old *अदृष्ट* is destroyed by the fire of knowledge. Hence at the expiry of previous “Karma” there is no other “Karma” to be experienced. As a result of this, there can be no birth, and at the end of the experience of the results of ‘*Prārabhata*’ (प्रारब्ध) in the present body, the absolute elimination of sorrow takes place. This is liberation, the *Summum Bonum*.

A kindred school of thought, believing in the same concept of practice and liberation, offers a slightly different view regarding the division of categories. They** entertain the belief that to remove bondage, a knowledge of the twelve objects of valid cognition (i. e. *प्रमेय*) is required. These objects are—the self, the body, sense-organs, objects of the senses, consciousness, *manas*, activity, defect, birth after death, result, sorrow and liberation. Of these, the self is the experiencer of pleasure and pain, the seat of those experiences is the body; the means of experiencing are the sense-organs; the things experienced are the objects of the senses ; experience of pleasure and pain is the consciousness; the inner instrument of experience is the *manas*; virtue and vice are called activities; and faults like attachment (राग) resentment (द्वेष) and delusion (मोह) are the causes of birth. Through birth the self becomes again and again related

** The Naiyāyikas.

with the body. The reaping of various results of "karma", the body and the instruments like the sense-organs are technically called results. This uninterrupted series or succession of births and deaths is called sorrow. The absolute dissolution of sorrow is termed liberation.*

IV

The conception of self as pure consciousness and of liberation as perfectly isolated self-existence.

Others hold that the self is the all-pervading, attributeless consciousness. This attributeless self is many in num-

* According to the view under discussion, knowledge, joy and sorrow etc. are produced through the conjunction of self and *manas*. When there is no conjunction between *manas* and self, there is no knowledge etc. This happens in the state of every dreamless sleep. At that time the atomic *manas* enters some subtle voin, whereby it does not become related to the sense of touch. As there is no conjunction of the self with the *manas*, and the *manas* with the sense of touch, there is no production of knowledge in the self. When after awaking from dreamless sleep, a man attains such knowledge as "I did not know anything", this is due to inference of the absence of knowledge during dreamless sleep, (and it is not a case of remembrance as others hold). From this it follows that the self is unconscious. It is also corroborated by our experience, such as 'knowledge is in me' (the difference between the support and the supported is well-known). At the time of liberation the unconscious self remains as it is. There is no knowledge, sorrow and joy, because there is no relation of the body with the *manas*. Though the self and the *manas* are eternal, still at the time of liberation, all virtues and vices earned are no more; owing to this, the conditions for the distinct conjunction of the self with the body, the sense-organs and the like become absent, and consequently there can be no birth. The possibility of birth being overcome, the annihilation of sorrow takes place. The self thereafter remains eternally an absolute sorrowless, joyless, consciousness-less entity. This is, according to them, the ultimate goal of life.

ber, and is by nature free.* But besides these ever-free selves, there is the principle called "*Prakriti*", an unconscious self-evolving Energy which is the root material cause of the world of experience. The bondage of the ever-free self is due to its contact with the unconscious Energy. This contact again is due to beginningless non-discrimination. Thus the ever-free self becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain through its contact with the unconscious Energy**.

* According to this view of the Sāṃkhyas, the self (*Puruṣa*) is taken as the seer (ग्राहक) of, and distinct from, the not-self. Not-self comprises knowledge (ग्रहण) and the known (ग्राह्य). By the mind-stuff we think the known (that which is cognised through five external attributes namely sound, touch, colour, taste and odour) in many ways; by sense-organs we know it, by organs of action it is caused to move and by the power of vital airs the body is preserved. Besides the known and the knowledge there is another entity namely which knows (ग्राहक). The Sāṃkhyas regard the self (*Puruṣa*) as merely consciousness, and not the support of consciousness. There is nothing called the relation of *inherence*; so non-eternal knowledge, sorrow etc. are not inherent in the self, but are the states or modifications of intelligence (बुद्धि) which requires for its illumination some self-manifest unmodified witness-self. As intelligence is ever known, its knower is unmodified. Thus, according to this view, knowledge and after-knowledge (which are non-eternal and innumerable) are not inherently supported in unconscious self (as the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika-Prābhākaras uphold), but knowledge is the modification of intelligence which becomes illuminated by one eternal witness-consciousness. To account for the dissimilarity of individual experiences, they assert, self should be regarded as many. Without the difference of *Puruṣas* (selves), they say, the difference of mind-stuffa cannot be explained.

** If the self of itself enjoys objects (विषयताग्रहण), then there will be no liberation (extinction of all experience). So there is some medium (मार्ग). It is not merely eyes and other sense-organs (external organs), because when they stop working, even then thoughts etc. are produced. Nor is this merely *manas* (inner organ), because when it becomes calm (प्रज्ञात्न), even then in dream a human being has the egoistic notion of being the other, say, the tiger etc. Nor is it

Unconscious Energy ("*Prakriti*") with its manifestation namely the faculty of apprehension (*Buddhi* or intelligence) etc., falls under the category of the experienced. That Energy, if unmodified, cannot be the means of such experience of the self. To serve this end, it has to modify itself as intelligence and the like. The entire objective world as well as the world of subjective operations are the products of the evolution of *Prakriti*. The processes of knowledge take place in *Buddhi* in relation to the *manas*, sense-organs and their objects, which are all the evolutes of *Prakriti*. The self only witnesses the operation of *Buddhi* (faculty which is operative in every form of empirical consciousness). In thus witnessing the operations of intelligence, the self does not go through any transformation of its intrinsic nature, but simply reflects itself on intelligence. So experience of the self means the reflection of consciousness (self) on intelligence. Owing to this conjunction or interrelation of intelligence and the self, intelligence, which is intrinsically unconscious, being the modification of *Prakriti*, comes to appropriate the nature of consciousness and appears as conscious. This interrelation backed by the eternal non-discrimination by the self of its nature as distinct from Energy leads the self to consider every act of Energy as its own and to experience pleasure and pain in reference to those activities that fall to the share of Energy. And when it takes the Energy as a separate entity and learns that it is only a cause of its troubles and refrains ended in "ego", (अहं) because when it stops in dreamless sleep, the "intelligence" (बुद्धि) is proved as the support of the effort which is the cause of inhalation and exhalation. This also cannot be said to be the limit, because that also is limited (परिमित), and hence an effect. The cause of बुद्धि is the unmanifest, unlimited. There is no proof about its being manifest or limited. If it is assumed, then there will be infinite regression. Hence, the unmanifest (अव्यक्त) is the unlimited primal cause.

from enjoying its activities, it remains self-complete. The ultimate end of all activities of Energy is the liberation of the self that is in bondage. The course of evolution of the unconscious Energy will terminate for each individual, when he realises the essential nature of his own self. To those who know the truth, the Energy remains inactive and hence as good as non-existent, but for others its activity does not cease. So according to this view bondage is due to non-discrimination (अविवेक) between the self and the Energy, and liberation results from the discrimination (विवेक) of the two. When by discriminative knowledge this beginningless non-discrimination is removed, then the Energy does not lead the previously bound self to sweet and bitter experiences. The interrelation of the self and Energy being removed with the removal of non-discrimination, it (Energy) does not serve this individual again. From this results the complete and absolute cessation of all kinds of sorrows, and the self, which is by nature unassociated and self-complete, becomes dissociated from *Prakriti*. Even this knowledge of the distinction of the self from *Prakriti* and the consciousness of its absolute purity vanish at the state of absolute liberation. Hence isolation or detachment of unconditioned self from the phenomenal world is liberation, the final End.

The theme of liberation may also be dealt with in a slightly different manner. From the intuition of the difference between the self and the not-self, (that is, from discrimination such as the following :—"the self is pure consciousness, eternal and ever free, and the not-self is unconscious; the self is unmodified, and the not-self is modified; the self is the seer, and the not-self is the seen") all egoistic notions in the shape of "I am the doer" etc., are eliminated. Hence, the effects of egoism, namely attachment, resentment, virtue and vice,

are not produced. And the karma which is already in store, cannot, owing to the extirpation (burning दाह) of ignorance, attachment and the like begin to bear fruit. The 'prārabdha' karma (which have already begun to fructify) however, which is the cause of the body, can only be exhausted by being reaped, because it has already begun to produce results. The burning (दाह) of karma means the failure of *sancita* karma (already in store) to bear fruit. But the destruction (नाश) of karma means something more, i. e. the destruction of the mind-stuff after the reaping of the results of *prārabdha* karma which preserves the body. The destruction of the cause means the destruction of the effect; the destruction of 'karma' means the destruction of the cycle of births. Thus liberation, i.e., the absolute elimination of sorrow, takes place.

In short, the mundane existence (संसार) of the self is nothing but the reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब) of sorrow, which is in the mind-stuff (अन्तःकरण), on the self (पुरुष) which is related to it. When after the rise of discriminative knowledge, the mind-stuff disappears, the elimination of that reflected sorrow takes place. This is liberation of the self, the realisation of our purpose.

According to a school of kindred thinking,** the same is the nature of liberation, i. e., with the elimination of intelligence and the like there is absolute negation of the experience of pleasure and pain; still it is effected mainly by the suppression of mental functions (योग) and not by discrimination (विवेक) alone.*

** The Pātanjal-yoga system.

* According to the view under discussion joy is an unconscious entity, being the manifestation of some constituent (*Sattva*) of *Prakṛti*, and it is not an attribute of unconscious or conscious self, nor is it the essence of consciousness. So when the self becomes aloof from the embrace of *Prakṛiti*, it cannot enjoy nor be joy itself, but becomes sorrowless.

The Conception of self as essentially blissful and of liberation as the manifestation of this essential character.

Some thinkers consider all-pervading selves* as having eternal consciousness and eternal bliss. These characteristics of the self are not manifested during the mundane existence. But in consequence of the knowledge of truth accompanied by the performance of actions prescribed in the *Vedas* (ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय), the eternal knowledge of the self, which is not dependent on any particular object, shines forth, and its eternal bliss becomes manifest. Though eternal bliss and its eternal knowledge are ever present in the self, still during mundane existence, owing to hindrance of vice etc., this true character of the self is not experienced; but at the state of liberation, every hindrance is entirely destroyed, and this character of the self becomes a matter of actual experience. Though this state is a positive thing, which has been produced, still it is never destroyed; because there is no cause of its destruction. Hence, this eternal bliss is henceforward eternally enjoyed by the liberated self.

*According to this view of the Bhatta-Mīmāṃsaka, the self is neither merely unconscious nor merely conscious nor is it consciousness. It is not the support of consciousness by the relation of *inherence*, nor is it the unmodified witness-consciousness. The self, according to them, is the support of consciousness, which is the modification of the self. The self is of the nature of intelligence-substance. Because the self is different in nature from the known, it is intelligence and because it is the support of qualities like knowledge, it is a substance.

The conception of selves as finite spirits and of liberation as the attainment of the Kingdom of God.

Others maintain that the selves are finite atomic spirits dependent on God, the omnipotent and omniscient Lord of the universe. They hear about God, sing the praise of God, meditate upon God and worship Him with devotion and reverence. According to their feelings and depth of devotion, the devotees look upon God as a master, a friend, a son, a parent, or a lover. Faith in God manifests itself in three forms. The first of these is the spirit of *Service*, being propelled by which a man is led to please the Divinity by doing meritorious works. The second is *self-surrender*, due to which the devotee remains in perfect resignation and entire devotion to the will of God. The third is the *deepened love* in which the devotee becomes attached to the Lord with all the ardour of an affectionate heart and the finite spirit enters into deeper and deeper communion with the Divine. As the result of these "*Sādhandas*", the devotees get rid of mundane existence through the grace of God, ascend to the Spiritual world in which they are in constant communion with their beloved Lord and find sublime spiritual enjoyment there. Their individuality is never merged in God. This is liberation, the Supreme beatitude.

There are some systems of religion* which do not recognise the self as an eternal entity, but regard it as created by God with the creation of the physical organism in which it becomes embodied. The advocates of these systems

* The religious sects of the West.

do not believe in rebirth. According to them the world was not shaped by God out of a pre-existing material. God is creator, not artificer. Creation is an act of bare will of God. They offer worship to God for the salvation of the soul and this worship assumes various forms. Through such worship and spiritual discipline they surrender themselves to the mercy of God and God in his infinite mercy is believed to forgive their sins and to make them pure. As a result of faith (and not by *meditation*) they become saved from sin and hell (not from Karma and rebirth) and become entitled after death to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven in which their purified souls enjoy eternal bliss.

VII.

The Conception of self as an effect of God and of liberation as Unity with Him.

Others* recognise the self as emanated from God and during the state of mundane existence as both different and non-different from Him. The non-dual conscious Reality (Brahman) exists in three forms namely in the forms of cause, the effect and Jiva (individual living being). By means of the discriminative knowledge of God attended by the performance of 'Karma' prescribed in devotional scriptures, intuitive realisation of Truth is attained, and thereby the difference of the self from God is removed and it is freed from Karma and desires. The self which is an effect thus becomes identified with God who is the cause of all. This is liberation, the Divine felicity.

* The Tridandi—Vedāntin and Bhāṭkarācharya.

VIII

The conception of self as the illusory manifestation of attributeless Brahman and of liberation as becoming one with Brahman.

Others** regard the self as essentially a non-dual, attributeless consciousness, but individualised through its illusory identification with the three bodies – gross (स्थूल), subtle (सूक्ष्म) and causal (कारण). The attributes like doership, experience of pleasure and pain etc. being illusorily attributed to the self which is essentially attributeless, one makes effort for the sake of his own liberation. The said illusory identification is due to the active operation of Cosmic Ignorance (अज्ञान). To destroy this root is the main object of *Sādhana*. In order to eliminate an illusory entity, the knowledge of the reality upon which ignorance superimposes the illusion, is necessary. For the elimination of the fancied thing, the knowledge of the substratum is the only remedy. So to get rid of the root-ignorance (मूलविद्या) which has for its substratum Reality and which is the cause of bondage, the knowledge of Reality is required. By such knowledge, one can get rid of individuality and bondage which consist in the illusory connection of the seer (consciousness) and the seen. For this, hearing (श्रवण) of the Scriptural truths, reflection (मनन) upon their significance and meditation (निदिध्यासन) on the ultimate Truth are necessary. As a result of hearing, one can understand without the least shadow of doubt that the self-evident Vedic Scriptures uniformly hold that non-dual “Brahman” is the only Reality. The object of reflection (मनन) is to refute by an intellectual examination all objections that can

** The non-dualistic School of Vedānta.

be urged against this position and to be thoroughly convinced of its logical soundness. The object of meditation is the removal of contrary thoughts and the fixing of the mind in the self.*

By the practice of meditation, one consciously shakes off his identification with the gross, the subtle and the causal bodies. At the first stage of meditation, he struggles to avoid the reference to gross objects outside. Without much efforts, the ardent aspirant manages to succeed in forgetting this reference to external objects. At that time, subtle thoughts, involving no reference to external objects, make an encroachment upon his mind and the person has to make long, constant and bold effort to

* This practice of meditation is not like that of Divine devotion. The practice of devotion (भक्तिसाधना) implies an emphasis upon the individuality of the devotee, looking upon God as possessed of infinite attributes and as distinct from the individual, having personal relationship of the devotee with God and strengthening the feeling of love towards Him. But the person who practises meditation on the non-dual self ignores his individuality, does not consider God's existence to be different from his own, neither thinks upon Godhood nor contemplates any relation with God, does not try to excite in himself the feeling of love, but struggles to forget and merge himself in the absolute homogeneous oneness. Besides, the intuitive knowledge of Reality is indeterminate in character in as much as it refers to an indeterminate object, namely, the attributeless Reality; while devotion is a determinate feeling referring to a determinate object namely God with attributes.

In order to get rid of fickleness, some at first begin by pronouncing monotonous sounds having a prolonged vibration. They take some monosyllabic word which provokes in them spiritual thoughts. This they do in order to facilitate concentration but not with the purpose of practising devotion. When the mind is more calm, they attend without any exertion to subtle and natural breath-sounds. When the mind attains to a greater calmness, a slight effort to become one with the homogeneous existence is made.

check these disturbing thoughts and make his mind calm. Afterwards references, both inner and outer, lapse and a void is felt. At that stage one enjoys, through very subtle mental modification, the sweetness of calmness. In this stage, there is the identification of the self with the causal veil, and the Reality with that veil merely is experienced. In order to remove this veil and thereby to become one with Reality, a subtle mental modification having for its object the same undivided aspect of Reality which is covered by this veil, should be aroused. This mental modification can only arise if the subtle ego abides as if merged with the undivided Reality. This is the trance with thought which leads to the trance without thought. So just before the moment, when the ego lapses and there is the trance without thought, there arises at the last moment of the trance with thought a very subtle mental modification (knowledge) which drives away the root veil and thereby becomes the cause of intuition of the ultimate Reality. Thus we find that the trance without thought is a stage beyond knowledge, a stage in which unqualified Reality alone exists, where the knower and knowledge are experienced as non-different from the known Reality. The trance without thought should be distinguished from dreamless sleep inasmuch as there is no veil in the former, while in the latter, owing to the absence of the mental modification which can drive out ignorance immediately before the arrival of the latter, the causal veil, the seed of bondage, remains as before. Though in trance without thought, there is no veil, still due to fructifying "karma" (कर्म) he awakes from it and his empirical life begins again.

Now, let us prove how the said intuitive knowledge of Reality sets at nought the bondage of the individual for

ever. Because Brahman has no manifold form, its knowledge burns all ignorance without leaving any residue. As Brahman does not possess many forms, so in order to manifest other forms, knowledge is not again necessary. And owing to its self-luminous nature, Brahman has no other unmanifest form. So when the full knowledge of Truth arises, ignorance, the seed of mundane existence, cannot again come into being. Hence it should not be supposed that a residue of ignorance remains after its destruction by knowledge. After the destruction of root-ignorance, there cannot be connection with the causal body again, and the subtle body owing to the absence of karma becomes incapable of migrating. The accumulated karma are lost because the veiling capacity of ignorance which is the support of it (सञ्चितकर्म) is absent. Because of the absence of its support the fructifying karma (प्रारब्ध) should not also exist, but still they do exist. In order that knowledge of Truth may be possible, a residue of karma must bear fruit, because if all karma is destroyed, then the body would perish at once. Though there is the rise of knowledge and the loss of ignorance therefrom, still the karma which has begun to bear fruit, cannot be destroyed except by being reaped. Thus, the fructifying karma can be destroyed only by bearing its fruits. And a person who has knowledge of Truth is not touched by the results of karma which he performs after illumination. In this way, all karma are thoroughly destroyed. Thus, after death the self loses its individuality. It cannot go anywhere because the reality is a plenum (पूर्ण the ever-complete, the full) and the self is not different from it. So after death it becomes identified with infinite Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. When his apparent bondage or individuality is absorbed in Reality, he attains to his true nature, and what is one's real nature cannot be abandoned.

BOOK SECOND

**THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.**

BOOK II

The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion Introduction

It has been shown in the First Book that reverence for the Scriptures, faith in God or some supernatural being, adherence to the Law of '*karma*' (acts and their retribution) in some form, belief in the self as distinct from the body and its capacity for spiritual self-discipline (*Sādhana*) and attainment of liberation (*Mukti*), are generally recognised as essential features of Religion, and that each of them can be supported by strong rational arguments. But the reader is expected to ask himself if the arguments adduced are perfectly satisfactory to his reason or there is room for reasonable doubts about their validity. As a result of impartial examination, the author has been led to the conclusion that none of them is based on unassailable logical grounds. In this Book I wish to share with the reader the logical difficulties I experience in the way of the acceptance of these prevalent doctrines. First of all, I find that the exponents of these doctrines differ widely in their conceptions about God, soul, *karma*, scripture, liberation and the mode of self-discipline. For instance, let us think of the conceptions about God. In the first book, we have tried to defend three diverse conceptions of God after the manner of the advocates of these three views. This conflict of conceptions may be variously interpreted. In the first place, it may be held that all these conceptions are equally valid and so the question of the exclusive superiority of one of them cannot legitimately arise; secondly, it may be held that one of those views is perfectly valid and the others are false; thirdly, it may be held that this conflict indicates an

evolution of thought and as such one of them is the highest truth and the others are partial truths leading to it; lastly, the arguments on the strength of which each of the conceptions is established are vitiated by logical flaws and hence no conclusion about the nature of Reality can be regarded final. The author proposes to establish by critical examination that the last of the above-mentioned alternatives is alone acceptable to a rational mind. What is said here with regard to the problem of God is equally applicable to all the other fundamental problems. We shall here critically examine the arguments that have been adduced by different schools of philosophers for establishing their respective conceptions about these problems and we shall show the logical difficulties which vitiate those arguments.

In this critical investigation, we shall take our stand on normal experience admitted by all the systems and follow the same rules of logic as are followed by them. By an examination, through this method, of all metaphysical conclusions separately, we shall try to establish that all of them are defective. Our criticism of one philosophical conception is not to be taken as its criticism from the standpoint of another conception, but as a criticism mainly in the light of the admissions of the advocates of the theory itself.*

* By the study of religio-philosophical systems we find that these all have got reverential regard for their own Scriptures. We find further that some have recognised God and others have not some have found the ultimate explanation of the world in God alone, others in *Karma* alone, others in both God and *Karma*, while others in natural activity of some unconscious Energy called *Prakriti*. All these systems suggest some *Sādhana* which, they assert, leads to the attainment of liberation. So the topics we have to examine are (1) The Scriptures (2) God (3) *Prakriti* (4) *Karma* (5) *Sādhana* and (6) liberation.

CHAPTER I

THE VALIDITY OF THE SCRIPTURES EXAMINED INTRODUCTORY.

First of all, we shall be occupied with an examination of the validity of the authority of the Scriptures. Every religious sect looks upon its respective scripture with a reverential regard. The reasons for that reverence among the different systems may be summarised thus:—The scriptures are :—(1) the eternal linguistic forms of the eternal truths, authoritative by their own rights and not produced by any Agency, human or Divine ; (2) the revelations, by God Himself, of the truths about Himself ; (3) the utterances of the omniscient human beings, who cannot commit any errors ; (4) the expressions of the spiritual experiences of the *sādhakas*, who have realised the ultimate truths.

Let us discuss the validity of these in their order.

SECTION I

Eternity of the Vedas Represented

In support of the eternity of the *Vedas*, the protagonists of this doctrine assert that the *Vedas* do not contain sentences giving informations which can be gathered through other sources of valid knowledge, as is the case with ordinary books. Having once understood the order or succession of Vedic texts as uttered by the teacher, they are repeated exactly in the given order by the disciple. In this way they are transmitted from one individual to another. In this manner they have come down to us and no first teacher or composer can possibly be discovered. Hence it is known that the *Vedas* are eternal, being wholly independent of all agencies, human or Divine.*

* The upholders of this theory do not accept either (a) the beginning or the end of the universe, (b) nor do they believe in God and (c) omniscience. (a) According to them, this world exists from eternity and it will remain in future as it is to-day. Never there can be the production and destruction of the universe as a whole. Hence there is no proof about creation and dissolution (सृष्टि). (b) Though 'Karma' is unconscious, still the 'Jivas' are conscious. Due to the relation of Karma with *Jiva*, Karma will bring forth results. So there is no necessity to recognise God as the giver of the results of Karma. (c) If the eternity of the Scriptures is accepted, then it is unnecessary, they say, to suppose the existence of any omniscient Being. When the scriptures are taken by the believers in the omniscient Being to be the authority about 'Dharma' (the laws of duty), it is better to recognise the validity of the Scriptures alone by which "Dharma" can be explained, and there is no necessity of recognising any all-knowing Being as a *via media* between "Dharma" and the Scriptures. The advocates of this view try to prove that the *Vedas* alone have the inherent right to be regarded as such Scriptures.

Eternity of the Vedas Examined

Now let us proceed to examine the doctrine of the eternity of the *Vedas*. In order to establish any conclusion it is necessary to find out the source of valid knowledge in favour of it.

(a) Incapability of perception to prove the Eternity of the Vedas.

By the source of valid knowledge called perception (प्रत्यक्ष), one cannot know that the Vedas existed from eternity. The senses can have no relation with time having no beginning; hence they have no relation also with Vedic existence which is said to be related to the beginningless time. Hence, perception which takes place by the relation of sense-organs with the object to be perceived, cannot refer to the alleged beginningless existence of the Vedas.

(b) Inability of Inference to prove the Eternity of the Vedas.

The eternity of the Vedas cannot be proved by inference. The proof of the eternity of the Vedas on the ground that no author of the Vedas is known at present, is untenable, because such an argument can equally be advanced

If creation and dissolution are acknowledged, then the beginningless succession of teachers cannot be upheld and an omniscient Being or God may be needed to reveal the Vedas from His memory of the succession of the Vedas of previous cycles. But in that case, the eternity of the Vedas as accepted by the protagonists of this theory will have to be abandoned. In order to retain the validity of the Vedas in the above manner, God, creation and dissolution have alike been sacrificed by this view.

with regard to many other books whose date or authorship is unknown. Suppose a stranger or a deserted infant of unknown parents comes to you; would it in that case be correct on your part to conclude that the person had no birth and that he existed from eternity? Moreover, on the ground that a book is being studied in a society from prehistoric times, the eternity of the book cannot be inferred. Nor can it be said that because the author of the Vedas is not remembered, therefore they are eternal. There are many old things whose makers are not remembered; can they on that ground be treated as without a beginning or a maker? If not, then why should an exception be made in the case of the Vedas? There are many sayings whose authors are not known, but which have been current without any break among people from time immemorial; but that is no reason to conclude that they had no origin.

Besides, when the usual words and Vedic words have no essential difference in their natural condition, when both have the same symbolism, when both produce knowledge according to symbols and utterances employed, as both Vedic and usual words when unuttered are not heard by a person and as there is no other distinctive feature of the Vedic letters they cannot be differentiated in respect of origination and inferred to be uncreated. Moreover, when symbolising of the meaning of words was invented at a given time, to accept some words as natural and eternally connected with some meaning is not allowable. When this planet of ours is known to have a beginning and when our period of habitation is also with beginning, it is not reasonable to call our language eternal.

(c) Lack of verbal testimony in favour of the eternity of the Vedas.

After showing that the eternity of the Vedas can neither be perceived nor inferred, now let us show that the beginninglessness of the Vedas cannot be known through verbal testimony*

In this case, there will be the fallacy of interdependence, because by verbal testimony, the beginninglessness of the Vedas will be established and by their beginninglessness, the validity of verbal testimony will be established. Moreover, there is no Vedic sentence which states the eternity of the Vedas. Besides, the eternity of the Vedas cannot be reconciled with the existence of historical narratives of the names and deeds of the seers of the Vedic hymns. Over and above, we find in the Vedas reference to periods preceding the age of its seers. Thus the attempt at proving the eternity of the Vedas through verbal testimony is a failure.

* Valid knowledge, which is produced from the comprehension of words, with regard to things not near, is called verbal knowledge (शब्दप्रमाण). The upholders of the view under criticism mean by verbal testimony the words of the Vedas. But there are philosophers who do not count word as a separate source of valid knowledge. Scriptures also deserve confidence, they observe, not naturally, but on the strength of the reliableness of the speaker. The credibility of things asserted in scriptures, they say, depends on inference. Hence the source of valid knowledge known as verbal testimony is not treated by them as separate from inference. But others treat words as a separate source of valid knowledge. Words do not make us know or understand things in the manner in which inference makes us understand them, because the relation of invariable concomitance of words and their meanings is impossible. Words, unlike inferences, produce valid cognition by means of their peculiar capacity of denoting meanings through the co-operation of the context in which they occur and their syntactical connection.

(d) Inefficiency of Analogy to prove the Eternity of the Vedas.

The beginninglessness of the Vedas cannot be proved by the source of valid knowledge known as *comparison* (*analogy*)**

If any sentence could be found which has no author, then through the similarity of the Vedas with it, the absence of their author would have been established by analogy. But no such sentence can be found. Hence, even by analogy, the eternity of the Vedas cannot be proved.

(e) Implication Inefficacious to prove the Eternity of the Vedas.

The beginninglessness of the Vedas cannot be proved even by the source of valid knowledge known as *implication*.*

** Through the remembrance of a thing already experienced, there is the knowledge of its similarity with things presently experienced. This is valid knowledge due to similarity (उपमान). Others treat *analogy* as a source of valid knowledge in a different sense. After the perception of the present thing whose name is unknown and that of its similarity with a distant thing already known, there is the remembrance of the meaning of some trustworthy person's words already heard which denote the similarity of the present and the distant thing. From this the name of the particular thing becomes ascertained. To explain,—suppose it has been heard from a reliable person that 'Y' is the name of a thing having resemblance with 'X' which is a familiar object. Afterwards an unfamiliar thing is perceived and its resemblance with 'X' also is perceived. Thereby from the remembrance of what has been previously heard the knowledge is gained that the name of this thing is 'Y'. This is knowledge from analogy. There are other schools of philosophers who do not acknowledge analogy as an independent source of valid knowledge, but include it in perception, inference or verbal testimony or in a combination of them.

* To cite the stock-example of *implication* (अर्थानुपपत्ति) as a valid source of knowledge, let us refer to the robustness of a person who is not perceived to take food during the day. In this

By implication we have a right to assume an unperceived thing without the recognition of which a perceived fact cannot be explained; but in the present case, we have no necessity of assuming the eternity of the Vedas in order to account for any fact relating to these Vedas. Moreover, if you have known the eternity of the Vedas from any source of valid knowledge, other than implication, then you have no right to put forward implication in favour of your view. By implication this can never be known, because that would lead to the fault of interdependence. The absence of any author of the Vedas is granted to account for the absence of their non-validity and again the absence of their non-validity is found on the ground of the absence of any author. This would lead to the fallacy of arguing in a circle.

Moreover, if the exponents of this view had been able to prove on independent grounds that all the words of the Vedas are infallible and that whatever books are composed by human authors are invariably vitiated by errors, then their arguments in favour of the authorlessness and eternity of the Vedas might have acquired strength. But this they have nowhere been able to do. Hence their position is untenable. Thus it is proved that there is no proof direct or indirect in favour of the eternity and authorlessness of the Vedas.

case, in order to give a sufficient reason for his vigour, it is surmised that he must be feeding himself at nocturnal hours, though not actually seen to do so. This is a case of implication. Those who advocate this source of valid knowledge do not believe in the validity of inference based merely on agreement in absence (व्यतिरेकी अनुमान). Those, however, who believe in the validity of the said inference do not consider implication as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

(f) . Words or sentences of the Vedas cannot establish the Vedic Eternity.

The Vedic words cannot be regarded as of a distinct nature from the words we ordinarily use. If the difference in nature between usual words and the Vedic words be accepted, then people would not understand the meaning of the Vedas. Moreover, the Vedas themselves do not declare to you the meaning of the Vedas. There is no eternal (अपौरुषेय) commentary to teach their meaning whereby to understand the Vedas. Therefore the acceptance of the difference between the Vedic and usual words is not advisable; and thus it is proved that the Vedic words should be regarded as man-made like usual words.

When the Vedic words are of the same nature with the words we ordinarily use, what proof can be adduced to show that the arrangements (आनुपूर्वी) of the Vedic words and the meanings attached to them are of such an exceptional character that they can be neither the products of any human author nor intelligible to the ordinary human understanding in the ordinary way ?

The upholders of the eternity of the Vedas have a peculiar theory, that the letters which are the ultimate constituents of words, Vedic as well as non-Vedic, are eternal. We are not particularly concerned with the refutation of this theory, because by their own recognition the Vedas do not consist of a combination of these letters or any special arrangement of these letters. The Vedas, according to their own view, consist of words and sentences which are particularised manifestations of the letters having a special succession in time and space. Even if we grant the eternity of the letters, the eternity of these words and their

arrangement and succession is not proved and hence the eternity of the Vedas is not proved.

The Vedas are not purely letters, but they are manifestations of letters arranged according to some peculiar succession (क्रम) and accent (स्वर). Eternal and pervading letters cannot have spatial and temporal succession. An accent which is produced through special space cannot also form part and parcel of eternal letters. When there is manifestation of letter through sound (ध्वनि) we experience accent. When this succession, which is a distinguishing attribute (विशेषणीभूत) of the manifestation of letters is non-eternal and when the sound which particularises (उपाधि of) letters is non-eternal, the Vedas cannot become eternal.

SECTION II

Divine Authorship of the Scriptures Examined.

Let us now examine the view that God is the Author of the scriptures. Let us first enquire if there is any proof of the existence of God. Without proving God's existence first, you cannot hold that God's words (scriptures) are authoritative. Taking it for granted that there are six sources of valid knowledge (प्रमाण), let us show that God cannot be known by them.

(I) God not proved by perception.

By perception (प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण) the existence of God cannot be proved. Only things which are present in time, limited in space, related to sense-organs and capable of coming in contact with them become the objects of sense-perception. Senses naturally take for their objects things with sensible attributes such as colour, touch and the like. According to common consent, God is not possessed of sensible attributes, He is not limited in time and space and is not capable of coming in contact with the sense-organs. Hence sense-perception of God is out of question.

(II) God-Vision Examined.

Some persons claim that though God is not an object of normal sense-perceptions, He becomes an object of perception to a devotee whose heart is purified by the worship of and meditation on Him. But this is not tenable. The objects of sight must either have an existence prior to seeing or existence merely at the time of seeing.

(a) Existence of God's form prior to vision unestablished.

God's form cannot be said to exist prior to the said vision. If it existed, then God would have been an individual with a real form, hardly distinct from that of an ordinary mortal having identification with a limited ego. Such a conception of God would not be acceptable even by the exponents of God-vision. Further, one who is endowed with a real form must be essentially related to and limited by that form and cannot therefore be conceived as an infinite Being. This would also imply that He is endowed with limited and non-eternal knowledge. This would amount to a contradiction of His Godhood. If God is supposed to be the Creator of the world, He cannot be said to have a form. Creation means the production of names and forms, as such, before creation forms cannot exist. If God is with a form, then He too will have experiences of joy and sorrow, as is the case with the mundane creatures, because it is found that body is the seat of these experiences. Moreover, if God is taken as corporeal, then it would imply that He has attachment; but one who has attachment cannot be God. He will be as good as a "*Jiva*." Besides, this will lead to the loss of the belief that God is eternally free from all kinds of bondage and limitation. If God is with a form, then he must be produced from something else. A thing with a form is always produced from another. That which has got a form cannot be eternal. Because it is produced, it will fall under the category of the created, and thus His creatorship of the world will be contradicted. And because the limited cannot have omniscience and omnipotence, God will lose His Godhood. If another creator of the Creator is recognised, then another creator of the second creator ought to be recognised and thus we would be led to admit

the existence of an endless series of creators. In this case, there would be the absence of any definite conclusion since there would be the fallacy of infinite regression (अनवस्था).

Let us put two alternatives to the supporters of the form of God. Is the real form of God (1) eternal and beginningless ? or (2) having a beginning ? It is apparent that neither of these alternatives is sound. (1) God cannot be inferred as having an eternal and beginningless form, because such an inference would be inconsistent with our normal experience about bodily forms which are known to be non-eternal. God cannot be said to produce Himself as His own result which is co-eternal with His self-production, because a result which has always existed cannot be a result. To say that anything is the cause of itself is at once to apply and to annul the concept of cause. (2) God's form cannot have any beginning, because in that case, before production of His form, He must have been formless and such a recognition would contradict the thesis that there is an essential relation between God and His form. Further, if the form has a beginning, it must be conceived as either originating by chance at some stage of the life of the formless God, or as having been produced by some other form of God. If God's form is caused by another form, then this second form must be caused by a third form and so on *ad infinitum*. The theory of chance would be unacceptable to every rational mind, as it would contradict the universally recognised law of causality.

From the above discussion it follows that there is no proof in favour of a real divine body, whether eternal or originated. Thus the first alternative namely God's form exists previous to seeing God is untenable.

(b) Instantaneous Production of God's body proves it to be imaginary.

Now, we come to consider the second alternative, namely, God's body is produced instantaneously with the act of perception. Instantaneous production is experienced with regard to mental states like joys and sorrows, products of fancy, illusory appearances of the waking state and dream-objects. If God's body is accepted as being produced in the way in which any of these is produced, then it will purely be an affair of the individual mind and therefore different in the case of every person. In that case the objective existence of God will not be established. The clear and vivid experience of God outside the perceiving subject can be quite consistently explained, if it is treated on the analogy of illusory appearance or the experience of dream-objects. Thus the subjectivity of such experiences is not disproved. The object of such God-vision being purely subjective, the real existence of God's form experienced in such cases is far from being established. Because the emerging, enduring and vanishing of the so-called Divine forms depend on the observer's mind, these must be subjective appearances and imaginary productions of the human mind.

(c) The fallacies of the conception of God's modification into forms.

Advocate :—When we worship or meditate on God, we sometimes actually see God. This is not the production of the human mind, nor is it illusory. What happens is this that formless God modifies Himself into forms and reveals Himself in the heart of the devotee. Such is the inconceivable power of God.

Critic :—Here several questions arise. Does God reveal Himself in the same form to all devotees or in different forms to different devotees ? In either case, it may be questioned whether this form or these forms are eternally associated with the nature of God or are created by God on particular occasions of His self-revelation according to the requirements or temperaments of the devotees. It may further be questioned whether these forms are non-different or different or both different and non-different or neither different nor non-different from His nature.

When we refer to the different classes of devotees having agreement with regard to the validity of God-vision, we find that they do not agree with regard to the forms in which God reveals Himself to them. Hence the forms of His self-revelation must be regarded as many. Now if these varieties of forms be conceived as eternally associated with God's essential nature, then God instead of being one must be conceived as many. This position is of course not accepted by any of these schools of thought. Further, it is inconsistent with their conception of God as essentially formless. Hence it must be concluded that the forms in which God is said to appear before them are His creations and not eternal realities.

Now we come to the last question, namely what is the relation between God and His created forms. Are they identical with Him or different from Him ? In case of identity, several difficulties arise. If the form be regarded as identical with the formless spirit, either the form is to be conceived as characterised by the essential attributes of the formless spirit or the formless spirit is to be conceived as characterised by the essential attributes of the form. In the former case the form would be above time and space,

devoid of parts and without any properties which can make it an object of perception. In the second case what is called the formless spirit would itself be limited by time and space, having division of parts and characterised by perceptible properties. That is to say, the formless would no longer be formless. Both these alternatives are unacceptable even to the upholders of the aforesaid view. It may be said that the forms and the formless with their distinctive characteristics are non-different from each other. But this is inconceivable. If a corporeal entity is the same as the bodiless, then it cannot be explained how the embodied which has colour etc., can be non-different from that which has none of these. If it is said that the form is different from that formless, then it must be admitted that the form does not pertain to the intrinsic nature of the formless. Then the vision of the form would not amount to the experience of the formless and would be no proof of the existence of the formless God.

The exponents may argue that God in His intrinsic nature is neither a Being with form nor a Being without form, but a substratum of which form and formlessness are two kinds of attributes. In that case the question would arise, what is the true essential character of that substratum. The character of having form and that of having no form being two contradictory terms, the *law of Excluded Middle* would prevent us from conceiving any Being having neither of these characteristics. If we want to form a rational conception of such a substratum, then it must be conceived either as with form or as without form. If the said substratum be without form, then being by nature devoid of all kinds of difference and duality, it can not be rationally conceived as having inherent in it the distinction and duality between form and formless-

ness. On the other hand, if that substratum be with a form, then it cannot be conceived as the substratum of the attribute of formlessness. Further, it is through the knowledge of the attribute that we derive the knowledge of the substance having that attribute, and a substance without its attribute is never experienced. Hence in the above case, in order to know the substratum with form, we are required to have previous experience of its attribute, viz., formlessness. But any direct experience of formlessness is evidently impossible. This being the case, the existence of the substratum with form will in no way be ascertained. Thus, the theory of God being the substratum of form and formlessness is refuted.

To avoid these difficulties it is sometimes argued that God is essentially a formless Being and the forms in which He appears to the devotees are different from Him and at the same time identical with Him. But this hypothesis, instead of solving the difficulties, lands us in hopeless logical contradictions. We shall discuss the defects of this position in greater details in the sequel.

The last alternative of the forms being neither different nor non-different from the formless God is a logically inconceivable position. It amounts to the virtual recognition of the impossibility of the solution of the difficulties which arise from the dogmatic assertion of the validity of God-vision.

Thus we find that there is no means to prove the existence of God and to determine His character, if He exists, on the strength of God-vision and the theory that God reveals Himself as the object of direct experience to the devotees.

Let us now proceed to the analysis of another conception involved in the doctrine of the self-revelation of God to the experience of the devotees. It is held that God modifies Himself into forms to make Himself visible to those who worship and meditate on Him. Now what is the true meaning of this modification? When God is said to modify Himself, does His original nature remain unaffected or is it changed into a different form? If His original nature remains unaffected, in what sense can the forms in which He is said to modify Himself be regarded as His modifications? Instead of being regarded as modifications, they should rather be more reasonably conceived as appearances which are not really His self-revelations, but the products of the meditation or imagination of the persons seeing them and consequently differing in the cases of different persons. If on the other hand, the essential nature of God is regarded as changed in the alleged process of modification, then it cannot be said that it is God who is really perceived in the perception of the forms, or else it would be different Gods perceived by different men. Thus neither of the alternatives enables us to form any rational conception of the modification of God.

It may be said that God's nature is partially modified into the natures of the particular forms, and hence there may be modification without affecting His unity. But in that case God's nature is to be conceived as divisible into parts. Hence the questions should arise as to what is the character of the relation between the modified part, the unmodified part and the total nature of God, and whether the modification of any part of His nature involves a change in His entire character. First of all, no believer in God can rationally conceive God or His nature as divided into parts, or in other words, can think of God as an

aggregate of parts. Secondly, if His nature be regarded as one whole containing differences within itself, then these differences should be inseparably bound up with one another and the whole, and if the whole is to be conceived as unchanged, no part can consistently be admitted as changing. Hence real modification of God into particular forms without losing His identity appears to be inconceivable.

Let us discuss the point a little more elaborately. Suppose God modifies Himself into different forms and becomes visible to man. Does this modification happen wholly or partially of the nature of God? The first alternative is of course not acceptable, because in that case God would altogether give up His eternal nature and nothing of it would be left behind. This would mean that a new God with a particular form is produced and the eternal God disappears. This is not only self-contradictory, but there would be no meaning of modification on such a supposition. With respect to the second alternative, the first difficulty is that God is to be supposed as having parts within Himself; and then the question will arise, whether the portion modified is different or non-different or different as well as non-different from the eternal nature of God. If that portion is different from it, then it will be a separate entity, and the modification of a separate entity will not mean modification of God Himself. Hence seeing a particular form produced by the modification of this portion would not mean seeing God. If there be the non-difference of the portion modified from the real nature of God, then the modification of the part would mean the modification of the whole. In that case the difficulties of wholesale modification, as mentioned before, cannot be avoided. To maintain that the portion modified is both different as well as non-different from the essential nature

of God, involves a palpable contradiction. And even admitting that the said contradiction is somehow avoidable, it must be admitted that because the portion modified is essentially non-different from the entire nature of God, in spite of its differences in some respects from the latter, it is really the entire nature of God which will have to be admitted as suffering change, and then the Divine nature would no longer remain Divine. So the same untenable situation will arise again. Thus in accordance with the arguments given above, we are bound to conclude that God cannot consistently be conceived as at the same time retaining His Divine nature and modifying Himself into particular forms.

Further, God is taken to be unlimited, i. e. above all limitations of space and time. How can it be conceived that He remains unlimited and all the same reveals Himself in particular bodily forms, which must have temporal and spatial limitations? If God is identified with a particular form with particular sense-organs, particular mental functions and particular manners of self-expression, He becomes evidently limited and only one among the innumerable corporeal beings of the world. Such a being cannot be called God, in the sense in which God is conceived. Further, God is regarded as all-pervading. If any particular form seen by any particular devotee at a particular place is regarded as God Himself, would not the rest of the world be without God? Hence consistently with the cherished conception of God, the particular forms cannot be regarded either as God or as of God.

It may be asserted that owing to God's inconceivable powers, the self-same God may appear in particular bodily forms and at the same time exist as the all-pervading

eternal bodiless spirit. This is not reasonable, because power itself is not directly perceptible, and is always to be inferred from the effects which follow from it ; but in the present case, the alleged effect, namely the body of God, is something unestablished ; hence for the explanation of this hypothetical effect, we should not suppose inconceivable powers in God as its cause. It would amount to the proof of one hypothesis by means of another. It may be said that the presence of such unique inscrutable powers in God is known from the scriptures. But here the very authority of the scriptures is in question. To prove the infallibleness of the scriptures on the authority of the self-revelation of God and to prove the inconceivable power of self-revelation of God on the authority of the scriptures involves an obvious fallacy of arguing in a circle.

(d) Forms seen outside or within cannot belong to God.

Moreover, God-vision, these religionists assert, takes place within as well as without. Let us consider these alternatives. Let us take the latter first. Here they have to prove that the outward form which appears before them belongs to God. So it is clear that from the very start they cannot grant that the said form is God's. What is to be proved cannot be the ground or reason for an inference. So their procedure should be this :—First, they have to prove that there is God and then they should show that the said form is God's. We shall show presently that no proof in favour of the existence of God is logically convincing. However, if the outward form is taken to be God, then God would be of the nature of an effect and hence no God at all, since every form is by universal experience the effect of some cause. The God-visionists may argue that the

law viz. that every form is an effect, is not universal, but has exception in the case of the Divine form. This assertion is evidently made in contradiction to our normal experience. If such an uncontradicted normal experience is not relied on, then the law that every effect must be the product of an agent may also be said to have exception, and the attempt to prove God on the basis of this law would be futile. Hence God will remain unproved. In that case to speak of His form would be meaningless.

Even granting that God is formless, it cannot be proved that the form belongs to Him. It has already been shown that form cannot be the modification of formless God.

Now let us consider whether the form seen by the devotee within himself can belong to God. It is generally perceived through meditation. Here even granting that God exists, we assert that meditation of God is impossible. If God is all-pervading, He cannot be an object of meditation in His intrinsic nature. Meditation implies the formation of a definite image of the object in the mind, which again connotes limitation and relativity of the object meditated upon. Hence, God as the object of meditation would be a limited being, and not the all-pervading God believed by them. On the other hand, if God is conceived as not all-pervading but limited, even then, as He has an independent existence of His own, distinct from the existence of the person meditating, He cannot be said to actually enter into his mind, and the image he forms or sees in meditation must be different from God as He really is. Thus in neither case is the meditation of God, as He is, possible. As God in His essential nature can never be meditated upon, God-vision through meditation must be a product of intensified imagination.

(e) **Psychological account of God-vision.**

The fact of so-called God-vision may be accounted for psychologically as the product of the repetition and concentration upon the image which the devotee forms in his mind as a result of the instruction he receives. The conceptual form in the devotee's mind may get projected and appear as an actual object of perception, as in the case of reverie. In such conditions the inner sense throws its impression upon the outside. In cases where such vision appears even without any conscious and voluntary effort of the devotee, the phenomenon may be explained in the same way as the dream-phenomena, in which many apparently unthought-of visions are seen. Thus the visions can in no way be regarded as the proof of the existence and self-revelation of God.

Some persons do not realise the subjectivity of these forms. This is due to emotional feeling and want of discrimination on the part of the devotees. As desire or impulse is marked, the feeling accompanying religious conviction is intense. Such personal bias should not lead us to conclude the reality of God's body. The subjective conviction is no guarantee to others of the reality of the object. What is emotionally important is not bound to be scientifically valid. That vision may create joys in the seer ; but it should not be the test of ascertaining the reality of the thing. And with regard to joys, there is no fixed rule. What appears joyful to one may not be so to others. Joys and sorrows are the results of the different ways in which objects, real or imaginary, are received by different persons, and these again are due to differences of temperament, education, environment and habit of individuals. With the change of mental and physical conditions

these feelings also are changed, even with regard to the same object. Though the object of experience is identical, still some derive pleasure, and some pain from the same. The very same thing which causes pleasure to a man at one time, produces pain to the same man at another time. Thus the real sources of joy are not things themselves, but the subjective conditions. Hence, in the case of God-vision, though the form of God said to be experienced by the devotees may be purely subjective, produced through the devotees' voluntary thinking (भावना) assisted by early impressions, still it causes joy and love in their hearts. In some cases the devotees may pass into such a rapturous condition at the time of the vision, and the objects of the vision may appear with such a stamp of apparent reality, that the subjective dealings with these objects of vision may be imagined by them to be as real as with objects of normal experience. This (subjective certainty) bears analogy with the experiences in dream, hallucination and the like. So it is shown that as the so-called God-vision can be quite reasonably explained as a psychical production, as merely the presentation of a mental construction of our own, as of exclusively human origin and character without admitting the existence or self-revelation of God, the real existence of God is not proved thereby. Further, that vision itself bears testimony to the non-pervadingness, non-eternity, mutability and dependence of the object of vision and these are opposed to the concept of God. So it cannot be God's vision. God-visionist's God will always be relative to his own soul, hence God as objectively real in the sense of his existence in some other outer reality other than the soul or outside the soul must be denied. Religious experiences reveal no other reality than the soul of the believer.

(f) **Concluding Remarks.**

Let us put the matter clearly in brief. In order to prove the soundness of the so-called God-vision, it is necessary to show first that God exists and further it has to be proved that God can have modification. If there is God and there is no modification in Him, it will not serve the purpose. If God and His modification are proved, that will only point to the possibility of God-vision, but there will be no ascertainment of it. In order to ascertain the same, it is necessary to show that the form seen belongs to God. But you cannot identify, because you have not seen before the private individual form of God; nor can you establish this by reasons, because there is no way of measuring the amount of subjective projections involved in God-vision. As the vision may quite legitimately be interpreted in terms of the mind and its self-projections, that vision can never prove the existence and activity of any such extra-mental reality as God is believed to be. So God can never be proved to be the object of internal or external perception. Besides, the vision of God would be proved only if God would become an object of experience before the vision of what they believe as God's form, and if one could have the knowledge that God is just taking this form; but there happens no such experience. Only some particular form is seen, its source being unknown. Hence it is not proved that God-vision is not imaginary.

Thus by a critical examination, from various points of view, of the position that the existence of God can be proved by perception, we are unavoidably led to the conclusion that perception is no proof in favour of the existence of God.

(III) God not proved by Inference.

Now, about the inference regarding God. We first discuss inference in general.

(a) General discussion on inference.

Everyone acquires without doubt inferential knowledge of a thing from the knowledge of some other thing. Where the knowledge of one thing is produced from the knowledge of another thing, some relation between them must be admitted. If there be no such relation and there is yet inference of one thing from the knowledge of another' then the knowledge of anything would give knowledge of anything whatsoever. But this does not happen. What does happen is that some order prevails. Hence, their relation is to be recognised. In every inference, the knowledge of the particular relation subsisting between the inferred and the ground of inference is required. One thing is the invariably associated (व्याप्य *Vyāpya*) and another thing is the invariable associate (व्यापक *Vyāpaka*). By 'association it is indicated that in every location of a thing, another thing becomes related. What is more extensive than व्याप्य (that of which it is the concomitant) is व्यापक (concomitant). As for example, in the instance "man is mortal" the term "mortal" is व्यापक as its denotation includes the denotation of the term "man" and is more extensive than it. In case of fire and smoke, the smoke is व्याप्य and fire is its व्यापक; i. e. the sign (smoke) observed is invariably associated and the vehicle (fire) of the sign which is to be inferred is the invariable associate. In other words, wherever there is that particular smoke, in all such places there is fire, and in no place without fire can there be that particular smoke; because fire is the cause of smoke and without fire smoke

can never be produced. Because fire is related to every place of that particular kind of smoke, that smoke is said to be invariably associated (व्याप्य) by fire and the fire is called the invariable associate or the invariable concomitant (व्यापक) of that special smoke. Such relation of fire in the particular smoke is called invariable relation or concomitance (व्याप्ति). In every kind of inference, the knowledge of this particular relation of the associated and the associate is necessary. After the knowledge of that particular relation, wherever the concomitant is not perceived, but that of which it is the concomitant becomes perceived or known otherwise, there the particular knowledge of the concomitant is produced through the particular knowledge of that of which it is the concomitant, and this is inference. The thing invariably associated is taken as the reason for an inference—the middle term (हेतु) of a syllogism. Having known exactly from previous observation of relevant instances that, provided this thing remains, another thing must remain, we get the knowledge of the reason for an inference. Thus the understanding, that the presence of the invariably associated is the reason for the inference of the presence of the invariably associate, is produced. In the case of the inference namely “the yonder mountain contains fire because there is smoke in it” what takes place is this, that at the sight of the reason namely smoke, there is knowledge of the thing to be inferred, namely the unperceived fire. In such cases, in order to have an inferential knowledge of the unperceived thing, the perception of the same thing at an earlier date is necessary, without which there could not have been the knowledge of the relation between the unperceived thing and the perceived thing from which it is inferred now. Wherever there is the knowledge of it by inference, there the knowledge of the reason is needed; that is, it has to be determined precisely that the reason

being there, the other thing of which it is the reason must also be there. This is called the ascertainment of the invariable relation for which these data are required. This is the rule of *व्याप्ति* (invariable concomitance).

Where there is such a natural relation between two terms, there one of them viz. *व्याप्य* becomes the ground of inference and the other, viz. *व्यापक* its consequent. In the said example the relation between smoke and fire is natural; but between the two terms, the natural relation is such that the smoke is the *व्याप्य* (reason or middle term) and fire is the *व्यापक* (consequence or major term); for without smoke even, fire is observed, but without fire smoke is never observed. Hence smoke is the ground of the inference of fire, but fire cannot be the ground of the inference of smoke.

Let us make our point a little clearer in a different form. It is a matter of experience that sometimes fire is without smoke. This implies that there is no invariable relation of fire with smoke. But smoke is never without fire as its cause, hence we must admit the invariable relation of smoke with fire. It is found that when fire is related to the wet fuel, it becomes related to smoke. So the relation of fire with smoke, being the result of its conjunction with another thing, namely the wet fuel, is not natural; this is why it is not invariable. Smoke is always and unconditionally associated with fire, but not *vice versa* fire with smoke; for there is smokeless fire. So the presence of fire cannot be the ground of the inference of the presence of smoke. Thus, invariable relation is essential for inference. This is called *व्याप्ति*, which may be translated either as universal pervasion or as invariable relation or as invariable concomitance or as invariable association or as

universal accompaniment. This invariable relation is established through the observation of two kinds of instances (1) positive (अन्वय) and (2) negative (व्यतिरेक). So, that invariable relation is also of two kinds. For instance, to prove that mountain has fire, two types of instances are to be considered :—(1) wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the fire-place etc., and (2) wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke as in the lake etc. Here, the instances of the first type are positive and those of the second, negative in nature. In the first, the major term (fire) and the middle term (smoke) remain invariably in the same place; but in the second, there is invariable absence of the middle term in the absence of the major term. The relation, namely, wherever there is smoke there is fire, is called positive concomitance (अन्वयव्याप्ति cf. all A is B); and the relation, namely, where there is no fire there is no smoke is called negative concomitance (व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति cf. all not—B is not—A). When both the affirmative and negative concomitance between the thing to be proved (the major term—the consequent) and the reason that proves (the middle term—the ground) can be equally asserted, then alone the argument becomes perfectly sound and incapable of refutation. The inference which is drawn through positive concomitance is sometimes susceptible of doubt; hence in order to make our inference perfectly valid, the negative concomitance as well is given along with the positive one. (cf the methods of Agreement and Difference). There are three kinds of inference: (1) inference from the cause to the effect (2) inference from the effect to the cause (3) conclusion as to something beyond the reach of the senses only to be known in the abstract (सामान्यतोद्दिष्ट).

If the reason for an inference (हेतु) is qualified by the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति, of what is to be proved

(साध्य) and is contained in the minor term (पक्ष), then it is called a valid ground and is clearly to be distinguished from an apparent one. The ground (of an inference) having the following five attributes is valid:—(1) The ground (हेतु) must remain in the minor term (पक्ष). In the familiar example of the inference of fire, in the minor term, (mountain), the ground (smoke) resides. If the ground does not remain in the minor term, there cannot be an inference. (2) The ground must remain in objects (which are separate from the minor term), where the thing to be proved (साध्य) is decidedly known to exist. If the ground does not remain in places where there has been the ascertainment of the presence of the thing to be proved, then with that ground there cannot be the invariable concomitance of the thing to be proved. If there is no invariable concomitance of the thing to be proved with the ground, then on the strength of that ground the said inference is impossible. (3) The ground must not remain in those things where the thing to be proved does not reside. If ground remains in the place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved, there cannot be the invariable concomitance of it with that ground. (4) The ground must be possessed of attributes which are not contradicted by any source of valid knowledge. (5) The ground should not be counter-balanced. That is, the ground should not be opposed by a contrary ground.

The ground having these five characteristics will be a convincing one. The faultlessness of the ground being confirmed, it is ascertained that the invariable concomitance of the ground with the thing to be proved is natural.**

** In a positive-negative (अन्वयव्यतिरेकी) inference the above mentioned five attributes of the ground are required. In a merely

The ground where the above-mentioned five attributes do not remain is not a real ground of an inference, though it may appear to be so. Such defective grounds are called fallacious grounds (हेत्वाभास). Viewed from the standpoint of differences of time, persons and things, valid as well as fallacious grounds are countless. But still, owing to the absence of each of the above-mentioned five characteristics, fallacious grounds have briefly been divided by logicians into five groups.*

positive inference (केवलान्वयी e. g. what is known through a source of valid knowledge is nameable), no. 3 is not required and in a merely negative inference, no. 2 does not remain, so in those places four kinds of attributes of the ground are required. To explain,—the said five characteristics of the ground, being the determining factors (प्रयोजक) of the knowledge of universal concomitance, are also the guarantees for the validity of inference. The attribute no. 3 eliminates the possibility of the presence of the ground in cases where the thing to be proved is absent and thus assures the knowledge of the universal concomitance. But in the case of a mere positive inference, there is no observation of instances where there is the absence of the thing to be proved. In the case of a merely negative inference, we do not observe instances of the invariable concomitance of the presence of the ground and the presence of the thing to be proved, except in the case of the minor term, still on the strength of the knowledge of negative concomitance, the inference is drawn. Here the observation of the invariable co-presence of the thing to be proved with its ground is not the cause of the knowledge of the negative concomitance, but the experience of the accompaniment of the absence of the thing to be proved with the absence of the ground is the cause of this knowledge. Thus, in the case of a merely positive inference and in that of a merely negative inference, the ground should possess four characteristics and not five.

* Self-dependence (आत्माश्रय), interdependence (अन्योन्याश्रय), argument in a circle (चक्रीका) and infinite regression (अनवस्था) are fallacies, because the grounds of these inferences do not satisfy the characteristics No. 2 and No. 3 of the valid grounds of an inference

- (b) **No logical ground for the inference of God's existence available in experience : all inference vitiated by flaws.**

Having given a short account of inference, now let us show that the inference of God's existence is faulty. As inference is drawn from observation, it cannot have for its object a supernatural thing like God. Through the contact of sense-organs aided by the impressions of previous experience, it is known that the thing having the characteristics of smoke is invariably related to the thing having the characteristics of fire. Moreover, the characteristics of smoke are seen in the mountain. Hence that smoke (the invariably associated) gives knowledge of the relation of that which is invariable associate of it, namely fire in the mountain. This happens owing to the past experience of the invariable relation of smoke and fire on the one hand and owing to the present observation of smoke in the mountain on the other. Similarly, there would have been the inference of God as an agent of effects, if we could have experienced the invariable relation between all or any particular effect and the omniscient, bodiless agent. If God would become an object of direct experience, then it could be known that the world is related to Him. The world is

referred to above and thus fail to determine the invariable concomitance of the ground and the consequent. The result of the fault of self-dependence is the non-establishment of the support, the result of the fault of interdependence is the non-establishment of the ground, the result of the fault of a vicious circle is the non-extension of the ground and the result of the fault of infinite regression is the destruction of the original thesis (मूलस्यवकरी). In the case of an infinite series which is objectionable, the terms to be defined recur repeatedly, each being defined by the other, so that neither reaches any other definition than a circular one.

no doubt an object of perception, but God is not. If God also were an object of perception, then nothing would be accomplished by dragging in inference to prove His existence as the exponents do. Nor could there be in that case different views current about God. So the very attempt of the exponents of God's existence to prove it by means of inference can be regarded as a proof of the fact that He is not an object of direct experience. If God were an object of perception, then only it would have been possible to know the relation between God and the world. This world alone is experienced. Whether it is related to God or related to something other than God cannot be experienced. The relation between the objects of perception and the objects beyond the possibility of perception cannot be perceived; because to know relation, the knowledge of the related terms is necessary. The perception of the related terms becomes the cause of the perception of relation. Because God is not the object of perception, His relation cannot be understood by perception. As relation exists between two terms, it cannot be known through the knowledge of only one term. Now, the effect whose particular relation with its cause is not known cannot help us in determining its particular cause. The inference being dependent on the universal concomitance of the ground and the consequent, whatever is known as particularised by this relation can alone be inferred. Now, God, as has been pointed out, is incapable of being perceived, and hence His relation with the effects, viz. earth etc. is far from being established. Consequently, His existence can in no way be inferred from the existence of these effects. By the inference having for its ground the character of something as an effect, the existence of a cause merely might be proved; but a particular cause, having specific properties, can hardly be proved. The oneness or manifoldness of

the said cause, its specific characteristics, etc. everything remains unascertained. This can only be done after the observation of the invariable causal relation between any particular cause and the said effect. Similarly, in the case of the world, we can at best infer that it is the product of some cause or causes, but we cannot infer that God is this cause, because no invariable causal relationship can possibly be observed between Him and the world. There cannot be the inference arising out of the observation of either a particular or general concomitance, which would prove the existence of the omnipotent and omniscient cause of the world. In this world no effect is observed as the work of an omnipotent, omniscient and infinite Being. Things are experienced as being produced by agents who are limited in point of existence as well as knowledge and power, and nowhere do we experience any agent of unlimited knowledge, power and existence. Hence there is no experience of particular concomitance on the strength of which we can use the existence of the world as the ground of the inference of the existence of an infinite omnipotent omniscient cause viz., God.

Let us illustrate our point. On the strength of general concomitance, the existence of a powerful entity as cause may be inferred from the observation of an effect; no particular cause with particular powers and attributes can be inferred from any effect without the observation of particular concomitance, because there is no knowledge of concomitance between effects in general and any particular cause. Similarly, the existence of efforts etc., necessary for the production of an effect may be proved in a general way; but the particular form or kind or amount of effort necessary for the production of any particular effect cannot be proved without the establishment of particular con-

comitance. The supposition that the infinite variety of effects constituting the phenomena of the world must be the product of an all-powerful Being as cause and that He must make voluntary efforts for their production, can only be advanced, when all these effects of varied nature are proved to be produced by one doer. But there is no means of proving this. It cannot be said that for the sake of the economy of hypothesis,** one doer is being assumed, because the various effects e. g. buildings etc., are observed to be the work of many doers. Nay, sometimes even one effect is found to be the product of a combination of many doers. Economy of hypothesis, when not in accordance with the facts of general observation, cannot stand, because the concomitance which is observed becomes more powerful than the supposed concomitance. As we find that a plurality of effects is sometimes the products of one agent and sometimes of a plurality of agents, the relation between one agent and a plurality of effects is a relation of variable concomitance, and on the strength of such a concomitance we are not entitled to suppose that the cause of such an infinite variety of effects as the world consists of must be the product of one Agent. Such a hypothesis cannot be accepted as true, even on the score of economy, without verification or independent proof.

Moreover, all the previous arguments are based on the general concomitance that effect must have a doer. But

** The economy of hypothesis (समर्थ) aids the source of valid knowledge. When the intended correct apprehension is not accomplished fully by the recognised sources of valid knowledge, we are required to have recourse to hypothesis for the explanation of the phenomena under consideration; and it is one of the fundamental laws of the framing of hypothesis that the supposition must be minimum and must not exceed the absolute requirements of the case. This is called Economy of Hypothesis.

in nature we find such effects as sprouts, earth etc. which are not experienced to be the products of the efforts of any individual living being. Hence the general concomitance namely that every effect has a doer is itself far from being established, and consequently the arguments adduced on the basis of this concomitance cannot lead to any decisive conclusion. It may however be argued that the effects which are not experienced as products of any individual living being as the doer may be the product of some doer of a different nature from the individual living beings of our experience. This argument also is not tenable, because whatever is of a different nature from living beings is experienced to be unconscious. Hence, if any such doer be imagined he must be conceived as unconscious and this is certainly not what the exponents of God's doership want to prove.

Further, supposing that the universe must have a conscious doer, the exponents of this view maintain that He must be possessed of eternal knowledge. But the very possibility of eternal knowledge is questionable. Nowhere in our experience we come across any instance of eternal knowledge, whereas all knowledge is found to be acquired or produced. Nor can God's knowledge be regarded as acquired knowledge, because the conception of God is that He is bodiless, and a bodiless being cannot be conceived as acquiring knowledge, since the acquisition of knowledge depends upon contact of sense or mind with objects. Thus the doership of God possessing either eternal knowledge or produced knowledge is not established.

To recapitulate.—There are two kinds of inference. The first is observed in cases where both the related terms are perceived, but as God is beyond sense-perception the first

type of inference is inapplicable in this case. By the second type of inference, we can establish only general conclusions whose particular features remain unknown; so by this inference, we can establish at best that the effects have a cause or causes, but the particular feature of the cause or causes cannot thus be known. As we cannot make sure whether this cause is one or many, conscious or unconscious etc. we cannot know the nature of God through such an inference.

In the above, it has been shown that there cannot be affirmative concomitance (अन्वयव्याप्ति) in favour of God. Now it is further to be observed that in support of God, there cannot be negative concomitance (व्यातिरेकव्याप्ति). The believers in the existence of God infer that the non-eternal world, being of the nature of an effect, must have been created by God; because, if it were not created by the omniscient Creator, it would not be an effect at all, as is the case with Ākāśa. But this is unacceptable. This inference involves the fallacy of interdependence. In order to establish the concomitance, namely, that what is not made by the omniscient God is not an effect, the omniscient God must be known first of all (because the knowledge of negation is dependent on the knowledge of the negated), and, again, the said concomitance is brought forward in order to prove the existence of God. Because of this mutual dependence, the negative concomitance, stated above, cannot be of any help in the establishment of the existence of God as the maker of the world.

(c) Inference of all-knowing Person and the fallacies regarding it.

Now, we proceed to refute another inference in favour of God. To prove God as an all-knowing Person (पुरुष-

विशेष), some school of thought* argues as follows. We experience different grades of knowledge. Now, this gradation of knowledge must have its culmination somewhere, because whatever has increase of quantity, must have its climax. The quantity begins from atoms and ends in Akāśa. The knowledge having one object is increased by knowledge having two objects and further increased by knowledge having three objects and so on; in this way it goes on increasing until all objects are embraced; this all-embracing knowledge is the character of God. Thus the logical necessity of admitting the presence of all-embracing knowledge in some being is put forward as the ground of inferring the existence of God.

The above inference about omniscience is based on a wrong concomitance, namely that every attribute is capable of attaining its utmost stage of increase. Take the case of effort (special attribute). By particular efforts, we traverse the regions of space. This effort is not capable of reaching an utmost limit; because the space to be traversed being endless, if anyone attains the utmost limit of his effort, the result of this utmost effort will be complete cessation of movement. Otherwise if by the utmost effort he reaches the end of space, space will be proved to be limited, which also will involve a contradiction. Hence these thinkers will be forced to admit that space is boundless and effort is capable of being infinitely increased. Thereby it is proved that there is no last limit of efforts, though gradation of efforts is a matter of universal experience. Thus it is proved that it is not the property of an attribute that it should attain to its utmost limit. Hence the inference of the existence of an omniscient Being on the ground of the

* The Pātanjal Yoga view.

utmost increase of knowledge (special attribute) breaks down.

Moreover, it is not right to talk about the utmost limit of quantity, and the example cited, viz. the quantity of Ākāśa, is of no avail in this respect. If Ākāśa has quantity, then why not suppose a quantity greater than that? It is a matter of experience that quantity is everywhere capable of being increased, and if Ākāśa has quantity, there ought to have been a quantity greater than that of Ākāśa. If it be objected that because it is endless, there is no entity greater than Ākāśa, then a question concerning the meaning of boundlessness may be asked. If by boundlessness we mean the absence of limit, it would imply the absence of the quantity of Ākāśa, because quantity means "this much" and its absence means its opposite.

Advocate :—Let God's knowledge be unlimited like Ākāśa. The attainment of an utmost limit, spoken of above, is nothing but being devoid of quantity.

Critic :—If you talk about God's omniscience in this negative sense, even then your position is not tenable. If the knowledge of God is without any limits, His omniscience will be baffled on the ground that He will not be able to know His own knowledge completely. If it be known, then its unlimitedness will be disproved, because the knowledge of God's own knowledge would imply a knowledge of its limit. Thus all-knowing God cannot be proved.

(IV) God not proved by verbal Testimony.

In the preceding section we have shown that there is no ground of inference, on the strength of which the existence of God can be proved. Now, let us proceed to

show that the understanding arising out of knowledge of 'words' is also no proof of God. Every word is not counted as proof, but the words of a reliable person only are deemed to be so. But it is difficult to ascertain who is to be trusted. Among those who are reckoned as reliable in different sects, some accept the view of the non-existence of God ; others look upon God as an indifferent Person only i. e. God is not the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world ; others take God as the mere efficient cause of the world ; others believe God to be the material cause only ; others consider God as both material and efficient cause of the universe ; others are of opinion that God is the sole reality and the world is not real in the sense in which God is real, and that as the world has a phenomenal reality, God only appears as its cause, material as well as efficient, without being really so. These varied utterances of different persons accepted as reliable by different sects contradict each other, and hence cannot be depended on. A thing which is not brought about by the effort of any person, but has an independent character of its own, cannot, inspite of the different opinions entertained by persons with regard to it, really possess contradictory natures. There may be option with regard to action. The same act may be performed by some one in one way and by another in another manner. Action is effected by the effort of the person ; hence the nature of the action depends upon the volition of the person. But it cannot be that on account of the wish of a person, fire will turn out into water or cease to be fire. With regard to the nature of a thing, there cannot be any room for choice. The thing must, inspite of our different opinions about it, remain as it is. If the nature of an already existent thing were dependent on the judgment or wish of persons, then the different alternatives with regard to its nature might be-

equally valid. But the nature of a really existent thing is not dependent on personal judgments or wishes. The knowledge of such a thing must be acquired by means of the sources of valid knowledge, and it can be accepted as true only when it is in strict accordance with the real nature of the thing. Hence owing to the uniform nature of the thing, its valid knowledge must also be uniform. So, in cases of difference of views, at most one view held with regard to its nature can be true and the other views will be wrong. Hence believing in the validity of the scriptures, there is no hope of making a compromise regarding those contrary versions.*

In the face of these contradictory views, if we maintain that their inner significance is the same, then we would be forced to admit that whatever is said in the scriptures or reported as the words of reliable persons can not be accepted literally as true. To find out what is true and what is false in these sayings, or what is their inner significance, we have ultimately to rely upon our own understanding. Hence, when the scriptures are contradictory to each other, to accept the scriptures as a source of valid knowledge is of no avail.

* The effort at such a compromise is found in certain circles. They dogmatically believe in some sectarian scriptures and try to show that their own interpretation of those scriptures is the only valid one and other interpretations are of a lower order. But this attitude is a biased and narrow one. Thereby the quarrel cannot be ended because every one may likewise take his desired conclusion as the valid one and may explain away others' interpretations or label them as of a lower grade. When we find that no sects consider themselves as having less intelligence and their own interpretations as of a lower grade, and when they regard their own views as propounded by their preceptors to be the true conclusion, the above effort at compromise is in vain.

The differences in observation and reasoning lead to differences of conclusions. When there is a divergence of opinion with regard to a thing, all cannot be right ; either one of them is right or all the views are wrong. If there is really God, then only one of the above-mentioned contradictory views about Him can possibly be right. But which one is right, that cannot be ascertained by scriptural testimony. In case there is no God, all views regarding His nature will be false.

(v) Analogy cannot prove God.

Now about analogy. The conditions which must be fulfilled in order that analogy may be a means of ascertaining the existence and nature of God are absent in this case. Analogy, as has been mentioned before, can be applied under two conditions. Either, it must be known from some reliable authority that the name of God is to be applied to a Being who is similar to some Being already known to us ; or, there must be previous knowledge of the similarity of God to some object of our experience. In the present case, as the validity of what is called reliable authority is not established, the very first condition for having recourse to analogy remains unfulfilled. Further, because God is not proved to exist as yet, there cannot be the question as to His being like this or that. Moreover, as the knowledge of God is not obtained by perception, similarity cannot be dragged in for the purpose of referring to what has not been apprehended by the senses.

(vi) God cannot be proved by Implication.

Implication or necessary hypothesis also cannot be the proof in favour of the existence of God. In the familiar example of implication, a person's not taking food at the

day-time and his fatness are matters of observation, and thus they suggest the thought of his taking food at night. Hence implication is founded on perception and inference. That by food alone health is maintained and not otherwise is not known by implication. If there is no knowledge of a constant relation, say exclusive dependence of 'this' upon 'that,' then implication cannot take the form, namely 'without that this cannot be.' That relation being based on perception or inference, implication is dependent on perception or inference. And because the existence of God is not at all capable of being proved either by perception or by inference, so there can be no proving God by implication.

(vii) Non-apprehension unavailing with respect to God.

Now let us see if the instrument of knowledge called non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धि) is applicable here.* The knowledge of the absence of a thing is alone possible through non-apprehension. Hence by this means we can rather know the absence of God, but not His presence. If God be regarded as known through non-apprehension, He would be of the nature of negation, which is certainly not intended

* The knowledge of the absence of a thing, arising out of its non-apprehension, under conditions when if it were existent, it must have been perceived, is taken as valid. The negation is the object of such knowledge. As for example, in the lighted space before the eyes, if a pot exists, then it would be perceived; in such a case if it is not perceived, this non-perception would be a proof of its non-existence at that spot. According to other philosophers, the said non-apprehension is not the cause of the knowledge of negation, but through the conjunction of the eyes with the substratum of negation, the knowledge of negation takes place. According to this view, when the substratum (such as the ground) is perceived, the negation (such as—of pot) is perceived as an attribute of it.

by the exponents of the view. Thus the question of the proof of God's existence by means of non-apprehension cannot arise.

Thus it is shown that God cannot be proved by any of the recognised sources of valid knowledge.

(viii) The proving of God through Divine Scriptures involves fallacy.

It is assumed that God is known through scriptures of Divine origin. This involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii* or interdependence. God is proved through the scriptures, and God is taken as the author of the scriptures and the validity of the scriptures is granted on the ground that it is the production of God. In other words, when scripture will be ascertained as genuine through the trustworthiness of its Divine Author, then by that scripture, God will be established, and when by that scripture, the most trustworthy Divinity will be proved, then through His authorship, the genuineness of scripture will be known. So owing to interdependence, God cannot be proved through the scriptures, nor the genuineness of the scriptures through God's authorship.

(ix) Self-inconsistencies in the conception of God as the Author of the Scriptures.

If God be regarded as the author of the scriptures, we have to accept one of the following alternatives :—(1) The scriptures are caused through the will of the Lord who is formless and omniscient, or (2) formless God has induced someone to write the scriptures, or (3) formless God having modified Himself into form has produced the scriptures, or finally (4) God as an embodied Being is the author of the scriptures.

(1) Among these the first alternative is not sound. In this case, our only refuge is inference. Inference is based on observation of the universal concomitance, so it must have to depend upon similarity with observed facts (दृश्यसाधर्म्य), and cannot establish the existence of something dissimilar or contradictory to the known. Hence inference cannot prove anything lying beyond the senses without any aid of example. So to infer that formless God wills, we must observe somewhere that a formless being has will. But this we never experience. Knowledge, will and effort are universally observed as characteristics of the corporeal, and not of the incorporeal. With the body, knowledge, will and effort are present; without body they are nowhere found. Consequently there is no ground for the inference of the presence of will in God conceived as a bodiless Being.

(2) The second alternative is not also tenable. For a formless God, it is not possible to possess the power to instruct or dictate. In order to prove such a possibility, it is necessary to point out at least some instances of a formless being instructing others within the range of our normal experience; but no such instance is found. Hence to imagine the formless God inducing others to write the scriptures is an unwarranted conjecture.

(3) The third alternative is also unsound. The very conception of the modification of a formless God into form has already been shown to be logically untenable. The question arises—whether at the time of modification, God retains His original character or loses it. If formlessness is retained, then the contradictory qualities of having form and having no form would be affirmed of God at the same breath, and this would of course not be allowed by any

canon of logic. And if formlessness is lost, then the embodied being into which the formless God is alleged to transform Himself would be a distinct entity altogether, and there would be no link to identify the one with the other, and hence to speak of the one as the modification of the other would be absolutely meaningless. If, however, the formless and the form be conceived as identical, then the form cannot be said to be the modification of the formless. If the form be the modification of the formless, then the formless and the form cannot be regarded as identical. If two entities be identical, the one of them cannot be said to be the modification of the other and *vice versa*. Thus, it cannot be held that the formless God becomes modified as the form and then produces the scriptures.

(4) The fourth alternative is also untenable. If you recognise the body of God, then the question will arise whether that body is eternal or non-eternal. It cannot be said to be eternal, since there is no ground for inferring the eternal existence of any body. In our normal experience, wherever we find a body, we find it to be produced. On the basis of this experience, we are convinced of the invariable concomitance between the existence of a body and the attribute of its being produced. Hence the conclusion should be that if God has a body, it must be non-eternal and created. Neither can the body of God be said to be non-eternal. Before creation, there is none to create God's body and therefore God's body can have no cause. We cannot say that God Himself is the cause, because it would amount to the abandonment of the thesis that God is an embodied Being and the acceptance of the view that God is essentially a formless Being. We have already shown that if God is conceived as a formless Being, there is no ground for inferring that He can have will and action, and con-

sequently that He can produce any effect. Hence the supposition of the body of God being created by Himself is baseless. The inconsistency between the idea of formlessness and the idea of activity may further be shown on the ground that activity implies the necessity of conjunction with physical and mental instruments, and such conjunction is impossible in the case of a formless being. Nor can you say that God becomes endowed with the body through another body. In this case, there will be *regressus ad infinitum*. So, the view that God as an embodied Being is the author of the scriptures has no ground to rest upon.

In short, the four possible alternatives on the Divine origin of the scriptures cannot bear examination.

SECTION III.

Omniscient "Jiva's" Authorship Refuted.

Now, let us refute the view that some omniscient human beings are the authors of the scriptures. Let us show that there is no proof about all-knowingness of any human being. It is being shown that omniscience can in no way be achieved. For this purpose, neither sense-experience, nor inference, nor contemplation (भावना), nor spontaneous cognition (प्रतिभा), nor "yogic" knowledge will be adequate.

(a) All-knowingness not possible through external perception.

Perception through the eyes and other sense-organs cannot be possible in respect of all things. The possibility of sense-perception is by nature subject to some limitations. Particular senses can make only particular kinds of things the objects of their perception, and these things must be existent in the present time within the range of the powers of the senses concerned in order to be perceived. For example, the eyes can perceive only objects having colour, but here also their powers are restricted; only such coloured objects as are existent in the present time within the range of their powers and without any barrier between themselves and the objects can be perceived by them.

The relation between the senses and their objects, upon which perception depends, is generally explained in two ways;—either the senses reach the objects so that there may be contact between them, or the objects produce

impressions upon the organs of the senses from a distance. In both cases, we must admit that the objects are required to be present in time. To explain,—if these senses go out so far as to meet the objects, the conjunction between the objects and the senses must lie in both, and as the objects which are not present cannot be the supporters of conjunction, the senses cannot reach them. So, for the senses to reach the objects, it is necessary that sense-objects must be present in time. If senses do not go to objects, but objects produce impressions upon the sense-organs from afar, it is not required that things themselves must be supporters of the conjunction ; still as sense-organs cannot receive impressions from things which are non-existent at present, but which might exist in the past or may exist in the future, perceptual knowledge must necessarily be limited to the object existent at present. So here also it is proved that objects of senses must be present in time in order to be perceived.

Now this principle being established (i. e. senses know only present objects), it is proved that though the eyes and other senses, by dint of the development of their capacities through some practices, may know greater and greater number of objects, objects of bigger and bigger size, or objects at longer and longer distances, which cannot be ordinarily perceived, still they will never be able to experience objects which will come into existence in the future or which might have existed in the past. Moreover, when a causal relation is already established, it is quite possible that a quantitative change in the cause will produce a corresponding quantitative change in the effect ; but such a change in any cause cannot in the least affect anything which is not its effect. This being the case, the particular sense which is the cause of the knowledge of a particular

kind of objects, may, with the development of its capacities, produce an increase in the knowledge of that particular kind of objects alone, but it cannot thereby know any object of a different kind, with the knowledge of which it has no causal relation. As for instance, the eyes have a causal relation with the knowledge of particular coloured objects of the present time, and this knowledge can be increased with the development of their power. Thus they may know present objects of an enormous size, belonging to a distant space which cannot under normal conditions be so perceived ; but as the eyes are by nature incapable of perceiving a past or future object, any degree of development of their powers will not render them capable of perceiving them. What is true of the eyes is true of all the special senses. Hence the question of knowing any absent object, even through a developed organ, can hardly arise. Further, when an effect is produced or an action is performed as a result of the co-operation of two agents, it cannot be accomplished in the absence of either of them. Perceptual knowledge is the result of the co-operation of the senses and their respective objects. The knowledge of the past or the future would be possible, if the senses could produce knowledge without the co-operation of their objects. But this is evidently impossible. Hence the presence of the objects to be known is indispensable for the production of perceptual knowledge. This also proves the impossibility of any person's knowing the past and the future and thereby being omniscient by means of perception.

(b) All-knowingness not possible through internal perception.

Now, let us consider the alleged capacity of the mind to know all things independently of sense-perception by

any other possible means. Mind independently of sense-organs is experienced to know only the states and processes of the mind itself, such as joys, sorrows, etc. So only joys etc., are found to be the objects of mental perception. Thus mental perception which has only mental states and processes for their objects cannot have outside things as their objects. In normal experience we never find the mind coming in direct contact with external objects without the mediation of the senses. If the mind could independently of sense-organs know outside things e. g. colour, sound and the like, then there would have been no blindness or deafness. The blind and the deaf are not without mind ; but they cannot see or hear owing to the absence of the sense-organs. It may be urged that though the mind cannot directly perceive external objects, it may have remembrance of them, and in this matter of remembrance the mind may claim independence. But this is not true. By analysis of the nature of remembrance we find that the mind, which is with impressions of the objects of past experience gained through other sources of knowledge, becomes the cause of remembrance. It cannot thus produce remembrance independently. In inferential and other cognitions also, mind is not independent, because without knowledge of the ground for an inference and that of other factors, such cognitions cannot take place. As there cannot be the direct relation of mind with outside objects, as is found in the case of eyes and other sense-organs, and as mind is dependent on cognitions gained through other sources, so through mind no new or additional knowledge can be gained with regard to outside things which are not its objects. Thus, it is impossible for mind to know all things.

(c) Omniscience not obtainable through contemplation.

Contemplation (भावना wishful thinking) always refers to objects perceived or heard or inferred or imagined. Thus, a development in contemplation may result in giving more and more vivid impression concerning objects previously perceived, heard or inferred or imagined. But this can in no way give us any additional knowledge of any new object. Hence contemplation cannot be said to be any valid source of knowledge (प्रमाण), because it depends on former knowledge, whereas a valid source of knowledge must be independent in character. Thus it is that as a result of contemplation, none can attain omniscience. But it is asserted by the advocates of contemplation as a source of knowledge that in course of contemplation various new experiences are gained. This is a misinterpretation of what actually happens. On account of the presence of various impressions, due to previous experience, in the subconscious region of the mind, at the time of contemplation many of these impressions come to the forefront of distinct consciousness. This, therefore, cannot be regarded as any new addition to knowledge.

(d) All-knowingness not available by drugs etc.

By taking medicine and recourse to other practices, one cannot attain to all-knowingness. By a draught of a miracle-working medicine, by the recital of incantations (मन्त्र), through the practices of austerity and trance, sense-organs cannot transcend their intrinsic limitations.

Advocate :—One who is without impurity can know anything and everything. Impurity alone veils the knowledge of truth.

Critic :—This can never be. Even if impurity shrouds the knowledge of certain things, still the removal of impurity may be the cause of the knowledge of those things. The person will see the object which was shrouded by impurity, but will not see any other object. Hence he will not be an all-knower.

(e) Spontaneous Cognition Examined.

It may be said that omniscience is attainable through spontaneous cognition (प्रतिभा) which is clearly distinct from perception and inference. By this process, mind cognises objects without coming in contact with them as in the case of perception, or without taking its stand on the knowledge of concomitance as in the case of inference. This spontaneous cognition is a matter of every-day experience. For example, when a person knows that his brother will come to-morrow though he has no reasonable grounds for entertaining such an expectation, and that knowledge turns out to be true, the person is said to get spontaneous knowledge. It is quite possible that through such spontaneous cognition, one may be omniscient.

But this argument is not convincing. The alleged spontaneous cognition is not a matter of general experience, but it may occur on rare occasions, and in most cases, with regard to events concerning particular objects either dear or hostile to the cognising person. In such spontaneous cognitions, the mind cannot be said to be independent of the influence of the object concerned. Owing to a strong liking of the heart for a particular object and a feeling of deep interest in the facts concerning it, such cognitions about such an object may occasionally take place in particular minds, and similarly due to strong dislike for a hostile

object and deep interest in the affairs concerning it, such cognitions are sometimes experienced about such a hostile object. So the particular disposition of the mind and the special emotional relationship between the mind and the object are the causes of the alleged knowledge about dear and hostile objects. Even attachment and aversion cannot strictly be said to be the cause of such knowledge, because there is no such guarantee that the same will happen in all cases. Thus, it is found that peculiar dispositions of the mind with regard to peculiar objects become occasionally the cause of the said knowledge, but are not its valid or constant cause. Hence it is uncertain whether the same would happen on other occasions or not. For example, the spontaneous cognition about one's brother's arrival is not bound to turn out a fact. Supposing that he comes as anticipated, it would be a coincidence of his anticipated fact with actual fact, which would really be in accordance with some other law of causation. Had the coincidence of this cognition with fact been due to its intrinsic validity, then in every case of such a cognition, the same would have been true. As it is not so, the occasional validity of this sort of cognition must be admitted to be dependent on causes other than itself. Hence this sort of spontaneous cognition cannot be accepted as an independent source of valid knowledge. Thus it is shown that the independent power of the mind to have knowledge of all kinds of things cannot be proved on the ground of the validity of spontaneous cognition, because the validity of spontaneous cognition itself as a source of knowledge is far from being established.

(f) "Yoga" cannot reach Omniscience.

The supporters of the doctrine of the independent power of the mind to perceive or know things may put

forward a class of facts in support of their view, viz. the exceptional power which the "Yogins" are said to acquire to see or hear or otherwise know the events of the past and future and of distant regions beyond the scope of the senses. This knowledge cannot be regarded as the products of sense-perception or inference or any other recognised source of knowledge. Hence it may be claimed to be the product of independent perception by the mind, whose power has been increased by certain kinds of practices. We shall not question or discuss the universal validity of such knowledge at present. Even admitting the validity of such "Yogic" knowledge, we find that what the facts justify us in inferring is that in exceptional cases exceptionally gifted minds can experience particular things which are beyond the scope of normal experience of ordinary minds. But there is no ground to prove that such knowledge can make all things and laws of the world its objects and can thereby rise up to omniscience. Hence the possibility of omniscience is not found to be capable of being proved by any means.

(g) Scripture-writers' omniscience not ascertainable.

Now, even if the possibility of omniscience be assumed, we find no reasonable ground on which the omniscience of the authors of the scriptures can be ascertained. If from the writings of these authors it is known that they were all-knowing, then this will lead to the fallacy of interdependence. In that case, it will be held that owing to the authorship of all-knowing seers, the scriptures are valid, and that owing to the validity of the scriptures, their authors are all-knowing. In other words, when the validity of the scriptures will be ascertained, there will be the ascertainment that the writers of those scriptures are all-knowers, and when their all-knowingness will be ascertained

then alone the validity of the scriptures will be ascertained without the least shadow of doubt. Thus both the validity of the scriptures and all-knowingness of their teachers become non-established.

In order to know that this man is omniscient, it is necessary that the man who asserts this fact of omniscience, should also be omniscient. To know that this man's knowledge has made each and everything its object, it is required for the knower to make that man's knowledge and all objects related to that knowledge the object of his own knowledge. But as this is not possible, it is not reasonable to hold up any one as an all-knower. Besides, those whose knowledge is limited, do not themselves perceive the nature of knowledge about all things, nor do they know what things are the objects of such a knowledge, how and through what reason, could they infer another's all-knowingness? No ground can be ascertained by them, which will serve to establish this all-knowingness. If it were possible, then those men who would make such an inference must themselves be admitted to be all-knowing. It is not possible for a person to determine whether another has or has not knowledge about the object which is beyond his own knowledge. So it comes to this that a person who cannot himself realise all-knowingness cannot put faith upon such a claim. Hence it is impossible for him to believe implicitly whatever any person claiming such omniscience says about extra-mundane (अलौकिक) objects, which he is incapable of knowing on the strength of any other independent sources of valid knowledge (मूलप्रमाण).

Besides, there is a great divergence of opinions about the very same subject among those who are believed to be all-knowing seers belonging to the same or different sects.

Hence on the strength of their sayings or writings called the scriptures, it is difficult for unbiased minds to come to any definite conclusion about any subject.

Besides, let us analyse our experience of the waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and Samādhi states, and show that all-knowingness is impossible. In the waking state, the individual being is identified with limitations. Without the identification of the ego with the gross body, the waking state is never possible. The knowledge of the person who is identified with limitations cannot refer to all objects. Because of his limitations, he cannot have any direct relation with past, future or remote things. So in the waking state, none ever attains to all-knowingness. In dream, there cannot be all-knowingness. In that state the individual beings lose, more or less, their independence and also remain identified with limitations. In that state, there is no experience or remembrance of the world of the waking state. So there cannot be all-knowingness in that state. In dreamless sleep and swoon, there is no capability of knowing things. In trance with thought, there is the awareness of that state. Without a being to own a state, there cannot be the awareness of the state. So owing to limited ego-identification, there cannot be all-knowingness at that stage. In the trance without thought, there is no consciousness of the difference of knowledge, knower and the known and that state is even without self-consciousness; so there cannot at that time be all-knowingness. If the all-knowingness be there, the trance will be lost. Thus it is proved that the knowledge of the individual self cannot have in any state reference to all objects. So all-knowingness is impossible.

SECTION IV.

TRUTH-SEER'S AUTHORSHIP REFUTED.

Now, let us examine the remaining alternative, namely that the scriptures are the products of those who have realised Truth in trance ("*Samādhi*").

(a) *Samādhi* Described.

Samādhi (profound meditation) is of two kinds :— One is with thought (संविक्ल्प) and another is without thought (निर्विकल्प). These stages are generally attained through steady practices. At the initial stage of such practices, the struggle (प्रत्याहार) on the part of the student to turn attention away from objects other than the one desired, predominates. As a result of this process, mind becomes, for a time, occupied with the desired object and sticks (धारणा) to it. Due to the successful practice of the above procedure, the absorption of the mind with the desired object becomes deep and long. This state of mind is technically called meditation (ध्यान). Here there is a continuous stream of consciousness in which there is the vivid experience of the contemplated, contemplation and the contemplator which are blended together and at the same time remain distinct. As a result of the ripening of the practice of meditation, the trance with thought takes place. In this state, meditation becomes so deep that a vivid consciousness of the object of meditation alone remains at the exclusion of the vivid consciousness of the contemplator and the act of contemplation. Our awareness of mental functioning in this state is far subtler than the normal consciousness of waking and dreaming states. When

even the awareness of this subtle functioning lapses (निरुद्ध), the trance without thought takes place.

(b) Samādhi-experiences are varied, without fixed gradation and subjective.

Now, let us see what experiences we gain in *samādhi*. In the trance with thought, mind being one-pointed (एकाग्र), the subject-matter of meditation alone is deeply impressed upon the mind. Suppression of desires (वासना) for other objects accompanying the meditation helps the ripening of meditation, and the meditation, when ripened into the state of trance, becomes the cause of the realisation or direct awareness of the object of meditation. Different men may meditate upon different objects, or the same man may meditate upon different objects at different times. For this reason different forms of realisation may occur in the state of trance, according to the differences of objects meditated upon. Past experience functions in all present experience and defines its objects. Sometimes, owing to the awakening of previous impressions, there may even be in that state the experience of objects unthought-of. But, in such state, each aspirant, as a rule, experiences according as he meditates and even the same person, at different times, experiences quite differently because of the change of the object of meditation. This experience is an individual affair, hence on the ground of these experiences, we cannot arrive at any definite conclusion about the nature of Truth. An experience which varies at our will can never be the determinant of the nature of an object, having independent existence of its own, and consequently cannot be relied upon as an evidence with regard to the real character of its object. Subjective certainty cannot be accepted as the criterion of truth unless it can be supported by some other independent evidence.

Nor can one speak of various grades of spiritual realisations, for it is due to their predilections that different aspirants choose different objects for their meditation, and as a result of this process of meditation, the variation in their realisations takes place. This being the case, the last object of one's realisation may legitimately be the first object of another's realisation and thus there can be no fixed order of spiritual realisations. Had there been any such order, the objects of intuition could not have changed their nature according to individual choice. As among spiritual realisations, what is high or low cannot be thus determined, you cannot speak of higher or lower order of realisation. Besides, in these realisations, there is no evidence of the objects existing independently of the meditation of the person. Hence, the object referred to should be admitted to be a mental ideal. On the other hand, the distinction of higher and lower grades of realisation presupposes an objective standard, the realisation of an objective reality. This being the case, the question of the grades of spiritual experiences cannot arise at all.

It is sometimes maintained that as a result of individual thinking some supra-mental Reality manifests itself in deep meditation as the object of realisation. But it is merely an assumption. As there is scope for interpreting this experience as a mental creation and its object as having merely subjective existence, some additional and independent evidence is necessary to prove that it is a case of real manifestation of a really existent entity, and this evidence is nowhere available. Further, the validity of this statement depends upon the validity of the doctrine of transformation of Reality, which has already been refuted. Even granting that the above assumption is valid, we cannot come to any definite conclusion about Truth through

trance with thought. As the mind is active at this stage, it cannot be unhesitatingly asserted that the object of this trance has not within itself subjective elements, and as the subjective elements cannot at this stage be eliminated, it is not possible to determine the nature of the said object by the elimination of mental contributions. It is well-known that this realisation also changes with the change of thought, so this individual experience cannot be accepted as the determinant of the nature of truth. Hence intuition is not the means for securing objective and universally valid knowledge.

**(c) All-knowingness not attainable in
Samādhi with thought.**

Some thinkers maintain that in trance with thought, one attains to all-knowingness. But this is not possible. Before entering into this trance, mind struggles to forget objects in general, and concentrates all its energies upon one object of its meditation. At this state of mind, there is no relation of mind to extra-mental things. The granting of omniscience amounts to the loss of one-pointedness of mind in trance. So all-knowingness cannot arise at that time. Besides, as there is, at that time, a lingering sense of egoism which cannot subsist without the feeling of limitedness, knowledge can have no reference to all objects. Hence there cannot be omniscience. Thus, it is absurd to hold that in trance with thought, the aspirant becomes omniscient.

**(d) Discrimination of the true and the
false impossible in Samādhi.**

Moreover, in the normal waking state we have the capacity to differentiate between what is true and what is false. The knowledge, the contradictory of which is proved

by stronger evidence and which is thereby negated, we count as false ; and that which is not so negated, we count as true. But in trance with thought, we cannot retain this power of discrimination : what appears to us we indiscriminately take as true, whether it is really true or untrue we have no power to decide. If that power were to remain at the time of this trance, then this concentrated stage will be nullified. Where there is no experience of the opposite, there cannot be discrimination between the true and the false, and as such there can be no judgment of truth or falsehood. Thus it is not reasonable to accept the experience of trance with thought as a method or means of ascertaining truth.

(e) Invalidity of Samādhi-evidence.

In trance with thought these five things are found :—namely, (1) want of fickleness, (2) One-pointedness of mind (3) subtle modification of the mind, (4) absorption in the nature of the object of meditation and (5) a kind of experience called intuition or realisation of the object meditated upon. In trance with thought, the experience of the mental object varies according to the character of the contemplation of the student practising. So there cannot be the ascertainment of Truth through it.

Thus we find that we do not intuit or realise any extramental reality in trance with thought. The object intuited has no existence independent of our mind, but exists as long as the trance lasts and ceases to exist as soon as the trance ceases. It is found that, as the result of private psychological habit, we get the particular form of experience in the trance. This realisation varies in accordance with modifications of experience and personal differences. Hence, this realisation or intuition can never

be saved from the dangers of pure individualism. In this state, our cherished thought is projected outward or externalised (sometimes, the sub-conscious enters into consciousness) and presents itself before us with the appearance of reality. From such experience, which is purely subjective and individual in its origin, we should not jump to any universal objective conclusion. Therefore we should never venture to formulate the nature of Truth upon the evidence of trance with thought. Thus the validity of the scriptures should not be advanced on the ground of that experience.

(f) Samādhi without thought and Awakening from it described; Truth-realisation disproved.

Now, about trance without thought. The difference between trance with thought and trance without thought consists in the fact that in the former, attention, setting aside every reference, becomes concentrated on one, and in the latter even that reference is absent. Since a subject without an object is inconceivable and likewise an object without a subject cannot be conceived, the mind, at that state, becomes, as it were, lost or non-existent or unmanifest. Though mind is not destroyed altogether at that state, still all mental modifications become for the time being suppressed (चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध). When mind has no object to think about and is completely without effort, that state is called its suppressed state. There, even the awareness of this state of suppression is eliminated, and therefore it cannot be known in the manner in which we know the waking state at the waking hours. When we wake up from trance without thought we refer to that state through remembrance or inference. So, in this state, all distinct and discriminative knowledge is entirely absent. Because at the time of the trance without thought, the initial thought gets lost and

another thought does not arise, because it is a state where mental function cannot be known, and because one cannot objectify self or non-self at that time, no thought or experience is possible there, and no person can have the capacity of ascertaining the nature of things and thoughts there. If anything were realised or intuited at that state, there would be a shadowy sense of the knower, knowledge and the known, and on that account the trance without thought would be lost. If in dreamless sleep one were to know that he is in dreamless sleep, then dreamlessness would not be there. The same holds good in the case of the trance without thought.

Let us now discuss the process of awakening from that suppressed state. Sometimes through some loud sound or some other external cause that state is disturbed and as a result the person comes down to the level of normal waking state. Sometimes it happens that without any such external cause, the mind begins to be imperceptibly active. Later on, we feel that some very subtle thoughts are welling up in the mind. Slowly and gradually, this process goes on. Now, when the person awakes suddenly from that state of calmness and attains to vivid waking state, his impressions acquired through former education are aroused. As a result of this, he begins to explain the said trance in a manner that does not contradict the metaphysical conclusion reached by his previous discriminative knowledge or belief. As the same state is variously explained and as the explanations are found to be varied and conflicting, it is not sound or safe to accept any of these conclusions about the nature of Truth as realised in the trance. When a person comes down from the 'trance without thought' to the 'trance with thought', his experience is affected by the present activity of his latent desires. Naturally there will

be a difference in those subjective objects of experience. At this state, the capacity of deep contemplation remains, but the power of discrimination is not possessed. So what was experienced in the trance without thought and what really is the nature of it, one cannot be sure of. When the mind becomes less concentrated, we carry the remembrance that in the trance without thought, we had no awareness of mind's activity as we have now; sometimes, however, owing to the revival of our former impressions about the nature of the ultimate reality, the belief is held that we experienced that Truth in that trance. Though in the trance without thought, there is no chance of the rise of any such experience in the mind, still because we cannot ascertain the nature of Truth at that state and also because having awaked from that state we offer explanations of that state in the light of impressions just revived, which are different owing to the difference of our education, we cannot come to any definite conclusion about Truth on the basis of the trance without thought. In order to come to any definite conclusion regarding the nature of Truth, we have to depend on those explanations alone and there is no other way to get at the truth of things in trance without thought, and as these explanations are various and unstable coloured by our prejudices or traditional opinions, no conclusion can be said to claim absolute truth.

It is generally admitted that in the trance without thought, there is neither the experience of the outward world nor that of any mental function, nor is there the consciousness of time and space; but we have just pointed out that the attainment of such a trance by any individual does not enlighten him regarding the nature of Truth. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that though here is the general recognition of the trance without

thought among different sects, still some of them hold that Pluralism in its various forms is the right view, others Dualism, others Qualified Non-dualism, others unqualified Non-dualism, and still others Dualism as well as Non-dualism. If there were the realisation of the Truth in this trance, it becomes difficult to understand how this divergence of opinions among the adepts of such trance belonging to various sects is possible. Some people may suppose that there are different grades of realisation in this trance. But since there is no power of mind left for realisation in that state and also because mind is inactive there, to speak of grades of realisation at that state is meaningless.

Concluding Remarks.

To conclude : as what is called intuition in the state of trance with thought is mere individual awareness which is subjective, and in trance without thought there is no experience at all, we cannot grant that any person has ever realised Truth by means of trance. Nor the validity of the scriptures through authorship, direct or indirect, of any such person can be believed in.

Recapitulation :—

Thus, to draw the final conclusion of the whole chapter :—

I. The Scriptures cannot be regarded as non-produced.

II. The Scriptures cannot be proved to be the productions of God.

III. The Scriptures cannot be the product of all-knowing ' Jivas.'

IV. The Scriptures cannot be the productions of Truth-seers.

From this it follows that the scriptures cannot be proved to be the production of any infallible Being or Beings. Hence they must be considered to be composed by human beings, who, however specially gifted, must be subject to error. Thus the belief in the infallible authority of the scriptures which is one of the fundamental articles of faith with the followers of all the historical religions is found to be without any rational basis.

CHAPTER II

The Critical Examination of the Theory of God as the Efficient Cause of the World and Atoms as the Material Cause.

INTRODUCTORY.

The advocates of this theory regard atoms as the material cause of non-eternal objects of the world and infer that God is the maker or agent (कर्त्ता) of those effects. Omniscient God is the prime mover and regulator of atoms and its effects. The atomic theory is based on the doctrine of the absolute distinction of effects (i. e. अवयवि) and their material cause (i. e. अवयव), and this doctrine in its turn is founded on the theory of the non-existence of the effect in the cause (असत्कार्यवाद). According to this theory, effects do not exist before their production or after their destruction, while their material cause abides. Now, let us examine the said theory.

SECTION I

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NON-EXISTENT EFFECT.

(a) The cause-effect-relation remains unexplained:--

You admit that the relation of the effect with the cause is production. But if the effect were non-existent before production, then you cannot explain the relation of the effect with the cause. In the non-existent, there cannot be the property of being the support of any existent entity, nor can there be any determination of the relation with it.

(b) Temporal particularisation not possible in the effect.

If the effect is taken as non-existent, then the time prior to the production of the effect, because of its having no relation with the effect, will not particularise the effect, that is, will not determine the absence of the effect. Such being the case, the non-existence non-particularised by time will characterise the effect, and this is contradictory to existence. In other words, where non-existence is non-particularised by time, as is the case with the hare's horn, etc., there existence can never be perceived. Because of the non-existence of the effect being non-particularised by time, the advocates of the theory of the non-existent effect cannot hold that the effect will be existent after its production. Because the non-existent cannot be related to a particular time, so what is non-existent at some time must always be non-existent.

(c). Existence and non-existence cannot be determined as properties or essences of the effect.

According to the advocates of the doctrine of the non-existent effect, the effect exists after its production and before its destruction, but does not exist before its production and after its destruction. Now the question arises : are existence and non-existence the properties (धर्म) of the effect or are they its essence (स्वरूप) ? In case, the former alternative is accepted, we have to ask whether existence and non-existence are the properties of different substrata (धर्मि—subject having attributes) or they are the attributes of one and the same substratum. Of these two alternatives of the first alternative, if the former is accepted i. e. if it is held that the substratum of the attribute of non-existence is the non-existent, and the substratum of the attribute of existence is the existent, then it cannot be established that the non-existent has the property of being the effect (कार्यत्व). When the effect is produced, it must become existent, because the non-existent cannot be the support of the attribute of production, a fact corroborated by our normal experience. This is admitted even by the advocate of this theory, in as much as according to him also, the produced effect does not become non-existent during the time it lasts. So we have to accept that the effect which has become produced is an existent, i. e. it possesses the attribute of existence. It has been maintained in the alternative under discussion that the non-existent is the substratum of non-existence, and the existent is the substratum of existence ; so it follows that the effect will be the substratum of existence even before production. If at that time the effect is held as non-existent, then that substratum of non-existence should be, according to admission of the alternative, quite different from the said effect which is the substratum of existence;

and because it has been found that the effect is an existent, that substratum of non-existence cannot be the same effect. To explain : if the effect is the substratum of non-existence before its production, how could that substratum of non-existence be the same as the said effect which is the substratum of existence ? So, that substratum must be different from the latter. And because there is difference between the two, the said effect, even before its production, will not be the substratum of non-existence. So the alternative under discussion is invalidated.

Now let us consider the second alternative of the first alternative. That is, we are going to consider the view that the same substratum has the attributes of existence and non-existence. This view also is not reasonable. You admit that without a substratum, there cannot be a non-eternal attribute ; so you have to admit, if we are to uphold this alternative, that at the time of the non-existence of the effect, the effect must exist as the substratum of that non-eternal attribute, viz., non-existence. The effect which is the substratum of non-existence is the substratum of existence too; so existence and non-existence must go together. But the existence of the substratum being there, there cannot be its non-existence which is contradictory to its existence. Thus, existence and non-existence cannot be the properties of the effect.

Now about the second alternative. The view that existence and non-existence are the essence of the effect is not valid. Existence and non-existence are contradictory to each other, so how can they be the essence of the same effect ? Besides, the essence of an entity must be identical, but as existence and non-existence are different, they cannot be the essence of the identical effect. If existence and non-existence are taken to be the essence of any thing different

from the effect, then you will fail to prove that the effect is non-existent before its production, because in that case existence and non-existence, being the essence of another thing, will have no relation with the effect. Thus the view that existence and non-existence are either the properties of the effect or are its essence is refuted.

**(d) Effects impossible being non-related
to prior negation.**

What was non-existent before its production can never be brought into existence. If it were possible, then there ought to have been the possibility of the production of such absolute non-existents, as hare's horn and the like.

Advocate—Because there is no 'prior negation' of hare's horn, etc. in any cause, they are not produced. But there is the prior negation of pots etc. in their material causes, so their production is possible.

Critic—Had there been some relation between the non-produced pot and the alleged prior-negation, then there might have been its difference from hare's horn. When the pot is non-existent at that time, it is meaningless to speak of its prior negation at that moment. At that time it is without any essence or nature (स्वरूप), so it cannot even have the relation called 'Swarupa' (simple relation, i. e. final relation which is not different from terms and hence without a third relating unity) with negation.

Advocate—The relation of the non-existent pot with its prior negation is of the nature of negation (अभावस्वरूप).

Critic—This cannot be. That nature of negation has in itself no definite specification (विशेष) which distinguishes it from other prior negations; therefore you will

be forced to admit that this is a general negation and it is equally related or unrelated with all things as with the pot.

Advocate—Your objection is not valid ; because before the production of the pot, the genus (attribute) of potness being eternal, is naturally there, and because the prior negation of the pot refers to the genus of potness, there may be, even in the absence of the pot, its relation with its prior negation.

Critic—As the attribute of potness does not exist in this negation, so it cannot differentiate it from other negations. The attribute which is present in a substance produces some differentiation from others (इतरव्यावर्त्तकत्व) in the said substance (धर्मी), if it is present. But the existence of the attribute of a substance cannot produce differentiation in the substance, if the substance itself does not exist. Thus, the pot, if non-existent, cannot have the attribute of being the counterentity of prior negation. Hence as there is no ground for particularising the negation and establishing its special reference to the pot, speaking of the production of the non-existent pot is as good as speaking of the production of hare's horn.

Moreover, the doctrine of the production of the non-existent effect involves the fallacy of interdependence. Owing to the production of the pot, it is dissimilar from hare's horns and owing to its dissimilarity from the same, it is produced.

Concluding Remarks.

Thus if the effect is taken as non-existent at sometime, then it must be taken as non-existent for all times. There is no production of the non-existent effect, because what is not yet produced cannot have any relation with its cause.

and it is futile to grant it any relation with the same after its production. Hence, the doctrine of the production of the non-existent effect is not sound.

Refutation of Inherence.

According to the theory of the production of non-existent effect, there was the absence of the effect first, and then the effect comes into being and then it becomes related to its cause. The relation which subsists between the cause and the effect is called the relation of *Inherence* (समवाय). The cause, the effect and the relation between them are each regarded as separate from the other two. Owing to this relation between the cause and the effect, the effect becomes inseparable from its cause. (See pages 33-36)

• Now we shall examine this doctrine.

(a) Inherence not proved by Perception.

In actual experience, the effect is always perceived along with its cause, so on the strength of perception, it cannot be proved that the cause and the effect are distinct entities related by means of what is called the relation of *Inherence*. If the separateness of the related terms could be established first and later on their relation were perceived, then we would be forced to admit that the relation of inherence binds together two separate entities, viz. cause and effect. But as in the case of the cause and its effect there is no perception of separateness, there appears to be no necessity for admitting that it is the relation of inherence between them which brings them and keeps them together. Besides, as according to this theory, the relation of inherence is itself different from the related terms, it cannot explain the perception of the inseparability of two other related terms. If the effect were absolutely different

from its cause, then it would not have uniformly produced the experience of the inseparability of the effect from the cause. The perception of 'the earthen pot' is taken as a proof of the fact that the pot is the effect of earth. This perception has for its object 'the pot' which is perceived in a relation of invariable co-existence (सामानाधिकरण्य) with its cause-earth. If this perception be taken as a case of misapprehension, then we would fail to prove that the pot is the effect of earth, because the fact that the pot is not perceived as detached from earth is the basis of proving that the earth is its cause. Hence such perceptions as that of 'the earthen pot' must be held as valid knowledge and these perceptions evidently disprove the theory of the absolute difference of the cause and its effect. What contradicts a valid perception cannot be proved by any other means of valid knowledge, for valid perception is the primary source from which all other sources of valid knowledge derive their materials. Thus on the strength of universal experience of the nature of an effect, it is shown that there is no ground for regarding cause and effect as separate entities required to be related together by means of the relation of inherence which is different from them.

That inherence has a character different from that of other things would become established, if such an exceptional nature of inherence could be proved by perception. But the self-existence of inherence and the relation of other things, such as cause and effect, substance and attribute etc., through inherence are not known through perception. Moreover, if we analyse our perception of external things e. g. that of the pot and its colour, earth and the earthen pot, etc., we find that our analysis does not tell us that the pot, its colour, and the said inherence between them, or earth, pot and the inherence between them are

cognised by perception as of different natures. If such were the nature of our perception, then there would not have been any dispute about the relation between cause and effect, or substance and quality. Nor would there be any scope for the misunderstanding that there is oneness between earth and the pot, or the pot and its colour. Besides, it is admitted that inherence is not an entity having a form with sensible properties ; so it cannot be known by perception. Moreover, it cannot also be admitted that a thing possesses a nature other than that perceived, because thereby there will be an unwarrantable stretch (अतिप्रसंग). Hence inherence is not the object of perception.

(b) Inherence not proved by Inference.

Nor there is inference about inherence. Inherence or any other thing having an eternally uniform nature cannot have the property of being a cause. Hence it cannot be the cause of the relation between cause and effect, substance and attribute. Moreover, if inherence is not related to inherent terms, then neither the knowledge that the terms are related would arise, nor would inherence account for their relation. If inherence can become related to terms through itself and without the mediation of any other relation, then why should not the same be the case with the substance and attribute, cause and effect. So the assumption of Inherence would be an unnecessary hypothesis.

Moreover, the nature of the alleged inherence is contrary to the very conception of relation. A relation is necessarily dependent on the terms it relates. This is the nature of a relation. So the determination of the existence and character of a relation depends on the determination of those of the terms it relates, as in the case of the relation

of conjunction. But you admit that the relation of inherence exists independently of the two terms it relates. So the alleged inherence does not fulfil the conditions of a relation.

(c) Oneness, all-pervadingness and eternity of Inherence refuted.

Besides, those who advocate the necessity of recognising the relation of inherence to account for the relation between substance and attribute, cause and effect etc. maintain that the relation of inherence is itself an entity which is one, all-pervading and eternal, and which serves as the medium of connection between particular substances and particular attributes, between particular causes and their particular effects and so on. But if this inherence is to be conceived as one and all-pervading, it must be regarded as related to all substances and causes at the same time. If this be so, when particular attributes or particular effects are produced, there is no reason why this inherence should relate this attribute or this effect to any particular substance or particular cause in preference to others. For example, when the attribute of colour is produced it is expected that this one all-pervading relation should relate it with all things whether ethereal, aerial or physical. But this never happens. Hence the existence of such an all-pervading entity as the sole ground of the relationship between particular substances and attributes or between particular cause and effect cannot be admitted. If the inherence is accepted as one, then the inherence of all changes is one everywhere, hence, the inherence of these changes will also be in the efficient cause. So, both the material and the efficient cause, being the substratum of changes, their distinction vanishes.

Besides, it is not logical to accept inherence as eternal. There is no proof about the eternal persistence of a rela-

tion between two created things.' By perception, the eternity of the relation of colour etc. cannot be proved. The non-eternity of such relations is known through perception. We experience that after the pot has been subjected to the baking-process, its relation with the dark-green colour is destroyed and that with a new colour viz. red, is produced. It may be objected that such cases do not refer to the relation of inherence, but to the negation of one of the terms related; in the example cited there is the negation of the dark-green colour, but not the negation of the relation of inherence. It may be pointed out that in that case the advocate would be forced to admit that conjunction also is eternal, because the experience of the destruction of conjunction between two substances may likewise be interpreted as not a case of the negation of conjunction, but the negation of one of the conjoined substances, the relation of conjunction remaining unaffected. This is a conclusion which is of course unpalatable to the advocate.

(d) Recognition of Inherence involves superfluity.

Moreover, you observe that a qualified (विशिष्ट) knowledge has for its object the relation of the attribute (विशेषण) and the substance (विशेष्य); but you do not see that in order to have qualified knowledge it is not indispensable to accept validity of the relation of inherence. You admit that in a perception qualified by negation, there is no reference to inherence; we may say that the perception qualified by colour etc., can as well be explained without the recognition of inherence.* In other words, if the relation of स्वरूप is

*Negation has no special property (स्वकार) of its own, its essence is constituted by the essence of its substratum. Take for example, the absence of the pot on the ground. Here the absence of the pot has for its essence (स्वरूप), the essence of the ground in which it resides. So the relation of the negation of the pot with the ground is the relation of *Svarupa* (स्वरूप) which means that the relation is identical with the terms related.

granted in the case of negation, then it will mean the end of the relation of inherence: in that case, in the place of the alleged inherence, the relation of स्वरूप can as well be recognised.

Advocate—The substitution of the relation of inherence by the relation of स्वरूप leads to a superfluity of hypothesis, because in that case, instead of recognising one relation of inherence, we will be forced to admit infinite स्वरूप relations of the infinity of objects.

Critic.—When we can explain qualified perceptions through the recognition of the avowed relation of स्वरूप, it is simply unnecessary and superfluous to admit another relation, namely inherence, which you have not as yet been able to establish. So it is your hypothesis which violates the Law of Parsimony. If the relation, called inherence, were, even according to your view, adequate to explain all similar cases, you would not find it necessary to suppose another relation, viz., the relation of स्वरूप between negation and its substratum.

Moreover, if the inherence which is not dependent on related terms is to become a relation, then the universal existence (सत्ता) or space (गगन) etc., would perform the function of such a relation, hence what necessity is there for the recognition of inherence ?

(e) The acceptance of one स्वरूप Relation disproves Inherence.

Let us now analyse the character of *Swarupa* (स्वरूप). The relation that subsists between knowledge and its object is explained by the exponents of this view as that of 'Swarupa.' Now, if it is granted that the relation of स्वरूप itself is identical with the related terms and not separate from them,

then knowledge and the organs of knowledge would have to be treated as the same. Take for instance the knowledge of the pot gained by the eyes. According to this view, knowledge of the pot produced by the eyes is identical with the relation of the eyes with the pot. Now, if this relation of the eyes with the pot is identical with the knowledge of the pot, the eyes must be admitted as identical with the knowledge itself, and in that case we might use the term 'eyes' in the place of the term 'knowledge', which is evidently absurd. Hence the relation of स्वरूप ought to be asserted as distinct from the terms it relates. When this point is proved, the relation of स्वरूप can easily be taken as one. If there is no harm in your admitting the unity of the alleged inherence, simply on the ground of economy of hypothesis, one can on the same ground prove that स्वरूप is one. Hence the relation of inherence other than स्वरूप will not be proved.

(f) The Theory of many non-eternal Inherences is fallacious and purposeless.

Now, if it be conceded that the relation of inherence is not one all-pervading and eternal, but many, particular and non-eternal, then also its validity cannot be established. The relations which are produced must all be born from related terms. So at the time of their coming into existence there will be no relation, hence there will be the separation (युतसिद्धि) of related terms. Therefore that relation will not be inherence. Moreover, you admit that every positive effect must be produced from a cause to which it becomes related by the relation of inherence ; so the said produced inherence, according to your own admission, must itself be an effect of another inherence to which it should be related by way of inherence, thus there will be an infinite regression. Besides, if such is the case, then the positive effect

too may be produced from merely those which are its own cause and still not inherently related with it, as is the case with the alleged non-eternal inherence; so the recognition of this inherence to account for the production of effects which are said to be inherently related to their cause is to no purpose.

(g) Recognition of Inherence commits the fallacy of Infinite Regression.

Moreover, if inherence is different from related terms, then to establish its relation with these terms, another relation will have to be required. If it is observed that the relation of inherence is related with these terms by another relation called the substance-attribute-relation (विशेषणविशेष्य-लक्षण), that also would not improve the situation. The defect of such a course of reasoning may be pointed out by an analysis of the substance-attribute-relation itself. There also, following the same line of argument, this relation must be produced by another relation, and so on *ad infinitum*. From this it follows that the so-called substance-attribute-relation can be of no help.

Advocate.—If in order to know a thing we require the help of a second thing and to be aware of the second, if the awareness of a third is needed and so on, there will be *regressus ad infinitum* in apprehension (प्रतीत्यनवस्था), and if such a regression would have taken place with regard to the awareness of inherence, then and then alone the recognition of inherence would have been fallacious; but as a matter of fact there is merely an infinite regression with regard to the *existence* (सत्त्वानवस्था) of inherence and not with regard to *knowledge*.

Critic.—No, there is an infinite regression with regard to its awareness too. Because inherence is itself an attribute, therefore for its own apprehension, it stands in need of a rela-

tion with a substance, and the apprehension of the second relation requires the apprehension of a third relation. So in so far as the apprehension of inherence is concerned, the infinite regression can hardly be avoided. Thus, it is proved that inherence, if regarded as different from the two terms it is said to relate, various insoluble logical difficulties arise.

(h) The acceptance of स्वरूप relation to avoid infinite regression is unavailing.

Again, in order to avoid infinite regression, it is argued that inherence is not dependent on another relation, but it becomes related to the terms by the relation of स्वरूप (simple relation). But this also is not reasonable. Here the question arises, as to whether the relation of स्वरूप is the essence (स्वरूप) of inherence or different from it. The first alternative would lead to the fallacy of self-dependence (आत्माश्रय), because if the nature of the related terms is designated as a relation, then it must be admitted that the terms depend for their existence upon their own nature. Besides, if one's own self is asserted as a relation, then it will be contradicted (बाध) by the experience, namely the possessor (स्व) is not the possessed (स्वाय). The second alternative would obviously lead to an infinite regression. Moreover, if the relation of स्वरूप is different from the related terms, it must be either produced or not produced. In both cases, there will be inaccuracies as have been shown in the case of inherence, either as produced or unproduced. It is quite obvious that the relation of स्वरूप cannot be said to be non-different from related terms. Hence the conclusion that inherence becomes related by the relation of स्वरूप does not stand logical test. Besides, if everywhere there is the relation of स्वरूप, then the characteristics of the material cause as assumed by you will be inaccurate, because it will be applicable to the efficient cause also.

Atomic Theory Examined.

When the theory that the effects are non-existent before their production and after their destruction (असत्कार्यवाद), and the relation of inherence (समवाय which is different from the related terms and which makes two separate terms inseparable), are refuted, it is improper to allow any truth to the supposition that there is an absolute distinction (अत्यन्तभेद) between the material cause and its effect, and that the distinction is not observed on account of the relation of inherence. So the fundamental basis of the atomic theory (परमाणुवाद) namely, the effect is entirely different from its material cause and it becomes related to atoms—the ultimate particles (अवयव)—which are regarded as the material cause, by means of the relation of inherence,—is refuted.

Entities which are absolutely different cannot be related by the cause-effect-relation. If this were possible, then anything could be produced from anything else. That the hypothesis of Prior Negation can be of no avail will be shown at length elsewhere. Among those which are absolutely different, we find that the one is determined as exclusive of the other, the one remains as independent of the existence of the other, and the one is experienced as separate from the other; but in the case of cause and effect, we do not find such things; so cause and effect cannot be absolutely different. When the parts of a composite body are regarded as cause, and the body as the effect, it cannot be said that the cause and the effect are altogether different. No one experiences the cloth as separate from its thread. The whole and the parts are always experienced together, and there is no ground for holding that the two are absolutely different and only connected together by another entity, called the relation of inherence. The untenability of the absolute difference between the parts

and the whole—the cause and the effect—renders the entire theory of the creation of the world from magnitudeless atoms untenable.

Moreover, the very existence of atoms cannot be inferred on the strength of observed facts, because there is no ground for the establishment of such a universal law that the effect-substance is always produced from causes having less quantity than itself or that one effect is produced from the conjunction of many causes.

Further, even if the existence of atoms be assumed as a hypothesis, the creation of the world has to be explained by means of conjunction of these atoms. We now proceed to show that such a conjunction of atoms is not possible. There cannot be conjunction between partless entities in as much as conjunction always appertains to parts of entities conjoined. If the partless atoms become conjoined wholly with one another, then the effect of such conjunction cannot possess extension or magnitude. If the conjunction having no particularisation (निर्वच्छिन्न) be admitted, that is, if it be admitted that conjunction pervades the whole extent of its relata, then it would imply that there is one and only one conjunction, conjoining every particular atom with all other atoms as well as the all-pervading entities like the selves, space and time. To make such conjunction possible, either every atom would have to be all-pervading and would lose its atomic condition, or those all-pervading entities would have to be atomic. Both these alternatives are unacceptable. Thus the conjunction of atoms can by no means be explained.

To sum up—because the atoms, their conjunction, the absolute difference between the parts and the whole cannot be proved, it cannot be concluded that all the substances which are effects are produced from the same kind of atoms and their conjunction.

SECTION II

INTRODUCTORY.

We have so far pointed out the inadequacy and unreasonableness of supposing an indefinite number of magnitudeless atoms as the material cause of the world-system. The advocates of this theory further admit the existence of God as the efficient cause of the effect-world. They infer that God has created this world with these atomic materials. Now we proceed to consider this theory. In doing so, we shall first of all show that the nature of the effect as explained by the advocates of the said theory is ill-defined, and then prove that there is no ground for the inference of the agency of such a God.

The Effect ill-Defined.

In consequence of the admission of the non-existence of the effect before its production, the property of becoming an effect is regarded as implying the following characteristics : (1) the relation of inherence between the effect produced and its material cause (कारणसमवाय) ; (2) the relation of inherence between this effect and the universal genus called existence (सत्तासमवाय) (3) the quality of being the counter-entity or counter-correlative of its prior negation (प्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्व) ; (4) the relation of the effect with the first moment of its production (आद्यक्षणसम्बन्ध).

Now let us examine these characteristics of the effect.

(1) The effect cannot be defined as inherently related to the cause.

In accordance with their theory, the relation of inherence between the effect and the cause should be interpreted as meaning that the one all-pervading inherence,

being qualified and limited by the nature of the effect, should be present in the cause. This again should imply that the effect should be recognised as the attribute of the said inherence. Now, it may be questioned whether the inherence is qualified by the effect before production or after production. The former alternative is unacceptable, because the non-existent can never be an attribute of any entity. Since there can be no relation of the non-existent (effect) with the substantive (inherence), the effect before production cannot qualify or limit the relation of inherence. The second alternative also cannot stand, because if the effect is already produced, its relation with the cause is already established and no relation of inherence is necessary to relate them. Thus the character of the effect as related to the cause by means of the relation of inherence is logically indefinable.

(2) The effect cannot be defined as related to universal genus of Existence through Inherence.

The relation of inherence with the universal genus, viz. Existence, will have to be produced in the effect in the form of an existent entity. It is this property in the effect of having inherence with Existence, that is called its production. Now, because there is non-existence of the effect before its production, this relation of the effect with existence cannot be produced before the effect itself is produced. If this relation is said to be produced after the production of the effect, it would involve the fallacy of interdependence. The relation of inherence of the effect with existence being established, the property of being an effect will be established, and again the property of being an effect being established, the relation of inherence of the effect with existence will be established. Hence the fallacy

of interdependence is unavoidable. Thus we fail to determine the nature of effect.

Moreover, the said definition of the effect implies three concepts :—

(a) the genus (b) the relation of inherence and (c) Existence regarded as universal genus. (See pages 36-37 and analytical content.) Let us examine these three in their order.

(a) Genus cannot be defined and proved.

There is no proof about the genus. A perception e. g. that of a pot, has for its object the particular pot. The genus potness must either be different or non-different from individual pots; but it can be neither. It cannot be different, because at the time of seeing the individual pots, the genus is not known as manifesting itself outside of them. The alleged genus cannot be asserted to be non-different from the individuals, because in our knowledge the different individual objects do not appear as universal. Further, if the genus be regarded as non-different from the individuals, either each individual would be a universal or there would be an indefinite number of transitory Universals of the same class. Neither of these alternatives would be acceptable to them. If it be said that the perception of general potness present along with the perception of individual pot implies the objective existence of the genus viz, potness, pervading all individual pots, then our reply is that it is observed that with regard to the pot and the cloth which are distinct entities, there is one knowledge which refers to both the pot and the cloth as substantives, that is, one knowledge referring to more than one independent object (समूहालम्बन); here though knowledge is one, still the contents of that

knowledge are not one. So from one knowledge with reference to different objects, the advocates of this doctrine cannot be allowed to assert that there is one pervading object, namely universal genus. Moreover, it may be asked—what is the nature of the knowledge of the said universal potness? The alleged knowledge cannot be regarded as the perception of the said genus. What we perceive are only particular individuals with which our senses come in contact. If it be claimed that along with the perception of the individual objects, we also perceive the genus pervading them, then it may be asked, whether the genus is confined to each individual or not? If so confined, then because of this confinement to a single individual, it cannot have any relation with other individuals. In that case the universality of the genus fails. If it is not thus confined to particular individuals, but all individuals of the class, then by the perception of one individual, there cannot be the perception of the genus, because for the understanding of it, the perception of all individuals would be demanded. In order to perceive the alleged universal, which is admittedly without parts and so remains wholly in its substrata (व्यासज्यवृत्तिधर्म), the perception of all individuals would be necessary. This is evidently impossible. Moreover, it may be asked, whether the space in which the pot is absent (घटान्तराल), is or is not void of the genus potness? If the first alternative be accepted, the genus potness related to a particular pot occupying a particular portion of space cannot be related to the pot of another space. If the second alternative be accepted, then you have to admit that even in the things other than the pot, there is potness; and because, according to you, the relation of the potness with the individual pots is Inherence which is an all-pervading and eternal relation,

the result would be that you have to admit that the same relation will be present between potness and all other things as well. This would be a violence even to your conception, because according to your own admission one genus is inherently related to the particular individuals of one class.

Further, the genus is regarded by you as eternal. The perception of such a genus would mean the perception of an eternal entity. But without perceiving all destruction and all prior negation, eternity, whose nature consists in never being the counter-entity of destruction and prior negation, cannot be perceived. This is evidently impossible, and hence the genus cannot be an object of perception.

Thus we have found that the universal genus, as explained by the exponents of this view, cannot be established by means of perception, and also that it cannot be logically defined. It will naturally follow from this that its existence cannot be proved by means of inference, because every inference must depend on perception for its data. The relation of invariable concomitance, on the ground of which the inference could be drawn, cannot be established in this case. Further, a logically indefinable conception cannot be supposed even as a hypothesis for the explanation of any concrete facts of experience. Hence the question whether it is the exclusive hypothesis does not arise at all. From our previous discussion it would be clear that the thinkers of this school were led to this impossible position on account of their basing their theory on the supposition of the absolute non-existence of the effect before its production.

(b) Inherence further criticised.

Now about the conception of inherence involved in the idea of the production of the effect as consisting in its being related to the universal genus, viz., existence. Here

the question arises whether the said inherence of the effect with existence has come into being at the time of the production of the effect or is existent from eternity. The first alternative is not sound. The relation which is produced is produced by the related terms. Here the material cause is the one term and the effect is the other term. But one of the related terms namely the effect, e. g. the pot, is not yet produced; hence from this non-produced effect, there cannot be the production of the relation of inherence of the effect with its material cause. The second alternative is not reasonable. There is no proof about the eternal continuity of the alleged relation of inherence. The relation of the effect with the alleged genus of existence does not merely rest on the universal of existence, but must rest on both the effect and the said universal. But because one (the effect) of the substrata of the said relation is non-eternal, the relation of the effect with existence cannot be eternal.

Moreover, assuming the position that the production of the effect consists in its being in relation of inherence with the universal genus, viz., existence, another question will arise, whether the relation of inherence presupposes the existence of the effect or it is possible even in the absence of the effect. The latter alternative cannot be accepted, because such a supposition would compel the advocate to believe that there may be this relation of inherence with existence even in the case of such non-existent entities as hare's horn or the sky-flower. No distinction can be drawn between the non-existence of the hare's horn etc., and the non-existence of the effect in question without committing the fallacy of interdependence. If the first alternative be accepted namely, that the relation of inherence with existence is possible only on condition that the effect is existent, then it would be inconsistent with their conception of the effect.

whose very existence is conceived as consisting in the relation of inherence with the universal genus, existence. The acceptance of this alternative would therefore mean that the present relation of inherence with existence presupposes another relation of inherence with existence. This would obviously lead to the fallacy of indefinite regresssion. Further, it would imply a plurality of the relation of inherence, which is unacceptable. If it is said that before this inherence the effects are self-existent and therefore there is no infinite regression, then because their existence is accepted even without inherence, it is futile to postulate inherence. So the belief that effects become existent by their relation of inherence with the universal genus called existence is not sound.

In order to avoid this difficulty, some exponents of the theory of inherence argue that before the relation of inherence with the universal genus-existence, the effect is neither existent nor non-existent, but it becomes existent through this inherence. This also is not sound logic. Between two terms, which are contradictory to each other, if one is negated, another is bound to be affirmed; so how can there be the negation of existence and non-existence of the effect at the same time? It is not possible to conceive of any form of the negation of non-existence, which can make it something other than existent and place it in a position of neither existence nor non-existence. Hence by saying that before their relation with the genus of existence, things are 'not non-existent,' their existence is avowed at that time, and by stating them as 'not existent,' their non-existence at that time is admitted. Hence there is contradiction involved in their statement. To avoid this contradiction, the advocate must admit that before its production, the thing is non-existent. So it comes to this, that the thing before its production will not have the mark of

any distinct characteristics which would demarcate it from the barren woman's son. A non-existent thing cannot have inherence with the universal genus spoken of, nor can the word 'before' be predicated of it.

That the very conception of inherence as relation cannot be logically established either by perception or by inference or by any other means, we have shown at great length elsewhere. Thus, we are bound to conclude that the conception of the effect as consisting in the relation of inherence with universal existence is illogical.

(c) Existence as genus not proved by perception, nor can it be held consistently.

Now about the conception of existence itself. You hold that perception proves the genus of existence. But by perception it cannot be established that existence is a genus that resides in the substance, the attribute and action alike, because there are many things which are beyond the cognizance (reach) of the senses, and hence are not amenable to perception. Moreover, you maintain that a genus cannot reside in a genus, but as existence is predicated of the genus of potness and the like, you cannot, if you are consistent, treat existence as a genus. You also admit that the genus, particularity (विशेष) and inherence are void of the genus, and if existence is a genus, then because of the impossibility of their being related with existence, they will have to be regarded as non-existent.

Further, our previous refutation of the doctrine of Inherence and the doctrine of genus has cut at the very root of the notion of Existence as the universal genus, and the theory of the production of effect explained in terms of their relation of inherence with this Existence is thus proved to be an unwarrantable hypothesis.

**(3). The effect cannot be defined as the counter-
entity of prior Negation.**

The third alternative, namely, the effect is the counterentity of its prior negation, is not sound. If it is maintained that the effect has, before its production, prior negation, then you would fail to establish why there is the cause-effect-relation between the thread and the cloth and not between the potter's wheel and the thread. The mere assertion of the cause-effect-relation between the thread and the cloth would be of no avail, because this is the point to be proved by an appeal to a source of valid cognition and not to be dogmatically asserted. You hold that there is the agreement in presence as well as in absence between the cause and the effect, and such being the case, you would be called upon to explain the cause-effect-relation in the light of your own admission and cannot recognise the same wherever you please.

Advocate—I can explain the cause-effect-relation in the light of my admission. In the thread, there is the prior negation of the cloth, but there is no such negation in the wheel. The production of effect will be from that alone in which there is one's own prior negation.

Critic—Before its production, the cloth is non-existent; so there cannot be any relation between the cloth and its prior negation. Hence it cannot be held that it has its own prior negation. In other words, that which is non-existent before its production cannot have the property of being the counterentity of a negation. If from prior negation alone, i. e. prior negation unqualified by its relation to the particular effect, there be the production of the effect, then there would be no reason why the particular effect should be produced from the particular cause, and

thus there will be the unwarrantable stretch (अतिप्रसङ्गः.) Hence there would be no order in the cause-effect-relation in the world.

The Recognition of Prior-Negation Unnecessary.

Now, let us refute the necessity of prior negation for the interpretation of an effect. It is held that if prior negation is not accepted as the ground of production, then the produced pot also will again, be produced, because its causes namely, earth, the potter-stick, etc., are then present. This non-reproduction of the produced effect can only be explained as due to the destruction of its prior negation. But this view is not reasonable. The objection that the non-recognition of prior negation of an entity as the ground of its production would lead to the re-production of the produced effect, is based on a confusion between the production and the reproduction of the effect. Take for instance, the case of the production of a pot. The stick and the lump of earth may be the cause of the production of the pot ; but from this it does not follow that they are the cause of the reproduction of the produced pot. The stick and the lump of earth are not even the cause of the continuity of existence of the produced pot, because there is no rule that the continuity of the existence of the produced pot will be dependent upon the continuity of its relation to the lump of earth and stick. And as the stick and the lump of earth are not even the cause of such continuity of the produced pot, they can hardly claim to be the cause of the reproduction of the produced pot. So it cannot be said that non-recognition of prior negation would lead to the reproduction of the produced.

The exponents of prior negation may advance another ground for its recognition. Prior negation should be deemed as necessary for explaining the difference in the

effects. It is, they say, due to the differences of prior negations that there are differences of the effects. If prior negation is not admitted, then there will not be the differences observed in the effects. This is also no valid reason for its recognition. Prior negations are not of themselves mutually distinguishable. It is only when they are particularised by their counter-entities that one prior-negation becomes distinguished from another prior negation and can be spoken of as the prior negation of the pot and not that of the cloth. But as the counterentities of prior negations are taken as the effects of respective prior negations, it comes to this that the differences of prior negations can only be interpreted in terms of the differences in their effects, but the advocate asserts the reverse hypothesis. As such, his position would involve the fallacy of interdependence. That is, due to the difference of prior negations, there are differences of effects, and due to differences of effects, there are the differences of prior negations. Besides, according to the exponent of this view, there is no pervading attribute, either positive or negative, in prior negation. Each pot has one and only one prior negation. All pots or many pots do not possess one prior negation. The causality of that prior negation should, if at all, be recognised with reference to that effect alone, which has been produced from it. But the acceptance of such causality is of no practical use in establishing any general causal relation. The necessity of understanding causality is to proceed towards the cause with the desire of getting the desired effect from it. But this will never be possible in case one and only one prior negation is taken to be the ground in relation to one and only one particular effect.

Further, if prior negation is to be admitted, its exact relation to the effect has to be logically understood. The effect is said to be produced through the destruction of its

prior negation. But the question arises :—Does the destruction of the prior negation follow the production of the effect, or does the production of the effect follow the destruction of the prior negation, or is the production of the effect identical with the destruction of the prior negation? In the first case, at the moment of the production of the effect, its prior negation is also present, and this would be self-contradictory. Further, in that case, the prior negation being present at the moment of the first production of the effect, the reproduction of the produced effect also would be possible. In the second case, if the prior negation is absent at the moment of the production of the effect, it cannot be accepted as the sufficient ground and explanation of the production of the effect. The necessity for admitting it would vanish. In the last case, the two being identical, one cannot account for or be the ground of the other. If any attempt for such explanation be made, it would involve the fallacy of interdependence. Of the two, however, the production of the effect being a matter of experience, the hypothesis of prior negation is useless. Thus there is no logical means of assigning any place to prior negation.

When it is needless to recognise prior negation as a ground of effects, it is futile to define causality in terms of prior negation.

(4) The effect cannot be defined as becoming-existent through the relation with the first moment.

The fourth definition of the effect is not accurate. If production means the relation of the effect with the first moment, then the question arises whether that relation is conjunction or inherence or simple relation. If that relation is of the nature of conjunction, then because that:

conjunction is of the nature of an attribute, it will be, according to your admission, subsequent to the production of the effect and so you cannot define effect as the conjunction of the first moment. Moreover, there cannot be conjunction of time with the attribute etc. That relation cannot be inherence, because time is not one of those entities, with which, even according to the exponents of this view, the relation of inherence of the effect is possible. Because there is no inherence of the pot with time, so the effect cannot be defined as its inherence with the first moment. Nor can there be a 'simple relation' between the effect and time. What is non-existent cannot have any nature, so there cannot be a simple relation (which is constituted by the nature of related terms) between an existent entity and a non-existent one which has no nature. If that simple relation be of the nature of the two related terms, namely time and the pot, then the time also will be of the nature of the production of the pot and the pot also will be of the nature of the production of itself. If that is the case, then you will fail to explain the knowledge viz. 'the pot is produced'. In this knowledge, production is the qualification of the pot and is different from it. Just as due to the identity of the pot with the pot, there can be no such knowledge as the pot has the pot; similarly, if the production of the pot and the pot were identical, then there could not have been the knowledge of the pot having production. Moreover, time being continuous, one moment cannot be distinguished from another moment, there being no differentia of any particular moment to distinguish it from another. The very conception of the first moment presupposes a reference to the production of the effect, because otherwise the term 'first moment' is meaningless. Hence as the one presupposes the other, they cannot be

simultaneous, nor can the latter be explained in terms of the former. Thus as no kind of relation can be logically established between the effect and time, the definition of the effect as its relation with the first moment is altogether unacceptable.

Thus we find that none of the four definitions of the effect offered by the advocates of the previous non-existence of the effect is logically admissible, and that their concept of the effect has consequently remained ill-defined. Our task ahead will be to prove the futility of their attempt at establishing God as the efficient cause of the world produced.

SECTION III.

THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD EXAMINED.

(a) Doership of God on the ground of the general property of effectness of things unestablished.

The advocates of the view under discussion infer God mainly through the observation of cause-effect-relation. It is found that whatever is of the nature of an effect is the product of some doer. From this the invariable concomitance between effectness and doership is known. Now all the produced things of the world have the character of effectness. Hence they must be the product of one universal Doer, viz., God.

Now, in the preceding discussion, it has been made clear that the exponents of this view could not logically establish the conception of effectness as consisting in any essential universal characteristic common to all effects. What we actually experience and can legitimately accept is that particular effects are produced from particular causes and that the causal relation always involves reference to particular related terms. For example, the effect pot refers to the potter, the effect cloth refers to the weaver, and so on. We find no universal property of effectness in all kinds of effects. Hence we are not entitled to draw any inference on the ground of such unwarrantable universal effectness. The property of being an effect is to be explained as different in different contexts and not in terms of any universal property common to all effects. It is

evident that the universal of effectness alleged to be inherent in all effects is not a matter of actual perception. Such a universal property, if existent, has to be known by inference from the actually observed relation between particular effects and their particular causes. But as the particular effects have always reference to particular causes and have to be understood in different qualified forms in different cases, we can discover no ground of concomitance on the strength of which we can infer the existence of any effectness characterising all effects in the universe. Thus on the strength of perception and inference, what we find is that there is the cause-effect-relation between the potter and the pot and not between the alleged maker of all effects and effects in general. As the general property of being an effect is not established, some doer as the efficient cause of all produced things, such as the earth and the like, cannot be legitimately inferred. Thus, it is shown that the very ground of the inference of the existence of God as the universal efficient cause being absent, the existence of God on this ground is far from being logically established.

(b) God cannot be inferred as the efficient cause of the world because agreement in presence and agreement in absence between God and the world cannot be understood and because God is taken to be dissimilar in kind from observed agents.

In order to know that all these things are produced by some intelligent efficient cause, called God, we have to observe that the existence of the said cause being there, those effects follow (अन्वय), and the existence of the cause not being there, there is an absence (व्यतिरेक) of those effects. This agreement in presence as well as in absence we find in the case of particular effects, such as the building and the like and their particular efficient causes. In

the presence of an intelligent cause, the effects which are not perceived already are perceived, and in the absence of that cause, even though every other condition is present, the effects are not perceived. This is the law through which we ascertain the relation of the efficient cause and the effect. But this is not observed in the case of the earth and the like which are treated as the effects of God. The application of this law is impossible in this case, because the supposed efficient cause, viz. God, being not regarded as an object of perception, the agreement in presence cannot be tested, and the non-existence of the earth and the like being unobservable, the agreement in absence also cannot be tested. Thus the existence and non-existence of the earth and the like can never be proved to follow the existence and non-existence of any intelligent being. Hence the existence of God as the efficient cause of the effect-world cannot be established by this line of reasoning.

Advocate.—If the actual observation of the presence and the absence of both the cause and the effect were necessary to establish the causal relationship between any particular cause and particular effect, then a particular observed effect, such as smoke, could not be inferred to be produced by an unobserved cause, such as fire in the mountain. If in such a case, we seek the cause-effect-relation between general smoke and general fire, then in this case also, there will be the cause-effect-relation between the general property of being an effect and an intelligent efficient cause.

Critic.—This argument is futile. There is a marked difference between such particular effects as the building etc., whose production can be actually observed, and such other alleged effects whose production we cannot possibly establish by observation. But there is no such difference in nature between the mountain-smoke and other kinds o

smoke always observed to be the effects of fire. We do not infer in the mountain fire, different from that seen in a fire-place. The difference of fire in the mountain and that of the fire-place is a local difference and is not a difference of intrinsic nature. Thus, the inference of fire in the mountain is possible because we are inferring fire which is similar in its nature to fire perceived in the fire-place. But the inference of God is faulty because there we are inferring an intelligent Being hardly akin in its nature to intelligent beings already observed. Hence there can be the inference of the unobserved fire in the mountain from the presence of smoke there, but there is no such justification for the inference of any unobserved intelligent cause of the earth and the like, on the strength of the experience that buildings etc., are always the effects of some intelligent efficient cause.

That the advocates themselves admit the essential difference between such effects as buildings, pots, etc., and the effects like the earth etc., is obvious from their following argument. They say that the earth etc. are essentially different in nature from such particular effects as buildings, pots etc. From this they argue that the earth etc., cannot be the products of mundane efficient causes like those of the buildings etc., but must be the products of a supra-mundane Intelligence. We shall show that this argument is baseless. Their case would have been proved, if they could establish the existence of the Supra-mundane Being on the strength of perception or any other valid grounds. That such a Being cannot be proved to exist by means of perception is evident. His existence has to be proved by means of inference. Hence we have to abide by the rules of inference. Inference is dependent upon the constant relation of the major and the middle terms. This relation can be

known only through previous observation. So in order to establish the ground of this inference, it is necessary to observe such a Supra-mundane Intelligent Being in relation to the actual effects of our experience. But it is quite obvious that such a Being is beyond the scope of our observation and hence the relation of invariable concomitance between such a Being and the effects can never be established by observation. All cases of efficient causes of effects, that we do and can possibly experience, are cases of finite non-eternal intelligence associated with body and mind, subject to all sorts of limitations. Such intelligent beings are always found to possess limited powers and their knowledge confined to only a limited number of objects and not to all objects. So we have no right to infer the existence and efficiency of any supra-mundane all-knowing and all-powerful intelligent Being viz., God. Thus because inference is not independent of the previous experience of relation and demands the similarity of the things inferred with known things, the existence of God cannot be proved on the strength of inference.

The exponents of the theory may argue in this way. From observation we know that every corporeal body is non-eternal and is of the nature of an effect. Thus a relation of invariable concomitance is established between corporeality and non-eternity and consequent effectness. Secondly, we find that whatever is of the nature of an effect has an efficient cause. Thus invariable concomitance is established between effectness and efficient cause. Hence we infer that the earth etc., being corporeal, are non-eternal and therefore effects, and being effects must have an efficient cause. Now, we observe that the intelligence and power, that should be present in the efficient cause of any effect, must be greater than or equal to, but never less than .

what is required for the production of the effect. Hence the intelligence and power of the efficient cause of all the effects constituting the effect-world must be super-mundane, omniscient and almighty.

This argument, though apparently very strong, is not convincing. First of all, admitting that all corporeal bodies are non-eternal and effects, it is not established by observation that every effect must have an efficient cause, because we observe many products of nature, such as the sprouts and leaves of trees, rivers and mountains, etc., which are not found to be the effects of any efficient cause. There may be established an invariable concomitance between effectness and cause, but not that between effectness and efficient cause. Secondly, even if the necessity for the efficient cause of every effect be admitted, it cannot be proved that all effects in the world must be the products of one efficient cause. What we actually find is that different effects are produced by different efficient causes. Hence with regard to the effects whose efficient cause we do not or cannot observe, one may infer a plurality of efficient causes. What is the ground for inferring that there must be one efficient cause for the whole effect-world? As the necessity for believing in the existence of one efficient cause, even as an exclusive hypothesis, for explaining the production of the effect-world, is not proved, the question of recognising his omnipotence and omniscience does not arise all. Thus we find no valid ground on which the exponents of the theory can take their stand for proving the existence of an all-knowing and all-powerful God as the sole efficient cause of all effects of the universe.

(c) Arguments for recognising eternal Divine effort as the efficient cause of the world refuted.

We are now going to enter into a discussion of a technical nature to point out how, following the mode of reasoning of the exponents of this view, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the idea of an efficient cause logically with the idea of its eternity. It will be shown that the very idea of effort on the part of the efficient cause to produce an effect involves logically the idea of its non-eternity. The inference of the existence of one eternal all-knowing all-powerful God as the doer of all effects of the world is based on the character of the relation between the particular doers and their products, as we actually observe in our experience. In order to examine the validity of this inference, let us here carefully analyse the character of this relation. When in some instances we observe that the effort of agent, e. g. the potter, being present, an effect, e. g. the pot is produced, and in the absence of such effort on the part of any agent, the effect is not produced, we are led to the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the effort of the agent and the effect on the strength of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence. From this we infer that wherever the effect is produced, it must be the product of such effort, and wherever such effort will be absent, the effect cannot be produced.

Now the following question arises—what type of absence or negation of effort, will be the cause of the absence of the effect? We find that with effort, there is an effect, and without effort, there is no effect. Now, the phrase, ‘without effort’ means the absence of effort. This absence then will be the cause of the absence of the effect. So it may be asked, what is the nature of that absence? There are two kinds of absence or negation namely negation of

correlation (संसर्गभाव) and the negation of identity (अन्योन्याभाव). The latter i. e. the negation of identity consists in the absence of the essence or the respective peculiarity of one thing in another and is equivalent to their difference (भेद). The former is of three kinds—the non-being of a thing before its production (i. e. प्रागभाव), destruction (प्रध्वंसाभाव) and absolute non-existence (अत्यन्ताभाव).

Now, the negation of the identity of effort cannot be the cause of the absence of the pot, because effects like the pot are observed even though there is this negation of effort. In plain words, the difference of the effort from the effect cannot be said to be the cause of the absence of the effect, because we find the effect is produced inspite of this difference. Among three forms of the negation of correlation, the absolute negation of effort cannot be the cause of the absence of the effect, because though there is the absolute negation of effort in the earth etc., still the effects like pots are being produced from it. But it will be said that it is the absence of effort having the self (आत्मा) as its substratum and not the earth, that is the cause of the absence of the effect, because when such an effort is absent, the effect is uniformly absent. Where there is no effort on the part of the self of the potter, there is no effect like the pot. To this argument our answer is that this does not contradict our assertion, because this absence of effort in the self is not absolute negation; even prior to the effect, the absolute absence of effort does not remain in the self. To elucidate:—owing to the absence of effort in the self particularised by the body (and not in the self pervading the whole universe), the absence of the effect is experienced; so the absence of effort on the part of that self is the cause of the absence of the effect. In case all the necessary conditions which usually accompany effort are there, but

yet there is an absence of effort in the self, we find there is an absence of the effect. This experience is never contradicted, hence the absence of effort in the self is the cause of the absence of effect. But the absolute negation of effort is not possible in that self, because you observe that wherever there is a possibility of an effort at any time, its absolute negation can never remain there. Thus, even prior to the effect, the absolute absence of effort does not remain in the self. So the absolute negation of effort on the part of the self is not the cause of the negation of the pot. Thus we find that neither in outside things like the earth etc. nor in the self is there the absolute negation of effort as the cause of the absence of the pot. Hence the cause of the absence of the effect cannot be regarded as the absolute negation of effort. Nor the absence, called destruction, of effort can be regarded as the cause of the absence of the effect, because we find that though there is the destruction of effort in the agent like the potters, there is nevertheless the presence of effects like the pots. So the conclusion is that the cause of the negation of the effect can only be of the nature of the prior negation of effort.

Now, in order to discover the agreement in absence, namely, wherever there is prior negation (प्रागभाव) of effort, there is the absence of effect, and thereby to establish the invariable concomitance subsisting between the absence of effort and the absence of the effect, we have to know that effort has the property of being the counterentity of prior negation.

This conclusion can also be arrived at in a different way. It is generally admitted that the doer of an effect must possess the knowledge of the material cause of the effect and the will to produce the effect from it, and that

it is due to this knowledge and will that the effect is produced. Now, in order to maintain the doctrine that an effort on his part is necessary to produce this effect, consistently with the causality of knowledge and will, it must be admitted that the effort is the result of knowledge and will and stands between the knowledge and will on the one hand and effect on the other. Without knowing that effort is the instrument (द्वार) through which knowledge and will give birth to the effect, it is not possible to know that knowledge and will as well as the effort are causally related to the pot. This implies that the effort being the product of knowledge and will has the property of being the counterentity of prior negation. Thus it is shown that if there is an invariable concomitance between the absence of effort and the absence of an effect, the only interpretation which this absence admits of is that it is of the nature of prior negation.

Now, we have to consider whether this property of prior negation is to be taken with reference to all efforts as efforts irrespective of their being eternal or non-eternal or merely with reference to non-eternal efforts. It is reasonable to hold that this property (प्रतियोगित्व of प्रागभाव) is to be taken in the former sense and not in the latter. According to the law of economy of thought (लाघव) we ought to ascertain the nature of the property of being the counterentity of prior negation as characterised by the nature of being an effort in general, but not as characterised by the nature of non-eternal effort. Besides, for the ascertainment of the law that where there is the absence of effort, there is the absence of the effect, the knowledge of the said property as characterised by the general nature of being effort, is indispensable. Hence, it is correct to hold that in the context referred to, the property of being the counter-

entity of prior negation (नागभाव or सामयिक अत्यन्ताभाव) would be known with regard to efforts in general and not only to non-eternal efforts.

Now, let us see what is the bearing of this doctrine upon the main subject of our discussion. It will now be evident that every effort is produced. Because the property of being an effort is characterised by the counterentitiveness of prior negation, the inevitable conclusion is that all efforts are produced. Now, if we accept the argument that whatever is of the nature of an effect must be the product of an effort, we are led to the position that whatever is an effect must be the product of a produced effort. If we apply this conclusion to the earth etc., which are taken to be effects, we are bound to infer that the earth etc. also must be the products of produced efforts. But this conclusion comes in conflict with the view that the earth etc. are effects and consequently produced by effort, but not produced by any produced effort. If we admit the negation of the property of being produced by produced effort in the earth etc., then in accordance with the principle obtained from our foregoing argument, the property of being produced by any effort will have to be denied of them, because production by an effort implies production by a produced effort. Hence, as the theory holds that there is the property of being an effect in the earth etc., but not the property of being produced by any produced effort, this amounts to a virtual contradiction of the invariable concomitance that wherever there is the property of being an effect, there must be the property of being produced by produced effort. Because wherever there is the absence of the property of production by produced effort, there is the absence of the property of production by effort also. Thus we find that the exponent of this view can by no means logically establish a

universal concomitance between the presence of the property of being an effect and the presence of the property of being produced by effort, and also between the negation of the property of being produced by effort and the negation of the property of being an effect. In short, when in all efforts, the property of being the counterentity of prior negation is known, the conclusion will be that every effort is produced. Wherever there is production through effort, there is production by produced effort. So what is not produced through produced effort will not be produced by effort at all. The earth etc, are not regarded as produced by produced effort, hence they can not be regarded as the production of any effort. Thus, we find that no invariable concomitance either in presence or in absence, is established between the property of production by effort (रुतिजन्यत्व) and the property of being effect (कार्यत्व). Therefore there will be no inference of the former from the latter.

Advocate— If we grant that there is no invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property of being produced by effort in general, and instead of that hold that there is an invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property of being produced by a produced effort, that would go against the law of economy of thought. That which is produced through produced effort must be produced by one having a body, and thus we would be led to hold that there is an invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property of being produced by one having a body. But this involves the breach of the law of parsimony of hypothesis.

Critic.—Your assertion that the recognition of invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property of being produced by effort involves parsimony

of hypothesis, is wrong as it will be shown by the considerations that follow. Have you ever known eternal effort? If the relation of eternal effort with effects had been observed and that of non-eternal effort with effects had as well been observed, then the question of the said parsimony of hypothesis could have arisen. But when you have never come across any instance of eternal effort, you cannot say that the granting of the invariable relation of the effects and efforts would economise thought. Owing to the impossibility of comprehending the property of production through effort in cases of effects like earth etc., which are known as not produced from produced effort, the question of the law of economy for the sake of applying the concomitance to such cases does not arise at all. Besides, when you have no knowledge of eternal effort and it is simply a creation of your imagination, if you try to establish the invariable relation between effects and efforts with the idea that this would favour your hypothesis of eternal effort, you are really indulging in a superfluity of hypothesis, because against the verdict of experience, you are upholding the existence of a super-natural effort.*

Advocate.—If earth etc. could be produced without a doer, they would never have an existence, because from a cause not presided over by intelligence, effects are not observed to be produced.

* In passing, it may be observed that the advocate himself does not consistently stick to the law of parsimony of hypothesis. Had he been consistent, he would have rejected his अन्वयार्ह्यानि theory of error in favour of the theory known as अह्यानि. According to the latter theory, there are in cases of so-called illusion, only two separate knowledges viz. partial perception of the present thing and remembrance of the distant thing, but according to the advocate, there is another qualified knowledge over and above these two. If parsimony of hypothesis is taken as a proof, then the said qualified knowledge should not have been recognised. Thus the avowal of the said parsimony as proof amounts to the denial of one of his vital conclusions.

Critic.—This reasoning also cannot be applied without deciding that every effect must be the product of some intelligent being with the attribute of effort. In other words, if the necessity of a doer for the production of every effect could be shown, then only it might lead to the conclusion that without a doer there would be an absence of the effect. But this cannot be ascertained as has been pointed out in the previous discussion. So the above reasoning is without force.

Advocate.—The necessity of a doer for every effect is established on the strength of the observation of the effects like the pots and other things, which are never found to be produced without a doer; so we can legitimately infer that the effects like the earth etc. also cannot be without a doer.

Critic.—The non-observation of effects being produced without the effort of any intelligent being as their efficient cause in the case of the pots and other effects, can be explained even without maintaining your thesis. If it is recognised that the particular kinds of effects, e. g. the pots etc., are alone produced by intelligent persons making efforts, then that non-observation namely that without a doer, the effects like pots etc. are not seen can be explained, without holding your view. If this is not admitted, then because the effects like pots etc. are not seen without being produced by an embodied being, the invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property of being produced by an embodied being also will have to be admitted. If on the ground of our non-observation of particular effects without a doer, we apprehend that every effect is produced by a doer, then you will be forced to conclude that every effect is produced by an embodied being. But this is not acknowledged by you. So there

cannot be the knowledge of the invariable concomitance that whatever has the property of being an effect must have the property of being produced by effort. Effort is always non-eternal and produced through body. The person who makes an effort is endowed with a body. One having no body can never make effort. These proofs favoured by the law of economy of thought are destructive of the said invariable concomitance.

Thus, we find that the very foundation of the proof of the existence of God as the efficient cause of the world is shaken. The proof is based on the assumption that effort being present, the effect is produced, and the effort being absent, the effect is absent. But this invariable concomitance between effort and effect is not established. Since every effort must logically be, as shown before, non-eternal produced effort of an embodied being, and since the earth etc., though recognised as effects, are not admitted to be products of non-eternal produced effort of any embodied being, the concomitance fails, and the effort of God for the production of the effect-world cannot be proved on this ground. If, on the other hand, the concomitance be accepted, then the earth etc. also must be regarded as the products of non-eternal efforts of some embodied being or beings, presupposing previous causes. Thereby also the eternal effort of formless God as the ultimate efficient cause of the effect-world is not proved. Thus we find no ground for the inference of the existence of God as the doer of the world of effects.

Being unable to prove the existence of an eternal effort as the efficient cause of the world of effects and being led to the uncomfortable situation of recognising the effort as non-eternal, the exponents of this view may appeal to the testimony of the scriptures as the last resort for esta-

blishing causal relation between eternal effort and the effects like the earth etc. If on the strength of reliable testimony, this causal relation is established, it is not necessary to observe the agreement in absence, and hence the prior negation of effort and its consequent non-eternity need not be admitted. On the ground of such testimony of the scriptures, the eternal effort of God as the efficient cause may be established.

But this refuge in the scriptures is unavailing. What is the source of the reliableness of the scriptures? Is it because God has revealed them? But it is the existence of God that has to be proved, and hence the argument involves the obvious fallacy of *Petitio Principii*. If their testimony is to be believed in, because they are embodiments of the wisdom of highly intelligent persons, then, however intelligent they may be, their knowledge also must be based on observation and inference. But as we have proved that observation and inference cannot establish this causal relation, it cannot be accepted merely on the strength of our reverence for the greatness of those persons. Thus the existence of Divine effort is not proved.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD EXAMINED.

Introduction.

In order to prove the existence of God as the regulator of the world it is necessary to show that the world is of such a nature that it necessitates the recognition of a Being with eternal and infinite intelligence, will and motive for the adequate explanation of the world-process. Now when in our actual experience we find that the effects produced involve an order and adjustment, a plan and purpose, we

find that they are designed and regulated by some intelligent person voluntarily acting with a view to achieve some end or ideal. On the strength of such observation we may be led to recognise an invariable concomitance between order and adjustments in the effect and the existence of a designer or regulator. If we can prove that there is such an order and adjustment in the entire world-process, then only we may have ground to believe in the existence of a world-regulator.

Inference of World-Regulator through the observation of so-called order invalidated.

Now we have to examine whether we have ample ground to infer that there is such an order or adjustment in all the products of Nature and also whether we are justified in inferring a world-regulator of the character as described by the exponents of this view. First of all, we experience among the natural events innumerable occurrences in which no order and regulation can be traced and which are rather found to be inconsistent with the laws so far known. We may cite a few examples such as earthquakes and tornadoes, epidemics and catastrophes, monsters born of human parents, destruction of planets and the like. Hence from our knowledge of the regulative laws in certain parts of Nature we cannot infer that the entire nature has a plan and system. Therefore there is no justification for inferring that the entire world has a regulator.

Secondly, it may be argued that the world is not in reality full of irregularities, maladjustments, havocs and catastrophes, but what we experience as such are due to our ignorance and error,—our incapacity to take a comprehensive view of the world and to determine the place and function of each object and event in it. But this cont-

vention, instead of meeting our objection, will rather strengthen it. We are also parts of this world-system, and if God is the creator and regulator of this world, He must be responsible for our ignorance and error and for this experience of irregularities and catastrophes as well as for the sufferings resulting from such experience. An omniscient and omnipotent perfect Being can not be expected to create and maintain such ignorance and error and sufferings in His creation. It is inconsistent either with His omniscience or with His omnipotence or with His perfection, that is to say, with the conception of God.

Thirdly, even if we assume that those events of Nature in which we have not been able to discover order and adjustment and government by laws are also regulated in accordance with some principles of which we are so far ignorant, we have no valid ground to infer that those principles and laws are the expressions of the wisdom and will of any personal regulator. We observe the concomitance of the presence of a personal regulator only with the production of human artifices. On the strength of such observation we cannot infer that the products of Nature also, where order and adjustments are present, should also be governed by any personal regulator.

Fourthly, even if we apply the law of concomitance, which we observe in the products of human artifices, to all effects of the world with order and adjustment, we should be logically bound to infer that the regulator of the world should in essential characteristics be of the same nature with the personal regulators of our experience. In our experience we find that all persons that design and govern and adopt contrivances to produce order and uniformity in their works are possessed of knowledge, will and effort which are finite and acquired and therefore non-eternal.

Hence the regulator of the world that can possibly be inferred on the ground of our experience must also be conceived as possessing non-eternal finite knowledge and will. This is however inconsistent with the conception of God.

Fifthly, in the objects of our experience we do not find that the agent who produces the order, adjustment and uniformity among them and in their workings should be present all along to keep up this order, adjustment and uniformity in them. Once the order is produced the effect goes on uniformly without the necessity of the intervention of the regulator. On the strength of such experience we cannot infer the continued existence of a world-governor to keep up the order and harmony of the world.

Sixthly, the advocates of the necessity of a world-governor for explaining the world-system cannot logically define the idea of a personal regulator with infinite and eternal knowledge and will, and cannot reconcile the conception of motive and effort with His infinite power and intelligence.

In order to prove that God is the regulator of the universe, it is to be shown that (a) there is an eternally intelligent Being who is an agent, (b) His intelligence embraces all objects, that is to say, He is omniscient, (c) He has eternal will for the purpose of regulation, (d) His regulation is guided by some motive. Until these points are proved, the conception of God as the regulator of the universe cannot be established.

Let us examine these conceptions one by one :—

(a) Arguments for eternal Intelligence examined.

That there cannot be any proof of the existence of an eternally intelligent agent of all effects on the basis of observation and inference, has been shown before. Moreover,

the question arises here, whether His eternal intelligence is separate from or identical with the essential nature of His self. If intelligence is separate from His self and is eternal, we cannot logically define the nature of the relation of this intelligence with that self.

Advocate—Intelligence is the attribute which is eternally related to the self of God by the relation of inherence.

Critic—This assertion does not solve the logical difficulty. You hold that the said relation of inherence is quite separate from the two terms related and also that it is everywhere the same, how can such inherence account for the relationship of the particular self, viz. God and the particular attribute, viz. eternal intelligence? Does the attribute of intelligence, which inheres in God, pervade the entire self of God or not? If it does, then the Divine intelligence, which is regarded as distinct from our intelligence, will have to be assumed, though not experienced. You admit that though our self also has intelligence as one of its attributes and though this self also is all-pervading, yet in our case intelligence is produced in the self in so far as it is particularised by a body; but in the case of the supreme Self, you are maintaining that intelligence eternally pervades the entire existence of that self, without any ground in our experience for such an inference. The relation of inherence being the same in the case of the Divine self and its attribute viz. intelligence, as in the case of our self and intelligence, it is necessary to account for the eternity and all-pervadingness of the Divine intelligence, which we observe to be absent in our case. Hence the relation of inherence cannot account for the eternity and all-pervadingness of the intelligence of God, and so long as this is not accounted

for, the existence of God with such eternal and all-pervading intelligence is not proved. If on the other hand, intelligence does not eternally pervade the entire existence of His all-pervading self, then the Divine intelligence cannot be conceived as embracing all objects, and hence God would have to be conceived as a being with limited and produced intelligence. This would of course be inconsistent with the very conception of God. Hence if intelligence is taken as separate from the essential character of the Divine self, it cannot be explained how intelligence pertains eternally and unconditionally to that self only. Moreover, it has already been proved in detail that the alleged relation of inherence itself has no validity.

If that intelligence is taken as non-different from God's self, then also there will be flaws. Nothing can own its own self—the self of an entity cannot be regarded as its attribute. To regard intelligence as the attribute of God and to speak of it as non-different from His self would involve self-contradiction. Besides, in the case of the non-difference of that intelligence, conceived as an attribute, from the nature of that self, either that intelligence should be merged in the being of that self or the self should be merged in the being of intelligence. In the former case, the intelligence as an attribute of that self will be absent and God would be a non-intelligent Being, and such a non-intelligent self cannot be the regulator of the universe. If it be said that the supreme self is merged in the said intelligence, then it is to be granted that only the attribute, viz. intelligence exists, but there is no substance in which it inheres. That is to say, there would be intelligence without any intelligent Being. This is not only inconceivable, but also contrary to what the exponents want to prove, viz. the existence of an eternally intelligent Being as the regulator of the universe.

Further, following the same line of reasoning, human intelligence may as well be admitted as being without a support. Viewed thus, the property of being caused by the intelligent being will not be established even with regard to the pot etc. and so it would be vain to cite it as an example in favour of the proof of the existence of God.

Thus it is shown that one implication of the alleged regulatorship of God, namely His possession of eternal intelligence cannot bear logical examination, and we are showing that similar would be the fate of other implications of the said doctrine.

(b) The grounds for the inference of Divine Omniscience examined.

Now let us examine the grounds for the inference of Divine Omniscience. Here it may be asked whether the intelligence of the Maker of the world is eternal or non-eternal? Along with the first alternative, we have to consider whether by that intelligence the Maker will know everything directly or indirectly. The first cannot be, because it is impossible to make both the past and the future the object of perception. It is well-known that perception takes note of the present objects only.

Advocate.—The past and the future have the nature of being present.

Critic.—This cannot be. If that is so, then we too should perceive the past and the future. No one experiences in perception that the present includes the past and the future.

Moreover, without a relation between intelligence and its object, there cannot be perception. And a relation is possible merely in the case of two existents which are

present; there cannot be any relation between two non-existent entities or between one existent entity and another non-existent entity. Thus, because God's intelligence has no relation with the non-existent which have lapsed or are not yet born, God cannot perceive them. Nay, it may also be pointed out that even the present object cannot have any relation with the eternal intelligence of God. Here the question arises, whether the intelligence of the ruler of the universe has any relation with things ruled, directly or through any instrument or through its substratum. The first is not tenable. The relation of conjunction is impossible in this case because the intelligence which is admitted as being an attribute (so without parts) cannot have conjunction. Nor can there be inherence of that intelligence with things, because there is no inseparableness of intelligence with things. Nor can there be the identity of that intelligence with things, because intelligence and things have contradictory natures inasmuch as one is conscious and the other is unconscious, one is the subject, the other is the object. As none of these three primary relations is possible in the present case, other derivative relations, because of their being based on primary relations, are in this case impossible. So there can be no direct relation of intelligence with things. The second alternative also is not convincing. Because God's intelligence is believed as eternal, it is not the result of any instrument; so a relation through an instrument is not possible in this case. And if God's intelligence be associated with an instrument, God will then be no God. The third alternative is not reasonable, because in this case all-pervading substances like 'Akasha' etc. and the qualities inhering in them will become non-perceived, inasmuch as the exponents hold that the Divine self, which is the substratum of this intelligence, and the Akasha etc. are both unborn

entities and they deny the possibility of conjunction between unborn things (अजसंयोग). Thus the conjunction of God with Ākāsha etc. being not possible, God's intelligence would not be able to know them.

Advocate.—No such relation is necessary for God's perception of things. He perceives all things independently of relations. Such is the inscrutable power of God, and it is in this exceptional power that His Godhood consists.

Critic.—Such a conception of Divine omniscience, in utter contradiction to all human experience, could be resorted to only when it could be proved that without the recognition of such a God with such omniscience, the world of our experience could not in any other possible way be accounted for. But no such proof is forthcoming. Further, whatever hypothesis may be framed for explaining the world-system, must be of such a nature that we may form a rational conception of it on the basis of our experience. But knowledge without any kind of relation, direct or indirect, between the knower, the knowing faculty and the objects of knowledge, is what it is not possible for us to form any definite conception of. Hence the acceptance of the position of the exponents would amount to bidding good bye to the canons of Logic.

Hence, the legitimate conclusion is that God cannot know all things by perception. Nor can God know them indirectly. Our experience says that all indirect knowledge is produced through an instrument and therefore God's intelligence, if indirect, will be so produced. Hence the belief in its eternity will have to be abandoned. If you accept that God's intelligence is non-eternal, then God will lose His Godhood and be like us. Therefore the second alternative put forward in the beginning becomes refuted.

Thus God's intelligence, if at all existent, cannot be related to all things and thus His omniscience is found to be incapable of being logically established.

(c) The grounds for the inference of Divine Will Examined.

There can be no inference about the Divine will. Will, as far as our experience goes, is found associated only with embodied beings. Will is nowhere experienced in the absence of body. Whether will is the function of the mind or an attribute of the self or an entity distinguishable from the self and the mind, in no case do we perceive its existence except through the mediation of the mechanism of the brain. Whether the brain is regarded as the instrument and the means, or the condition and the cause of mental functions, including the function of the will, in neither case can we perceive or infer the presence of any active will except in an embodied being. Besides, the will is regarded by the supporters of the view under discussion as a product of the union of the self, the mind and the body, and also as an effect dependent for its production on previous experience and memory. If we are to infer the will of God, He also has to be conceived as an embodied Being and His will also must be admitted to be produced from previous experience and memory and by contact between His self, mind and body. The admission of such a will of God would evidently contradict the conception of Divinity. It will be argued by them that the Divine will is absolutely different in nature from our will, and it neither requires the conjunction of mind and body nor depends upon any previous experience and memory for its function. But the very possibility of a will of such an exceptional character requires to be proved and its assumption begs the question

at issue. We have found that there is nothing in our experience that can justify us in inferring even the possibility of such a will.

Moreover, it may be asked whether God's will is eternal or non-eternal? If the will of God is eternal, then God's intelligence, deprived of the function of producing will, will be purposeless, because His will, being eternal will not depend on His intelligence for its production. Will independent of knowing is unthinkable.

Besides, if God's will is eternal, then even at the time of dissolution, there would be creation. Moreover, if God's will be eternal, then at all times, all effects should have been produced. If God has always one knowledge having all things for its objects and has one will referring to all objects and has one effort conducive to the production of everything, then all effects ought to be simultaneously produced and every effect ought to remain throughout at all times. In that case there ought to be no growth and destruction in the world and no successive order in nature. The exponents may observe that owing to the co-operation of other factors, there is the successive order in nature. But this is not legitimate. Here the question arises, whether the co-operating causes are eternal or produced. If eternal, there will always be the combination of the co-operators, and hence our objection stated above will stand. If the co-operators are produced, then it has to be admitted that the origination of the co-operator is through the knowledge and will of God. In that case also there would always be the combination of those produced co-operators. So the same objection of creation at all times will hold good. Over and above, there will be the fallacy of an infinite regression, that is, if owing to the combina-

tion of the produced co-operators, there be the creation of the produced, then for the origination of those produced co-operators, other produced co-operators will be required and so on ; hence there will be an endless series of causes and effects. Besides, God's one will, being the will of creation, preservation and destruction and the same being ever-effective, there will be the simultaneous origination, perpetuation and annihilation of all effects. Moreover, the will of God to create each thing will be fructifying only at one moment, namely only at the instant of origination, and will be fruitless at other times, because there is no happening of the object of that will in beginningless time previous to origination and also in endless time after destruction. Even though there is no possibility of the creation of the object of that will in beginningless and endless time, nevertheless you assume that there is such creation, then the position will be that the will of God is to be taken as the creator of impossible things. The same objection will apply to His will to destroy also. In other words, God's will to destroy will not be effective before and after the time of destruction. It is not reasonable to hold that through the destiny of individuals, the successive productions in nature e. g. those of fruits and flowers in due time, will be explained. This destiny also is the object of God's will ; so it is necessary to admit its permanent effectiveness ; hence there will be no order in origination, preservation and destruction. Moreover, because the body, the sense-organs and non-eternal knowledge are products of God's will which refers to all objects, and also because God's will is ever effective, so the body, the sense-organs and the knowledge would be there for ever. Thus in case God's will is eternal there will always be creation, preservation and destruction.

God's will cannot be said to be non-eternal. If so, then it ought to have a cause. Is that will created by that will or by another? Owing to self-dependence, the first cannot be. The second would incur an infinite regression. If the will is non-eternal, then being non-eternal, that will also will be dependent on the efficient cause, and so there will be an infinite regression. If for each effect, a beginningless flow of will is assumed, then for infinite effects, infinite flows of will have to be assumed. Without the recognition of the distinction in the causal material, the distinction in effect is not possible. Moreover, if God's non-eternal will be the effect of itself or another will, it is necessary to trace some other cause of its origination. God's eternal knowledge cannot be supposed as the cause of that will. According to the exponent the non-inherent cause of non-eternal will is the peculiar conjunction of the self and the *manas*; but God being without *manas* (inner organ of produced knowledge), the said conjunction of the self and the mind is impossible, and hence will cannot be produced from His mere knowledge. If the will be assumed to have been produced from the knowledge of God, in that case, we have to admit that for the production of will, knowledge about future things must arise in God before God's will. And as that knowledge must be accepted as valid, those effects which are objects of God's knowledge must be regarded as existent. This implies that the entire world of effects exists before God's will. As these are present already, there cannot be any effort for their production. So in case God's will is conceived as non-eternal, there would be no necessity for the will or effort on the part of God.

Thus, whether the Divine will be regarded as eternal or as non-eternal, the logical difficulties are insurmountable.

(d) **Creation and regulation of the world by Divine Will unestablished for want of any motive.**

Now, about the motive of Divine regulation. A thoughtful being is actuated by some motive in his activities. His activity is accompanied by selfish end or kindness towards others. But God cannot have any particular end to serve by the creation of the universe. God is supposed to be eternally possessed of everything attainable and He has nothing more to attain. So God cannot be said to be engaged in regulating the world with a view to relieve His own sorrows or to gain more joys for Himself. Such a thing can be possible only in the case of imperfect individuals. Nor can it be stated that God occupies Himself with creation with the object of removing the sorrows of others, because all the living beings are here acknowledged to be the products of God's creation, and the question of their sorrows and any attempt for the removal of them cannot arise before creation and this can therefore be in no way regarded as the motive of His creative efforts. The motives which lead a person to activity have been enumerated by some philosophers as of eleven kinds, namely (1) sweet will (2) dependence on destiny (3) acquirement of merit etc., (4) delight in sports (5) the offer of a reward (6) acquirement of happiness (7) the removal of unhappiness (8) the destruction of sinfulness (9) an escape from future sin (10) immense compassion (11) instinctive impulse (स्वभाव).

All these motives are irrelevant in the case of God as is being shown below :—

(1) If creation were guided by the sweet will of God, there would be no firm basis for what ought to be done and

what ought not to be done and the performance of action would thus be fruitless. Besides, in that case the enjoyments and sufferings of the world have to be explained by holding that God bestows happiness on those for whom He has liking and inflicts sorrows on those for whom He has dislike. Owing to the inequalities of creation, there would be the charge of partiality and cruelty against God. If God has no object which will rouse the feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness in Him, then why should He occupy Himself with doing certain things and preventing other things from happening. In our experience we find that one who engages himself voluntarily in doing and avoiding things is actuated by these motives. One who has got the desire to shake off that which is fit to be abandoned or has the desire to embrace that which is fit to be chosen must be a person whose wish is not yet fulfilled. So, where voluntary occupation is admitted, there the desire for attaining the acceptable and relinquishing the unacceptable is necessarily to be acknowledged and where such a desire is found, there non-attainment of the object of one's desire must also be admitted, and where there is such non-attainment, non-Godhood must be there. If there be Godhood, there should be fulfilment of all desires, and owing to the attainment of all possible objects of desire, there cannot be the wish to attain any object or to give up any other object, and due to the absence of such a desire, there will not be any inclination for purposeful occupation. If even without a purpose, one be occupied, such occupation may either emanate from the nature of the person or may be the spontaneous expression of any all-embracing emotion, and in either case it may be conscious or unconscious. That such activity also cannot be logically attributed to God will be shown hereafter.

(2) If God acts being swayed by the destiny of individuals, then there will be left no independence of God. That person is called independent whose activity does not require any incentive and is not performed under any restriction. To maintain that God is independent and at the same breath to assert that His acts are regulated by our destiny, is a piece of imagination which contradicts itself.

Before creation, there cannot be the production of 'Karma' and so destiny cannot exist. Hence the occupation of God waiting for destiny cannot be possible at that time. Besides, the admission that God, in order to create, has to wait for destiny, will be a case of interdependence. And if destiny is believed to be co-eternal with God, this also involves various difficulties, which we shall discuss in connection with the Law of *Karma*.

Inference is based on observation. Nowhere do we find any instance of any person undertaking to act, having been instigated by the 'karma' of others and without any interest at all on his own part. So such activity of God cannot be inferred.

There cannot be any relation between God and the merit or demerit of individual beings. There cannot be conjunction with them because those 'Karma' are regarded as attributes. Nor is there inherence. There cannot be the inherence of God with 'Karma' which are inherent in other individuals.

Inference is drawn after the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the ground (हेतु) and the consequent (साध्य). This invariable relation is ascertained through the observation of positive and negative instances.

We have the knowledge of intelligent individuals as regulators and we also experience that in each such case the ruler has a body, sense-organs etc. From the knowledge of such an invariable relation, there will be the inference that the regulator is a person who has a body. It is clear that one having a body cannot have the property of regulating the destiny which is said to be super-sensible. Hence, as from our observation the only invariable concomitance that we can establish is between unconscious sensible objects and corporeal intelligent regulators, there is no ground on which we can infer the incorporeal God as the regulator of supersensible destiny.

(3) The desire for the acquirement of merit etc., has been enumerated as another kind of motive for the activity; but this question cannot arise at all with reference to the motive of God, who is conceived as eternally perfect.

(4) God cannot be said to be engaged in playful activity, because the inclination for playful activity originates from the expectation of joy from it. If on account of delight in sport, God becomes occupied in creation and government of the world, then He is to be regarded either as in want of delight in the absence of play, or as possessing a limited amount of joy which He desires to increase by means of play, or as being governed by the impulse to play without any definite end in view or as playing like a careless child without any purpose. In the first alternative, God would be subject to pleasure and pain, and the real motive should be either the acquirement of happiness or removal of sorrow, the impossibility of which should be discussed later on. In the second alternative also, on account of the limit to His happiness, He should be regarded as an imperfect Being, and His incentive to play should

be interpreted as the hankering after the removal of His imperfection. If, as the third alternative supposes, He is governed by the impulse to play without any definite end in view, the conception of such a God would be inconsistent with the conception of a rational being with freedom of thought, will and action, and a being under the bondage of instinct or impulse cannot be thought of as the author and governor of this world-system. Lastly, if He is supposed to play purposelessly like a careless child, there would be no system or uniformity or regulation by law in the world which is the product of His play. Thus we find that the idea of play as the motive of the activity of God in the creation and regulation of the world can in no way be explained in strict consistency with the supposed nature of God.

(5) That God should act for any reward is obviously so inconsistent with the conception of God, that it requires no argument to refute it.

(6) If God creates for the production of joy, then it will either be the production of joy of 'Jiva' (individual living beings) or of Himself. In case the first alternative is accepted, then it should be expected that all the 'Jivas' in creation should be in enjoyment of happiness; but this is contradicted by our every-day experience. In experience we find the prevalence of sorrows side by side with joys, and these could not have been the case if the motive for the creation and preservation of the world were the dispensation of happiness to the 'Jiva'. If on the other hand we hold that it is His own happiness which is the object of His creation and government of the world, then He must be regarded as by nature either unhappy or imperfectly happy and requiring contrivances to make Himself fully

happy. This would be inconsistent with the conception of God, whether we regard Him, in company with some schools of thought, as in eternal enjoyment of perfect bliss, or, in company with others, as absolutely untouched by happiness and misery.

(7) God cannot act in order to drive away sorrow. Here also we may put forward the same alternatives, namely whether the motive is the removal of the sorrows of the 'Jiva' or of Himself. The arguments adduced above should be applicable in this case as well and hence this also cannot be regarded as God's motive for creating and governing this world.

(8, 9) Because you believe that in God there cannot ever be any sin, so there cannot be any activity on the part of God to destroy present sin or to avoid future sin.

(10) Another motive which may possibly be attributed to God is His boundless compassion. But one who is compassionate should not be the cause of the production of this pain-giving body and thereby become instrumental in giving rise to sorrows of living creatures.

Advocate.—The sorrows of the living creatures cannot be regarded as necessarily antagonistic to the compassionate nature of God. Though full of compassion for all creatures, He has to distribute pleasure and pain in accordance with the destinies of individual living beings. Hence He cannot be held responsible for our sorrows ; our past actions are responsible for them.

Critic.—In that case if the destinies of individuals are not the products of God's will, though they are effects, then your assumption will render futile the argument that the

Divine will has to be admitted for the explanation of the production and regulation of all kinds of effects in the world. If on the other hand the destinies of individuals also are taken as created by God, then it has to be accepted that He is responsible for the nature of the destinies according to which He gives sorrows to the creatures, and consequently for those sorrows as well. Hence there is no valid ground for regarding Him as full of compassion or for regarding compassion as the motive of His creation. Thus God cannot be relieved of all responsibility for the sorrows prevailing in the world and be proved to be compassionate, even by taking the help of another unverifiable theory that these sorrows are to a considerable extent dependent on destinies of the individuals due to their past actions.

Before creation, the living beings have no sorrows at all, because sense-organs, body and sensible objects are not yet created. So there cannot be Divine compassion arising out of a desire to relieve the sorrows of living beings. Nor can it be said that having prophetic knowledge of future sorrows of individuals, God becomes compassionate, for such a supposition in this case will land us to the fallacy of interdependence. In other words, creation in that case would be due to compassion and compassion would be due to creation. Moreover, if Divine activity results from compassion, then God should create merely the good things and would not create indiscriminately.

If it is said that God, being prompted by merits and demerits of individual selves, produces joys and sorrows, then it would be proved that God is not engaged in creation for the purpose of dispensing favour to the creatures, but that being impelled by the influence of these co-operating causes He occupies Himself with the work. If compassion

had been the guiding motive of Divine occupation, and if the evil destinies of the creatures had been an obstacle in the way of bestowing happiness on all His creatures, He, being almighty, might have destroyed all those evil destinies in the very beginning of creation and thus might make all His creatures happy. Hence the logical conclusion should be that either He is not compassionate or He is not almighty and independent.

Advocate.—The dispensation of joys and sorrows are not inconsistent with Divine compassion. God wants that His creatures should attain perfect bliss. But for the attainment of this bliss, they have to be emancipated from the destinies that have been produced by their own actions. In order to get rid of the bondage of destiny, the joys and sorrows produced by it have to be enjoyed and suffered. Hence the motive of the Divine government of the world is to lead all His creatures through these joys and sorrows towards the *summum Bonum* viz., perfect bliss.

Critic.—Now the question is: are these merits and demerits caused by the action of God or not? If the former is the case, then it may be observed that it is better and wiser not to produce these at all than to be busy in destroying them after having caused them. If it is admitted that there is no hand of God in the production of merits and demerits, then it may as well be that God has no hand in their destruction too. Besides, in this case, joys and sorrows will be produced by other causes without God's interference as, you say, is the case with merits and demerits. Moreover, if merits and demerits are not caused by God, then God cannot be the cause of all effects.**

** It may be argued that God created human beings with the freedom to act according to their will and to build up their own destiny by dint of their own free actions. It is the abuse of this freedom

If God is active for the sake of emancipation of living beings, then the living creatures should not have been actively engaged in bringing about an accumulation of fresh 'karma'. Moreover, who is responsible for the law that the destinies, or the accumulated merits and demerits of the living creatures, have to be exhausted by the enjoyments and sufferings of their fruits? If God Himself is the maker of the law, then His will is the cause of the sorrows of the creatures. It cannot be said that God is under the necessity to make and enforce this law of the fruits of merits and demerits, in order to create and preserve the varieties of the world.

which is the cause of all the sufferings of the world. God, however, out of compassion for them has been ruling their destinies in such a way as finally to emancipate them from their sufferings.

Here the question is :—who is responsible for the direction of the will towards the abuse of freedom? It cannot be said that the previous actions of men gave this direction, because the first men created by God could not have any previous action. If it be said that human nature itself is the cause of this wrong direction of the will, then either this nature is to be regarded as self-caused or the author of this nature must be responsible for this abuse of freedom. As the first alternative is unacceptable to the believers in God's creatorship, the second alternative must be accepted, and then God would be responsible for this abuse as well as for the consequent sufferings. If it be said that this will to abuse arose accidentally in human nature, then it would imply that the human nature was not created according to any definite plan and this would be inconsistent with the omniscience and wisdom of the Creator. If it be said that men having fallen under the influence of an Evil Power was tempted to abuse this freedom, then the question would arise whether that Evil Power is created by God or exists independently of Him. In the second case God would not be the absolute creator of the world-system. In the first case He would be responsible for the evil. Hence in no way can we reconcile the sufferings in the world—so wide-spread, so intense, so unjustly distributed, so useless, and so morally detrimental—with the compassionate nature of the Omniscient Omnipotent God.

In that case, God is not the sole designer of the world-system, but He has to depend upon other things for carrying out His purpose. Even then He may be regarded as a just Being, and not a compassionate Being. No compassionate being can be expected to inflict sorrows upon His creatures willingly even by reason of their demerits, because compassion lies in the forgiveness of demerits, and not enforcing punishment for them. Further, when the law-maker is himself the dispenser of justice, he cannot be discharged of the responsibility for the sorrows that arise out of this justice. On the other hand, if it is said that demerit is operative by being not ruled over by God, then the argument, namely "every effect is ruled over by an intelligent being" would be irrelevant. If it is supposed that God regulates demerit for the purpose of others' welfare, in as much as the experience of sorrow by creating indifference towards the world becomes serviceable for final emancipation, then it can be legitimately observed that such a hypothesis is not well-founded. The production of sorrow, you admit, is subject to God's will, therefore, if He is unwilling to produce sorrow, there should be no sorrow at all and the beatitude of the nature of the absolute liberation from all sorrow would consequently have been attained without passing through these sufferings.

Further, the alleged rule of the intelligent God over destiny serves no purpose. If, in this rule, He is dependent on destiny, then His compassion will be to no purpose. And if there is no such rule, then owing to the absence of sovereignty on the part of God, the unconscious destiny would be inoperative. The result would have been that there would be no conjunction of the individual selves with bodies, sense-organs etc., which are the effects of destiny, and thus there would have been no sorrow at all. So how

can the occupation of God be justified as an act of kindness ?

Moreover, when there is kindness, the kind person himself feels sorry with the sorrows of others, and to remove that sorrow of his own as well the person acts. So the kind person too occupies himself with the work of relieving others in order to relieve his own sorrows too ; that is, he wishes for the relief of his own sorrows arising out of others' sorrows. Thus the kind person also is ultimately actuated by self-interest. Hence if God's activity is a result of His kindness, He must be selfish as well as sorrowful and then He would no longer be God.

(11) It is sometimes argued that God does not create and govern the world with any ulterior purpose in view or under the pressure of any necessity, but that it is His nature to create and govern; hence if any motive has to be ascribed to Him, it is His nature which should be regarded as the motive of His action. But when we try to analyse this position, the question arises, is His nature different from His attributes, viz., knowledge, will and effort, which are assumed to be eternally inherent in His self or is it non-different from any or all of them ? If His nature be different from these attributes, then either these attributes should be subordinate to His nature, or His nature should be subordinate to these attributes or His nature and attributes should be co-ordinate with one another. If His knowledge, will and effort be subordinate to and governed by His nature, then He is devoid of freedom of thought and freedom of will and action. A being with such restricted and limited power of thinking, willing and acting cannot be regarded as God. Secondly, if His nature be subordinate to His intelligence, will and effort, then it is not His nature which is the cause and governing principle

of His action, but His knowledge and will should govern His nature as well as His action. An appeal to His nature for accounting for this world-system is therefore useless, and the difficulties which arise from the recognition of His knowledge and will as themselves the cause of action have already been discussed. Knowledge and will imply the necessity of motive for designing and producing particular kinds of effects in perference to others. If His nature and His attributes are regarded as co-ordinate with each other, neither can be conceived as having control over the other, and hence His nature cannot be the moving power of His activities. Further, if His nature be recognised as supplying the complete motive of His activities, there would be no necessity of admitting the existence of the attributes of knowledge and will of God, and His actions would emanate from His nature in the same way as effects are produced from unconscious material objects. In that case He would no longer be regarded as the efficient cause or as the designer and governor of the world. The charges which the advocates of the necessity of recognising the existence of a doer and governor of the world brought against the view of those who tried to account for the world-system by reference to material cause alone would be equally applicable to their case.

If, then, the nature of God be regarded as non-different from or identical with His knowledge or His will or both, the appeal to His nature becomes altogether useless, because His knowledge or will or both should be regarded as the motive of His activities. But we have found that a being with intelligence and will requires a motive for His action, and intelligence or will cannot itself be the motive. Thus we find that an attempt to account for the supposed Divine activity by reference to His nature is futile.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing arguments we find that we can discover no adequate ground in our experience for the *conclusive inference* that God, as we conceive Him, is the doer or maker of the world, nor can we *logically establish* the ideas that are associated with the belief in His regulatorship.

APPENDIX D

Criticism of the proofs of the existence of God Occidental

"With his usual love for formal schematism Kant urges that there can be three and only three ways of trying to prove the existence of the Supreme. We may attempt to prove the existence of the 'most real being' entirely *a priori* (i. e. without the use of any 'truth of fact' as a premiss) by arguing that existence is included in its very nature—the ontological proof; we may, departing from the strictly *a priori* method, employ the single truth of fact, 'something exists,' as one of our premisses, and then argue to the conclusion that a 'necessary being' exists—the cosmological proof; we may include among our premisses specific assertions about the character of the 'something that exists'; i. e., we may argue from the marks of intelligent and benevolent design in the actual world to intelligence and benevolence in its source—the physico—theological proof. Each of these proofs is now to be shown unsatisfactory.

I

Criticism of the Ontological Argument

The refutation of the 'Ontological' proof is one of the best-known passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant speaks of the argument as the 'ontological' (or Cartesian) proof. He examines it only in the form in which it had been revived by Descartes, and was apparently not acquainted with its earlier history. His objection, put briefly, is simply this, that the proposition 'God exists' can only be got out of the concept of 'God' if existence has already been included in that concept. If I define God as a 'really existent X', of

course I can make the true proposition, 'If there is such a being as the God thus defined, then that being exists.' But I am not entitled to assert that there is such a being, and consequently not entitled to assert the consequent of the foregoing hypothetical proposition ('God exists') categorically. In fact existence is not a real predicate. The concept 'a hundred dollars' has precisely the same content whether the hundred dollars actually exist in my pocket or not. 'Our concept of an object may contain what and as much as you please, still we must go outside it to impart existence to the object'.* Hence the ontological proof is not really a proof of anything. 'The Idea of a Supreme Being is in many res-

* "Kant presents his argument in still another form. If we think in a thing every kind of reality except one, the missing reality is not supplied by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with the same defect with which I have thought it. When, therefore, I think a Being as the highest reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be lacking of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thinking, namely, knowledge of its existence; and such knowledge can never be obtained save in an *a posteriori* manner. That is owing to the limitations imposed by the conditions of our sense-experience. We never confound the existence of a sensible object with its mere concept. The concept represents something that may or may not exist: to determine existence we must refer to actual experience. And Kant has already stated, the actual is always for us the accidental, and its assertion is therefore synthetic. A possible idea and the idea of a possible thing are quite distinct. A thing is known to be possible only when presented in some concrete experience, or when, though not actually experienced, it has been proved to be bound up, according to empirical laws, with given perceptions. It is not, therefore, surprising that if we try, as is done in the ontological argument, to think existence through the pure category, we cannot mention a single mark distinguishing it from a merely logical possibility."

(Norman Kemp Smith's "A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.")

pects a most useful Idea, but just because it is merely an Idea it is wholly incapable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone.' Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and exalted concept of the Supreme Being. The present writer does not feel that Hegel's witticisms on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension.' The logical investigations which have issued in the creation of the modern 'exact' or 'symbolic' logic of Frege, Peano, and Russell have made this point even clearer than it could have been to the first readers of the *Critique*. If it is immediately evident that there is a member of the unit-class of which 'supreme being' is the class-name, there is neither room nor need for proof. If this is not immediately evident, proof is wanted. In general it cannot be inferred from the definition of a class that the class has members. If the class 'supreme being' or 'most real being' is an exception, we require proof that it is an exception to the rule, and neither Hegel nor any one else has ever offered anything in the way of proof. Thus, as against Descartes, Kant's argument is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive. Nor does he see that the original Anselmian proof fares any better. It is not directly touched by Kant's denial that existence is a predicate, since Anslem does not rest his case on the assertion that existence is a predicate. But Kant's counter-argument can equally be stated without raising this question. Whether existence is a predicate or not, it is equally true that we are not entitled to infer from the hypothetical proposition, 'If there is a God, that God is an existent,' the categori-

cal proposition, 'God is an existent;' and this is what Anslem tries to do. He is really committed, as every defender of the ontological line of argument must be, to the attempt to prove that it is irrational to suppose that there might have existed nothing at all. In point of fact most of those who have tried to turn the edge of Kant's criticism have not attempted so desperate a task. They have consciously or unconsciously assumed as a premiss the proposition that something exists, and have been content to argue that, since something exists, God exists also. In doing this they tacitly admit the truth of the contention of Kant and St. Thomas that no purely *a priori* proof of theism is possible."

(A. E. Taylor's "Theism" in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 12.)

II

Criticism of the Cosmological Argument

(a) "The Cosmological argument ... starts with an existence of which we have experience, and not with a mere thought. It has all the defects of the Ontological argument, with additional weakness of its own. It is, indeed, a "nest of dialectical assumptions." In the *first* place, it makes a transition from the things of experience to things in themselves, and that by means of the category of cause, which applies only in relation to the former. In the *second* place, it takes an idea of absolute necessity, which is merely an ideal for empirical synthesis (though an ideal which empirical synthesis can never reach), as itself an object of knowledge. And, *lastly*, it involves or presupposes the Ontological argument; for we cannot argue from the conception of the necessary *Being* to that of the *ens realissimum*, (the Being that includes all reality), unless the two conceptions are convertible; and if they are convertible, the

Cosmological argument becomes unnecessary ; for the Being of God is already proved from the definition of God."

(Edward Caird's "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant" vol. II.)

(b) "Even if we grant, to the believers in a first cause, that an unending regress of causes is impossible,* their position will be untenable. For the hypothesis of a first cause involves us in hopeless difficulties.

The argument conceives God's existence as having no beginning in time. But this leaves two possibilities open. Either God's existence is in time, and has no beginning, because he has existed through unending time in the past. Or else God's existence is timeless, in which case of course there could be no question of a beginning.

On the first alternative—that God exists in time—we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time. Now if one substance is admitted to exist in time without being caused, why should not other substances do so too? And, if any substance other than God can be uncreated, then the necessity of assuming the existence of God to create them has disappeared. I cannot see why it should be said, of three substances existing in time, that God did not need a creator, but that a man and a pebble did. If God is held to be timeless, indeed, it might possibly be maintained that all substances existing in time required a creator, while God, who was out of time, did not require one. But we are considering at present the hypothesis that God's existence is in time.

*"There is involved in the proof the inference to a first cause from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes being presented one after another in the world of sense. This is an inference which Reason does not permit us to employ as a principle even within experience, still less to extend it beyond experience where there is no chain of causes at all." (Mahaffy's "Kant's Critical Philosophy.")

The universe, however, does not consist merely of quiescent substances. It contains events. And the argument before us says that, apart from the creation of substances, God is required as the first cause of the events which occur to these substances. This contention depends upon the principle that every event must finally be derived from a cause which is not an event, in order to avoid the infinite regress which would ensue if every cause was an event, and therefore required a cause.

But how does God cause an event to happen at a particular time which did not happen before? Is it by an act of volition which occurred at a particular time, and did not occur before? Then that act of volition is an event, and itself requires a cause. And if that cause is found in a previous event in God's mind, and so on, we should get back to the unending causal regress which the argument started by declaring impossible. We must therefore suppose that God causes changes without changing. Either he directly causes an event without forming a volition which is an event, or, if he does form such a volition, then the cause of the volition is not an event.*

But is this possible? How can that which is changeless be the sole cause of any event? A changeless state can, no doubt, be *part* of the cause of an event. But it would contradict the law of Causality to ascribe an event to a cause which contained no change. For in that case the cause would first exist without producing the effect, and would then produce it. And this change in the action of the cause would be itself an event which would have occurred without a cause.

* We are not yet discussing, it will be remembered, the hypothesis that God's nature is timeless, but the hypothesis that, while itself remaining unchanged in time, it can be the cause of an event—that is, a change in time.

If we pass to the second alternative about God's nature—namely, that it is timeless, it is clear that it is also incapable of change. And thus we get back the difficulties which we have just considered. An event happens, and makes the state of the universe different from what it had been before. The cause is said to be God's timeless nature. That nature is the same, however, before and after the event. (In itself, of course, there is no question of before or after. I mean that a human being who was judging of God's nature before the event, and one who was judging of it after the event, would be right if they made the same judgment.) Then there is nothing in that nature which accounts for the change; and it cannot be the cause. If, while the so-called cause remains the same, the effect varies, it is clear that the variation of the effect—that is, the event—is uncaused.

As to the substances, other than God, if they are held to have come into existence at a particular moment of time, the event cannot be explained by a timeless nature of God. If, on the other hand, they are held to have existed through all past time, they have lost that characteristic—their commencement—on the strength of which it was asserted that a creator was necessary.

It has been suggested that the series of events in time will appear, to a timeless being, as a timeless reality, and may thus be due to an eternal and unchanging volition of that being. But, if the true nature of what appears as temporal is timeless, it is not really a series of events, and therefore the law of Causality does not apply to it. It needs a cause no more than God himself. And thus the argument breaks down.

It may perhaps be replied that these objections are valid as far as they go, but that God's nature is beyond our comprehension, and that in some way which we do not understand he may be the first cause of changes, in spite of

this own changelessness. I have discussed in Chapter II the validity of such appeals to believe in something which our reason tells us is impossible, on the ground that our reason is certainly limited, and may be wrong.* With regard to

* "We are sometimes invited to have faith on account of the very limited amount of our knowledge, and the possible errors in it.... The fact on which it is based is unquestionably true. We know very little, compared to what there is to be known; and what we take for knowledge is frequently error. If this were assigned as a reason for not being certain as to the truth of our conclusions—and especially of our conclusions on obscure and disputed subjects—the argument would be unquestionably legitimate. And if it were given as a reason for complete scepticism, the conclusion, though exaggerated, would not be very surprising. But it is somewhat remarkable that our want of knowledge on any subject, should be put forward as a reason for coming to a particular conclusion on that subject. Yet this is often done.... This line of argument has two weaknesses. The first is that it will prove everything—including mutually incompatible propositions—equally well.... But if our intellects are so feeble that the absence of sufficient evidence in our minds is no objection to a conclusion in the one case, then a similar absence can be no objection to a conclusion in the other.... For if our intellects are too feeble for their conclusions to be trusted, our distrust must apply equally to their conclusion on the relative weight of the evidence in the two cases.

The other objection to the argument is that it implies that, if we cannot trust our conclusion that A is false, we have no alternative but to conclude that A is true. But there is a third alternative to being confident of the truth or confident of the falsity of A. It is to abstain from judging about A at all. And it is this which would seem to be the more reasonable alternative, supposing our intellects are as weak as they are asserted to be.... But the argument from the feebleness of our intellects is often used as a reason why we should believe a state of things to exist which our intellects pronounce to be self-contradictory....

But there is another form of the appeal to faith which requires more serious consideration. We are invited to have faith, not in the truth of a proposition, but in the goodness of a person.... Can we not,

this particular argument, however, it may be specially noticed that it requires us to be convinced, not only that we do not know the nature of God, but that we do not know the nature of a cause. The position we are discussing main-

we are asked, trust God as we trust our friends? In the first place it must be remarked that this form of faith can only have a very limited application in the establishment of dogma. It assumes, to begin with, that the dogma of the existence of a personal God has been already established. For the appeal to trust God as we trust men loses all plausibility if God is not a person. If the ultimate reality of the universe were an aggregate of atoms, or a chaos of sensations, or a substance devoid of will, intellect, and purpose, it would be futile to trust it.... We do not put faith in all men, but only in some of them. Why is this? I take it that our faith is an induction from experience...—an induction from the previously observed conduct of the man in question, or of men in general. Can such an induction be legitimately made in the case of God, supposing his existence as a person to be already proved? I do not think it can be. For consider how enormous is the scope of the conclusion of the inference as compared with the scope of the observations on which it can be based. What are the limits of our knowledge of what are, on this theory, God's acts? We know a very few of those which have happened on one planet for a few thousand years, together with a few isolated facts about events beyond this planet. On the strength of these we are invited to believe in a uniform law applying to all his actions for the whole universe. We know that the universe is much larger than our sphere of observation. It is perhaps even infinitely larger. Surely to conclude from so little to so much would be ineffably rash.... This objection would, I think, be fatal even if every one of the divine actions which we directly know was one which suggested a good purpose. But it is universally admitted that this is not the case, and that many of those facts of the universe which we directly know do not suggest a good design as their most obvious explanation.... It is clear that we cannot put faith in God without reference to our knowledge of his actions, although we can, in certain cases, do this with man. We trust them from our experience of other men. But if there is a God, he is probably not one of a class of Gods, and, if he were, we should know no more of them than of him. It is true that a personal God would be included with

tains that God is changeless and a cause. Our objections were directed to show that a (complete) cause could not be changeless. If this is to be doubted on the ground that the changelessness may be possible in some way which we do not understand, then what may be possible in this mysterious way is not merely a changeless God but a changeless cause. This means that a cause may be what our reason says it cannot be.

Now, if we do not understand the nature of a cause sufficiently to trust what our reason says about it, the whole argument for a first cause breaks down. If we are to be so sceptical about causes, we shall have no right to believe that every event must have a cause, or that an endless regress of causes is impossible, since these conclusions rest on what our reason tells us about causes. And the argument for a first cause depends, as we have already seen, on the exclusion of the alternatives of an uncaused change, and of an endless regress of causes.

Thus the hypothesis of a first cause is useless for the purpose of extricating us from the difficulties, whatever they may be, involved in an endless causal regress. If we are to avoid complete scepticism, it would be necessary for philosophy to show, either that such an endless regress is not impossible, or else that some other alternative has been overlooked. This question, however, does not concern us here,

men in the class of persons, but the difference between God and man would be far too great to justify any inference from the conduct of the one to the conduct of the other.....The conclusion I submit is that on matters of dogma we cannot dispense with proof, and we cannot prove anything by considering the people who believe it, or the disastrous consequences which would follow from its falsity. We must prove our dogmas more directly, if we are to continue to believe them. This will leave all questions of dogma more or less problematic and many quite unanswered. And this is doubtless unpleasant. But unpleasant things are sometimes true." (Taken from Ch. II)

since our discussion on Causality has merely related to the asserted necessity of a first cause.*

(Mc. Taggart's " Some Dogmas of Religion. ")

* "But how about perceptions of God or of the universe? And, in the first place, are there any such perceptions at all in our present experience? It has been asserted by various people that they have had such perceptions. I doubt, however, whether this is a correct account of what they have experienced. No doubt they have experienced something, and, if our theory of the nature of spirit is correct, that experience must really be perceptions. But when they say that they have perceived God, or the universe, they mean that they have had perceptions of them, as distinct from judgments about them, or imaginings of them. In the language we have adopted, they are speaking not only of perceptions, but of perceptions which are apparent perceptions.

In such cases, I am inclined to think, a judgment has been mistaken for a perception. (For the sake of brevity, I speak of judgments and perceptions, instead of perceptions appearing as judgments, and perceptions appearing as perceptions). It is not difficult to mistake an immediate judgment that something exists for a perception of that thing. Nor is it difficult to make the mistake, even when the judgment is not immediate, but has been based on reasons, provided that the judgment is firmly held, and is one of sufficient interest to excite a strong emotion in the person who makes it. To the possibility of these mistakes, and, indeed, to the great difficulty of avoiding them, I believe that most people would bear witness who have any experience of mystical states of mind, and who have the power and the resolution to analyse the states they experience. And it does not seem improbable that the cases in which people have supposed themselves to have perceptions of God, or of the universe, are cases in which a judgment has in this manner been mistaken for a perception... Where there is a perception at all, there is a perception of the object as in time, together with a judgment that the object is eternal, and these two are confused together and mistaken for a perception of the object as eternal." (Mc. Taggart's "The Nature of Existence" Vol. II)

III

Criticism of the Physico-theological Argument

(a) As the cosmological argument was seen to rest on the ontological, so Kant shows that the physico-theological rests on both the cosmological and the ontological. According to the physico-theological argument, the inference is drawn from the beauty and order of the universe that they must have an adequate cause. This cause is supposed to be a Being who possesses all perfections. By analyzing the argument, however, we find that it amounts to this: the beauty and order seen in nature are effects; these effects have an adequate first cause which is perfect and unconditioned (cosmological argument); and because I am obliged to conceive such a cause in order to explain phenomena, therefore an object corresponding with this idea of a first cause also exists (ontological argument). As both the ontological and the cosmological proof have been found unsatisfactory, of course the physico-theological one, which rests on them, is also invalid.

(Stuckenberg's "The Life of Immanuel Kant.")

(b) The *Teleologic Proof* seeks to attain certainty of the reality of God from the purposiveness in the world. In order to be convincing, it would have strictly to fulfil several requirements with regard to which we have long ago seen that it can satisfy them only with various degrees of probability. It would *first* have to show that there is in the world a purposive connection which *cannot* result from an undesigned co-operation of forces, but have been designed by some intelligence. But we have seen that even conscious design can effect the realization of its purpose only by means of instruments, from certain conjunctions of which that which is desired

proceeds as a necessary result; and that even the conjunction of instruments for this result is only possible when the conjoining design works also upon each of them with a blind force, which in accordance with general laws is able to move it in the way necessary to bring it into such conjunction with the rest. Hence though it may be in a high degree improbable it yet remains possible that a course of Nature destitute of design may of itself have taken all the steps, which in order to realize a purpose must have been taken under the guidance of design; and therefore this first requirement cannot be fulfilled.

And we do not succeed better in fulfilling the *second* requirement—in showing that purposiveness does not occur merely here and there but that it pervades the whole world harmoniously and without exception, so that not merely do intelligent actions occur in it, but the whole is embraced in the unity of one supreme design. How little does our actual experience suffice to show this! How much seems to us wholly inexplicable, purposeless, even obstructive to ends of which we had assumed the existence! The few brilliant examples of a harmony that we can at least partly recognise, which are presented principally by the animate creation, may well confirm an already existent faith in God, in the conviction that in that also which we do not yet understand the unity of the same wisdom may work purposely; but empiric knowledge of the purpose in the world does not furnish the means necessary for enabling any one to attain indisputable faith who does not yet possess it. Taken alone it would much more easily produce the polytheistic intuition of a plurality of divine beings, each of which rules over a special department of Nature as its special genius, and the varying governments of which agree so far as to attain a certain general compatibility, but not a harmony that is altogether without exceptions.

Not merely the detectiveness of the scientific knowledge which we have through experience but also internal difficulties hinder the fulfilment of the *third* requirement—that, namely, of showing that creative wisdom in carrying out its designs never experiences opposition, and is never forced to produce that which is even only indifferent as regards its purposes; but only if this were so would wisdom be omnipotent. Not merely, however, does observation show us much which at least our limited knowledge can understand only as an accidental and accessory effect of the struggle between a formative design and the independent and resisting nature of the material to be formed; but, moreover, general reflection cannot get clear the notion of design without contrasting with it some material independent of it by elaborating which it attains realization; and thus all our consideration of purpose leads us only to the notion of a governor of the universe and not to that of a creator, which was what we sought.

Finally, how little men have succeeded in fulfilling the *fourth* requirement, and in proving the unconditional worth and sacredness of the designs which we plainly see pursued in the world, is taught by a glance at the development of the doctrines which attempt this proof. For has not philosophy often pointed out to us as supreme and unconditionally sacred cosmic ends much in which living feeling can find no worth at all? Have not popular faith and dogmatic theology found cause in the ills of the world, and the logical consistency with which evil develops, to divide the domain of the world between God and the devil, taking comfort in the thought that even of this apparent discord there may be some explanation inaccessible to human reason? But though that which is inaccessible to human reason may indeed be an object of faith, it cannot furnish any proof that such faith is true; and thus the Teleological Proof is destitute of all demonstrative force, however great and unmistakable may be the efficacy with which it brings

together for the strengthening of faith all that is best ~~in~~ in secular knowledge.*

(Lotze's " Microcosmus " Vol. II.)

* "Concerning this argument, we may observe that, if the cosmological proof be sound, the present proof is superfluous. If God's existence can be inferred from *any* finite existence, the particular nature of what exists is irrelevant, or is useful at most, for a subsequent empirical proof that God is good. Moreover, with Leibniz's conception of substance, there is much difficulty in the idea of *creating* a substance. Here he falls into inconsistency with the ontological argument, to which I must now return.

If existence can be of God's essence—and it is necessary to the ontological proof that it should be so—then existence is a predicate of God. But if existence is a predicate of God, then it is a predicate. Hence, when we say anything exists, existence is a predicate of this existent. So far, Leibniz would admit the argument. But if existence be a predicate, then it is part of the nature of a substance, and a substance, by being created acquires a new predicate. Hence the special position of existence, as a contingent and synthetic predicate, falls to the ground. If all substances always contain all their predicates, then all substances always contain or do not contain the predicate existence, and God must be as powerless over this predicate as over any other. To add the predicate *existence* must be; metaphysically impossible. Thus either creation is self-contradictory, or, if existence is not a predicate, the ontological argument is unsound. But the other arguments, as Kant pointed out, all depend upon this argument....

A few words seem needed as to God's goodness. Most philosophers seem to suppose that, if they can establish God's existence, his goodness necessarily follows..."Where there are no boundaries, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite". But perfection understood in this sense, though it does appear to involve God's infinite goodness, involves equally, except on a purely privative view of evil, his infinite badness. To escape this, Leibniz, like most optimists, asserts that evil is a limitation. God, he says, is infinite, the Devil is limited....Such a view is absurd. For if evil be a mere limitation, all that exists is good in different degrees, and never evil in any degree at all. If any existent, such as pain, be pronounced evil, it follows that evil is a positive predicate, like good. Hence it

(c) "We know what sort of propositions have appeared to be self-evident to nearly everyone and have never been in any danger of being refuted. They are always propositions which assert that one quality is necessarily accompanied by a certain other quality; they are never propositions which assert that there exists an object which has such and such qualities. Now the proposition that God exists is of the latter kind, and not of the former, it is therefore most unlikely that it is really self-evident in the sense in which it is self-evident that $2 + 2 = 4$"

Refutation of Inductive Argument

These (inductive arguments) start with certain admitted facts about nature and man, and argue back to the existence of God as the hypothesis which best explains these facts. Of course, the conclusion of such arguments could never be more than highly probable.....Such arguments may be classified according to their premisses. (a) They may start from certain facts about inorganic nature and living organisms. (b) They may start from the fact that nature contains minds which are capable of distinguishing good and evil and of guiding their actions by ideals.....

(a) The first set of facts forms the basis of the famous Design Argument.....I will content myself with the following remarks :—

will be included in metaphysical perfection. The doctrine of analytic judgments must have contributed to the view that evil is a mere negation. For it is obvious that good and bad are incompatible predicates, and if both are positive, this is a synthetic judgment. Hence evil was regarded as the mere negation of good, though it would have been equally logical to regard good as the mere negation of evil. When once it is recognised that evil is a positive predicate, the whole privative theory of evil falls, and with it the connection of metaphysical and ethical perfection, as also the definition of God as having all positive predicates." (B. Russell's "A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz").

(1) We must distinguish between the adaptation of inorganic nature to life in general, and the peculiarities of organisms as such.....It is certain that the condition of inorganic nature on the earth is, and has long been, extremely well adapted to the existence and growth of living organisms. So far as we know, the conditions under which organisms can exist are very peculiar, so that it is antecedently improbable that they should be fulfilled. Hence it is argued that they must have been deliberately brought about by a mind which wanted organisms to exist and to flourish. This, I think, is a fallacious argument. It seems certain that the fulfilment of these conditions is really very local and temporary. They are probably not fulfilled now in the greater part of the universe; they certainly were not fulfilled formerly on the earth, and they almost certainly will cease to be fulfilled there in the distant future. Now it is not antecedently improbable that even very peculiar conditions shall be fulfilled for comparatively short time in a small region of a universe which is indefinitely extended in both space and time.....

(2) Two assumptions which are commonly made:—The first is that organism originated from inorganic matter. The second is that an organism really is nothing but a complicated machine i. e. that its characteristic behaviour is wholly due to the peculiar arrangement of its parts, and is not due to entirely new properties of matter which first appear at the organic level. If we reject either of these assumptions the argument loses much of its force. If there have always been organisms of some kind, and no organism has ever originated from inorganic matter, there is no need to postulate a designing mind even though organisms be nothing but machines. And if organisms be not merely machines, there is no need to postulate a designing mind even though organisms did originate out of inorganic matter. Now, I do not see the least reason to believe that the characteristic behaviour of organisms can be wholly explained by

the peculiar arrangement of their parts and the laws and properties of inorganic matter. Hence the argument for the existence of a designing mind from the peculiarities of organisms does not convince me, though I think it ought to have great weight with a purely mechanistic biologist.

(3) Even if we accept the argument it will not prove the existence of God, in the theological sense. In the first place, it would prove only that a designing mind had existed in the past, not that it does exist now. It is quite compatible with this argument that God should have died long ago, or that he should have turned his attention to other parts of the universe. Again, so far from proving the existence of a being on whom the rest of the universe is existentially dependent, it negatives this supposition. It proves the existence of a super-human workman faced with material whose properties he has to recognise and make use of, and not of a Creative being. Thirdly, there is nothing in the facts to suggest that there is only one such being. And lastly, there is nothing to suggest that he is morally perfect. We must grant him superhuman skill and power, but the actual state of the world forces us to limit either his power or his goodness or his wisdom, or all three. So, at the very best, the argument would prove only that at some time in the remote past there had been one or more Gods in the popular sense of the word.

(b) I will now consider the argument for the existence of God from the existence of minds like ours which can look before and after, make judgments of good and evil, and guide their conduct by them. It may be admitted that we cannot conceive of any natural process by which minds could have arisen spontaneously from mere matter. So it has been suggested that we must postulate the existence of God to account for the facts. But, in the first place, there is no reason to accept the alleged facts; and secondly, the hypothesis of a God would provide no explanation of them.

(1) It is quite possible that there have always been minds, and that no mind has ever originated from anything but another mind by a natural process. In that case the hypothesis of God is needless for the present purpose. (2) If we make the hypothesis we have explained absolutely nothing. We are still obliged to suppose that there have always been minds, though not always non-divine minds. And the production of non-divine minds from mere matter remains just as unintelligible whether we say that it happens spontaneously or that it is miraculously accomplished by God.

The fact is that the argument from Design and the argument which I have just been discussing illustrate an important general principle. If you start with a sufficiently narrow and inadequate view of nature you will have to postulate a God to get you out of the difficulties in which it lands you. E. g. if you insist that living organisms are mere machines, you have to postulate God to construct them out of unorganised matter. And if you insist that nature is fundamentally material and that mind is a kind of after-thought, you have to postulate God to account for the origin of mind, though, as I have pointed out, the hypothesis does not here really help you. But why should you start with these narrow and inadequate views of nature? They have no trace of self-evidence and they conflict with the observable facts in every direction. And, unless you make this mistake at the outset, I do not think you will be able to find any inductive proof of the existence of God.

To conclude, whether there be in fact a personal God or not, it seems to me that we have no good reason to believe in the existence of such a being. I think that there are such grave difficulties in the notion of a God in the theological sense that there are strong reasons against believing that such a being exists.

(C. D. Broad's "The Validity of belief in a personal God"—Hibbert Journal, 1925.)

CHAPTER III.

The Theory of God as the Efficient Cause and Prakriti as the Material Cause Examined.

INTRODUCTION.

In the preceding chapter we have discussed the theories that God is the efficient cause of the world, while its material cause consists of innumerable material atoms. There is another class of schools of thought which agree with them in holding that God is the efficient cause of the universe, but do not accept atoms as material cause. They hold that there is one Primordial Energy called by them 'Prakriti' which evolves itself into this world of diversities, but this *Prakriti* and all its modifications are moved and regulated by God. The doctrine of *Prakriti*, however, is associated with one very important school of Indian philosophy which has attempted at an explanation of the origin and sustenance of the world-system in terms of the spontaneous evolution of *Prakriti* in the presence of innumerable *Puruṣas* or Souls and does not feel the necessity of recognising any God as the prime Mover or Regulator. We shall here first of all expound and examine this doctrine of *Prakriti* as the material cause of the world and then we shall discuss the theories which add to this doctrine the conception of God as the efficient cause. According to these Schools *Prakriti* has a real existence apart from the existence of God, but God has the inherent power to exercise control over it. In the next chapter we shall see that there are schools which recognise *Prakriti* as the material cause, but regard it not as a separate reality, but as the Power or Energy of God, so that God Himself being identified with

Prakriti comes to be conceived as the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe.

It is to be noted that all these schools of thought agree in the conclusion that *Prakriti* is the material cause of the world and they all base this conclusion on the theory of *pre-existent effect*.

We now proceed to the discussion of the nature and logical validity of the theory of *pre-existent effect* and the doctrine of the material causality of *Prakriti* based upon it.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY OF PRE-EXISTENT EFFECT.

- (a) The difference between causal state and effected state of the effect, inexplicable in this theory.

According to this theory the effect exists in a subtle unmanifested state in the nature of its material cause and its production consists in its transformation into the manifested state from it. It is not a case of the coming-into-existence of anything previously non-existent, but the appearance in the manifested form of what already exists. (Pages 45-46, see also analytical content.)

Now, it cannot be said that effects remain in a subtle form prior to their production, because the subtlety of the effect can be explained only on the assumption that the effect-substance was less in quantity when it was in a causal state than when it is in the state of an effect. Without admitting that the effect was less in quantity when in a causal state, its absence at that state in its gross form can never be explained. Such an admission would lead to the recognition of an intrinsic difference of nature between the cause and the effect in as much as the quantity of the two differs. For example, on account of the difference of quan-

tity, the gross pot produced from the pot having less quantity in the earth will be another substance. Hence the gross form will be non-existent in the causal state of the effect. So it is futile to imagine a subtle, causal form of the effect. It is remarked by the advocate that the causal state and the effected state of the effect are but different states of the same substratum, namely the self-same effect; this being the case, it cannot be held that the substance in its causal state is different from that in the effected state. But this is not tenable. If the gross state is not existent before, the production of the non-existent will have to be conceded; so the recognition of the self-same substratum pointed out by the advocate, is of no value. Moreover, your admission is wrong also because of the fact that it involves the fallacious doctrine of the production of the non-existent in as much as you have to hold that the gross state was non-existent before and has now been produced. If you are led to observe that the same state was existent before, then there would be no difference between the alleged causal state of the effect and its effected state, which constitutes its present existence.

**(b) Veiling of the effect before its manifestation
and the removal of the veil inexplicable.**

Moreover, according to the advocate, before their production, effects exist in their cause in an unmanifested state. For example, the pot before its production remains unmanifested in the lump of clay. When the veil (आवरण) of the effect is removed, it becomes manifested. But this argument is not convincing. According to this theory, the effect remains before its production in the form of the cause, but there is a veil on account of which this nature of the effect is not manifested. Now, what can this be? Is it the cause itself or something else present in the cause? If the

former, then the production of the effect would imply the destruction of the cause. For instance, the nature of the pot would be manifested when its cause, viz., the earth, disappears. But this is not admitted, because the earthen pot cannot exist in the absence of the earth. Again, if something else present in the cause be regarded as the veil, what can that something be? Is it the particular form in which the cause exists before the manifestation of the form of the effect? Then, as the particular form is not the cause itself, it is to be regarded as a particular effect of the same cause. For example, the form of the lump of earth is the veil of the form of the pot. In that case, one effect of the cause is the veil of another effect of the same cause. If what you say is right, then when earth is reduced to the state of the lump, that lump also might become veiled by the pot which even at that time is supposed to exist in some form; so we should not perceive that lump even. Thus, the lump of earth, the one effect of earth, will be the veil of its another effect, namely the pot, and the pot will be the veil of the lump. That the pot can be the veil of the lump is corroborated by our experience that when earth is in the state of the pot, the lump is not perceived. Now in order to meet this objection you have to admit some peculiarity in the prior unmanifested state of the effect as distinct from its nature in the manifested state. That is, you have to say that the pot in its manifested state becomes the veil of the lump, but at the time when there is the lump, the pot remains in a state, in which it does not veil the lump. Therefore you have to admit that the effect as manifested, being distinct from the effect as unmanifested, is non-existent prior to its appearing in the manifested form, and consequently you have to embrace the theory of the non-existence of the effect before production. Thus, the theory of the production of the pre-existent effect breaks down.

Moreover, it is held by the advocates of the theory that the veil which obstructed the manifestation of the already existent effect is destroyed by the agent, and this destruction of the veil is followed by the manifestation of the effect. Now, to be consistent with their own theory of the pre-existence of the effect, they have to admit that the destruction of the veil being an effect was also already there. Accordingly they have to suppose the existence of another veil to account for the non-manifestation of this destruction, and so on. Further, the destruction being already there to be manifested, there is no necessity for supposing an agent or efficient cause for bringing about this destruction. So the operation of the potter to produce the pot would be valueless. If, on the other hand, that destruction is taken as previously non-existent, then they will have to recognise the production of the non-existent. And if there is production of the non-existent, the same may hold good in the case of the pot and all other effects. Thus it is proved that the theory of the pre-existence of the effect is not logically established.

(c) Functions to create or manifest or unveil an effect fruitless.

Moreover, according to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect, the property of being an effect (कार्यत्व) does not mean production, but only the manifestation (अभिव्यक्ति) of the pre-existent. The operation of the agent or the efficient cause is meant for the manifestation of the already existent effect, and not for the production of the non-existent. But the defect of the theory consists in its failure to explain any necessity whatsoever for recognising such an efficient cause. This we are showing in details.

If the effect lies *in toto* in its cause, then there will occur the non-production of the effect. It cannot be said that the existent alone is produced, because then there will be incessant production; and the operation of the agent will also be in vain, because that which is to be accomplished by the action of the agent has already existence.

The discharge of the function of an agent may be fruitful in these three ways: namely, it will create an effect or it will manifest an effect or it will remove the veil over an effect.

The first alternative is not reasonable because when the effect is existent, the working of the agent will not be necessary for its creation. If to justify the agent's creative operation, the effect be taken as non-existent, then there will be the contradiction of the theory of the previous existence of the effect.

With regard to the second alternative it may be asked, whether that manifestation is existent or non-existent. If it is non-existent, then its prior existence is not established. If the production of non-existent manifestation is allowed, your own theory will be refuted. If the manifestation is non-existent, then it will have to be admitted that which was non-existent before its production becomes existent through origin, and there is no reason why the same concession is not to be made in the case of all other effects. Under this condition there will be no force in your own theory. If that manifestation is existent, then for its abiding in a subtle form, the manifestation of that manifestation will have to be admitted and in the same way the second manifestation would require a third and the third a fourth and so on with the result that the fallacy of infinite regression will be unavoidable. If manifestation has existence like the effect, then the non-manifestation of the

effect will be contradicted. If the manifestation is existent before the operation of the agent, then because nothing further is gained, the function of the agent is to no purpose. If from the beginning the effect is there, there is no necessity for the operation of the agent. If even before the operation of the agent there are both the effect and its manifestation in the material cause, to what end then is the operation of the efficient cause? If it is stated that the operation of the agent is required for the manifestation of manifestation, then there will again be the fault of an infinite regression. Because according to this theory, manifestation cannot be non-existent, every manifestation will have to be assumed as existent; so every manifestation will have manifestation and thus there will be an endless series of manifestations.

Moreover, is the manifestation to be taken as the same as the effect manifested or of a different kind? In the first alternative, it will be non-existent or existent. In both cases, the faults have been shown. In the second alternative it will be related to the effect or non-related to it. If there is no relation between the two, there will not be the manifestation of the effect in as much as the manifestation does not belong to the effect. If there is any relation between the two, then the question whether the manifestation is existent or non-existent before production of the effect arises. The objections raised against the theories of the previous existence and that of the previous non-existence of the effect will apply with equal force in the case of the manifestation either as existent or non-existent. If the relation exists between manifestation and the effect before its production, it would imply that even before production the effect is already manifested, then, either there will not be occasional non-manifestation or non-

manifestation will never cease to be. As manifestation is already in the effect, non-manifestation can never be there. On the other hand if even at the time of manifestation, there be non-manifestation, then because both remain together, manifestation will never expel non-manifestation, so there will ever be non-manifestation.

Advocate—Before production of the effect, manifestation also is non-manifested. This non-manifested manifestation remains with the non-manifestation of the effect, but manifested manifestation does not remain with it. Though the non-manifested manifestation does not eliminate non-manifestation of the effect, yet by being manifested it can eliminate non-manifestation.

Critic—This cannot be maintained. In this case it is to be assumed that the manifestation of manifestation, after being non-existent at first, comes into being. In that case the theory of the non-existence of the effect before production arises. Otherwise the non-manifested manifestation also will be supposed to have a manifested and a non-manifested state of existence, and so on *ad infinitum*. Every manifestation and every non-manifestation will require one manifested and one non-manifested state. Thus it would involve the fallacy of *Infinite Regression*. If this fallacy is to be avoided, then the non-manifested is to be supposed as always existent or always non-existent. If non-manifestation is always existent, there cannot be its elimination, and if it is always non-existent, it will be eternally banished and there cannot be any question of its removal.

Thus, you cannot say that causal agency is necessary for the manifestation of the effect.

If the third alternative is held, in other words, if it is maintained that the working of an agent is efficacious for

the removal of the veil of the effect, then also the action of the agent becomes valueless. If that veil is existent, then it will not be cast out. As the production of the non-existent is impossible, so the destruction of the existent is also impossible. If that veil is non-existent, then it will be eternally dispensed with, so there cannot be its destruction. Hence, the operation of the agent is futile.

(d) Concluding Remarks.

Besides, according to the theory of the *pre-existence of the effect*, there is no annihilation of the existent, nor is there any creation of the non-existent. Accordingly, there cannot be the production of anything new or the destruction of what exists. Hence the facts of production and destruction are inconsistent with their theory. If it is held that something particular is produced, then something which was not in existence before has to be supposed to be produced, and if anything is regarded as destroyed, something which existed has to be considered as becoming non-existent. Both these conclusions being unacceptable to them, they will have to look upon the world as without any production and destruction and without any relation of cause and effect.

Hence the *theory of the pre-existence of effect* cannot offer any rational interpretation of the actual facts of our experience, and cannot supply logical definition of the property of being an effect.

RELATION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT EXAMINED.

Among the upholders of the doctrine of *pre-existent effect* some lay stress on non-difference of the cause and the effect, while others lay equal emphasis on both difference as

well as non-difference. We are going to examine how far these views are reasonable. Here we propose to discuss first the theory of non-difference of the cause and the effect and then we shall proceed to the discussion of the doctrine of difference-non-difference of the cause and the effect.

(a) The inconsistencies in the theory of non-difference pointed out.

Now about non-difference. The effect and the cause have each of them its own distinct nature, so they cannot be non-different from each other. The cause remains accomplished already, but the effect is yet to come into being. The same thing cannot simultaneously possess two natures—one already accomplished, and the other yet to come. So the cause cannot be identical with the effect. The cause-effect-relation implies that there must be some specific feature (अतिशय) in the effect distinguishing it from the cause, and *vice versa*. If this is not recognised, then there will not be any definite order of things, such as “this is the effect” and “that is the cause”. In case, there is entire non-difference between the cause and the effect, the thing will itself be its own cause. In that case the presence of the cause would mean the presence of the effect as well, and there would be no force in saying that the effect remains unmanifested in the cause and afterwards becomes manifested as the effect. That is to say, in case of absolute non-difference between cause and effect, there should be no difference between the manifested and the unmanifested conditions of the effect, and hence there should be no production or destruction of effect. Accordingly the effect being always present on account of the presence of the cause, the interference on the part of an agent to produce it would be purposeless. It cannot be said that there will be effort of the agent, for the manifestation of the effect, because

manifestation also is of the same nature with the cause, so its existence is obviously there. The cause and the effect being identical, the manifestation of the cause must imply the manifestation of the effect. If there is no manifestation of the effect in the cause, to speak of the existence of the effect in the cause would be meaningless. The effect being absent, there would be no significance in saying that the effect is of the nature of the cause, because it can never be that the very same thing is and is not. Besides, if the effect and the cause are one and the same, there should not be any interval of time between the production of the effect and its cause. If a passage of time is not admitted for the production of the effect, then the cause-effect-relation cannot be explained. The "existent" particularised (अवच्छिन्न) by prior time is the cause, and the "existent" particularised by subsequent time is the effect. A thing cannot bear such a relation to itself. Absolute identity can be no relation. A relation requires more than one term. Hence it is not proper to acknowledge cause-effect-relation as a case of absolute identity. In case of absolute identity, there cannot be the possibility of inference etc. of the cause through its effect. If the effect is the same as the cause, then the effect will not be the effect at all. The doctrine of the absolute non-difference of the cause and the effect leaves no room for the distinction between the material cause and its transformations. Thus we find that if the relation between cause and effect be regarded as a relation of absolute non-difference, the very conceptions of cause and effect disappear.

(b) The three interpretations of the doctrine of Difference-non-difference and their refutation.

Now let us discuss the theory of difference-non-difference between cause and effect.

" This doctrine of *difference-non-difference* is interpreted in slightly different ways by the adherents of the doctrine. Now we proceed to state the different interpretations of this doctrine and then refute them in their order.

I. Some think that the *difference* (negation of non-difference) of the cause and the effect is their *essence* (स्वरूप) and the *non-difference* of them is their *relation* of identity.

II. Others hold that *difference* of the cause and the effect is their *essential quality* and that their *non-difference* is the *negation* of the said difference.

III. Others acknowledge that *both difference and non-difference* are the *essential qualities* of the cause and the effect and are *equally positive* in character like colour and taste.

Now let us examine these views :—

I. According to the first view, the essence of the cause consists in its difference from the effect, but this difference is qualified by the attribute of identity with or non-difference from the effect ; similarly the essence of the effect lies in its difference from the cause, but this difference is qualified by the attribute of identity with or non-difference from the cause ; e. g. the earth as cause in relation to the pot consists essentially in its difference from the pot, this difference being qualified by the attribute of non-difference from the pot. Similarly, the pot as effect consists essentially in its difference from the earth as qualified by the attribute of non-difference from it.

Now the question is : Is the attribute of non-difference different from the cause and the effect, or non-different from them or different-non-different from them ? If it is admitted that this attribute of non-difference is different from the cause and the effect, then it is necessary to bring

in some other relation to connect this non-difference with the cause and the effect, and that relation also will be separate from that non-difference, because the characteristic property of relation is that it is different from the two terms it relates and supported on those related terms.

Advocate.—Because non-difference is of the nature of a relation, another relation to relate it with its relata is not required.

Critic.—Your assertion is illogical. We can infer that the said relation of non-difference requires another relation which is separate from it in order to relate it to its own substratum, because it is a relation or an attribute like conjunction ; and in the case of conjunction you also admit the necessity of another relation to relate it to the terms conjoined. Accordingly you are logically bound to admit that the relation of identity also can become related to its own substratum only through a relation distinct from it, because the relation of identity also has been here taken as absolutely different from its own substratum. Moreover, if non-difference is taken as absolutely different from the cause and the effect, then it will not at all be related to them, because, according to your own admission, no relation can be wholly distinct from the relata. You admit that conjunction is not wholly different from terms conjoined and you do not admit the validity of the relation of *inherence* which is taken by its adherents as wholly different from the terms it relates.

Hence it is proved that non-difference of the cause and the effect can not be taken as absolutely different from them.

If non-difference is reckoned as non-different from the cause and the effect, then the question is:—whether this

non-difference is of the nature of perfect oneness or essential identity with some element of difference? If the second is the case, then because of its difference from the related terms, it will require another relation for its relation to the cause and the effect, and that relation will also require another relation and so on. In this way there will be an infinite regression and owing to this regression, the non-difference of the cause and the effect will not be established anywhere. And if the first alternative, namely perfect oneness of them, is accepted, then that non-difference which is accepted by you as an attribute of the cause and the effect will cease to be an attribute of them in as much as in that case it will be reduced to the nature of the cause and the effect.

In order to avoid the faults involved in these two alternatives, if it is asserted that the said non-difference is both different as well as non-different from the cause and the effect, then also there will be faults. If the non-difference of the cause and the effect is taken as different-non-different from them, then let us find out the implication of non-difference which is a factor of difference-non-difference. If non-difference means identity and if that identity is both different-non-different, then the non-difference which is a factor of the second difference-non-difference will itself be different-non-different, because the alternative of difference and that of non-difference have already been refuted. Hence there will be infinite regression. Thus it is established that the first view, namely that non-difference is an attribute different from the cause and the effect, is not reasonable.

Now, if the essence of the cause and the effect lies in their difference from the effect and the cause respectively,

the difference is virtually conceived as a substantive. In that case difference would not be predicated of substantives, in such ways as this substance is different from that substance, earth is different from the pot etc. Besides, had difference been a substantive, its perception would not have been dependent on the knowledge of its counterentity. Further, if difference had been the very nature of a thing, the perception of a thing would always amount to the perception of its difference from other things, and there would not remain possibility of a rope being perceived as a snake or an oyster being perceived as a silver. Again, when we see a group of trees from a distance, we actually see the trees, but on account of our not seeing their difference from one another, we perceive them as one cluster. If difference had been the very nature of the trees, their perception would of course involve the perception of the difference, and there would be no occasion for the misapprehension. If on the other hand, the substratum is taken as of the nature of mere difference, then the perception of the substantive would be dependent on the perception of the counterentity. In such a case, the knowledge of one substantive would be dependent on the other substantive which is its counterentity and the knowledge of that counterentity will be dependent on another substantive, and thus due to infinite regression, not even a single thing would be established.

Thus we find that if difference is interpreted as constituting the essential nature of the cause and the effect, with non-difference qualifying it as an attribute, we fail to form a rational conception of the relation between cause and effect.

II. Now we proceed to the consideration of the second view. According to this view, the *difference* between the

cause and the effect is *not* regarded as constituting the *essential nature* of the cause and the effect, but the *essential quality* (धर्म) of both of them; while *non-difference* is regarded as the *negation* of difference.

Let us first try to understand this position more clearly. It is held that non-difference is the negation of difference, but still it is present along with difference. If the one implies the absolute denial of the other, then it is evident that the presence of the one must amount to the absence of the other, and hence the affirmation of both difference and non-difference with regard to the same entity is absurd. If it is said that the said difference and non-difference remain not in the same entity, but in different substrata, then the same effect will not be different as well as non-different from the same cause. Consequently, the only interpretation that this doctrine of the co-presence of difference and its negation in the same cause and the same effect admits of, is that the non-difference does not mean the absolute negation of difference, but only a partial negation of it. That is to say, the negation does not mean *denial*, but only *limitation*. Accordingly non-difference instead of being interpreted as the negation of difference should be construed as the limitation or qualification or particularisation of difference. Now, if negation, spoken of by the advocates of the view, be regarded as a negative concept, it cannot obviously admit of variation of degrees and cannot be divided into partial negation and wholesale negation. Negation, as such, must imply complete denial, and in this sense it cannot be a mere qualification or limitation of its counterentity. To accept non-difference as a qualification of difference must therefore lead to the interpretation of non-difference as a positive quality. But this is

the third alternative, to be discussed hereafter. Hence the second alternative cannot be literally accepted without violating the law of contradiction.

III. Now about the third view, according to which *difference* and *non-difference* are *both attributes* of the cause and the effect and are *positive* in character like colour and taste. In order to test the validity of this conception, we are considering two main factors involved in it. First, difference and non-difference being conceived as the positive attributes of the cause and the effect, they must be related to both of them. Hence we have to consider what can be the nature of the relation between them and whether any logical relation can be established. Secondly, difference and non-difference being both of them at the same time the positive attributes of the cause and the effect, it is necessary to consider if it is possible to interpret these attributes in any such way that they may not contradict each other.

Let us first consider the first point. How are these attributes of difference and non-difference related to their substratum? If there be no relation, then they cannot be regarded as the attributes of the cause and the effect. Now, what kind of relation is there between them? Is it conjunction or inference or identity? According to you, there cannot be the relation of conjunction between the attributes of difference and non-difference and their substratum, because you admit that qualities and actions are different-non-different from their substratum and yet you do not admit that there is a relation of conjunction between them and their substratum. Moreover, difference and non-difference being conceived as attributes, and not as substances, there cannot possibly be the relation of conjunction between them and the cause and the effect, because conjunction

tion always holds good between substances. You cannot uphold that there is the relation of *inherence* between them, because inherence being conceived as a distinct relation, which inseparably unites two essentially distinct entities, you do not and cannot recognise any such relation consistently with your *theory of difference-non-difference*. If you accept that there is the relation of identity (non-difference) in the present case, then because the non-difference between difference as well as non-difference on the one hand and the cause and the effect on the other is admitted, your own theory breaks down. In other words, the view that difference and non-difference are attributes of the cause and the effect like colour and taste becomes abandoned.

Advocate.—Though we cannot logically define the relation in the present case, nevertheless the existence of some relation must be recognised, because we actually experience the points of difference and non-difference in the cause and the effect; so on the strength of actual experience they are recognised as attributes of the cause and the effect.

Critic.—This is not correct. The conception that difference and non-difference are positive attributes pertaining to the nature of the cause and the effect is not really a matter of direct experience, but it is a matter of the interpretation of experience. In fact, though the actual experience of the earthen pot, the cotton cloth, the gold ornament, etc., is the same to all men, the relation between the cause and the effect has been variously interpreted by various schools of thought. Hence there can be no force in saying that the difference and the non-difference must be accepted as positive attributes of the cause and the effect on the basis of direct experience. Further, direct experience

cannot always be regarded as representing the true nature of a relation, because in that case there would be no room for illusion or error in perception.**

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that if difference and non-difference, which are the two factors of the difference-non-difference relation between cause and effect, be conceived as two positive attributes of the cause and the effect, we can by no logical means determine the nature of the relation of these attributes with the cause and the effect. If the relation of the attributes of difference and non-difference with the cause and the effect be not

** It is of course agreed that if the conclusion of any inference contradicts real facts, then that conclusion cannot be accepted. But it may be asked.—Does every sense-perception acquaint us with the real nature of the fact? Does our sense-perception of the sun give us true knowledge of the real magnitude of the sun? Do we not on some occasions see two moons in the sky or water in the desert or snake in the place of the rope? Do we not see the sun and the fixed stars moving? Hence any and every fact of experience cannot be regarded as representing the true nature of things. One sense-perception may be contradicted by another, and both cannot be accepted as giving true knowledge. Hence it is perception tested and verified that alone can be regarded as a source of valid knowledge. Sometimes a valid inference also becomes stronger than perception and proves the latter to be false. The enormous magnitude and the relative fixity of the sun and the stars, the diurnal rotation and the annual revolution of the Earth, etc., are all matters of inference, but they are accepted in contradiction to the testimony of perception.

Thus the validity of perception also requires to be tested and these tests must consist in the application of the logical principles—the principles and rules of the consistency of thought and harmonisation of knowledge. If it is found that any particular experience violates the fundamental principles of reason, if from any experience we form a conception which is found on analysis to be inconsistent with itself or with other proved facts, that experience will be regarded as illusory.

established, how can we conceive that the cause and the effect are related to each other by means of the attributes of difference and non-difference ?

(c) **The various ways of establishing the Difference-Non-Difference-relation futile.**

Now, we proceed to the consideration of the other important point in this conception. Let us suppose that the attributes of difference and non-difference are somehow related to the cause and the effect and bring about the relation between the two. The next question would be, how can we interpret the notions of difference and non-difference so that they may be consistently supposed to exist together in the cause as well as in the effect ? If the attribute of difference and the attribute of non-difference be regarded either as contradictory or as contrary terms, they cannot at the same time be affirmed of the same substance, whether this substance be the cause or the effect. It is the very nature of two contrary terms as well as of two contradictory terms, that the affirmation of one implies the denial of the other.

Hence difference and non-difference are to be conceived as two distinct attributes so that the affirmation of one may not imply the denial of the other.

If such a conception were possible, then the cause and the effect would be regarded as absolutely different from each other and at the same time absolutely non-different from each other, and the absolute difference between the two should not be in the least affected by the absolute non-difference between them. In that case all the logical absurdities arising out of regarding the cause and the effect as absolutely different should manifest themselves along

with the absurdities of regarding them as absolutely non-different. The only conclusion that would follow from both the sides of the supposition, is that there would be no cause-effect-relation between the alleged cause and its alleged effect. In the case of absolute difference, anything may be regarded as the cause of any other distinct independent entity ; in the case of absolute non-difference everything would be regarded as its own cause. Apart from the impossibility of the supposition and the absurdity of its conclusion, it is not what the exponents of the difference-non-difference-relation hold.

What the exponents of this theory would like to maintain is that the relation between the cause and the effect is neither that of absolute difference nor that of absolute non-difference, nor that of a combination of absolute difference and absolute non-difference, but it is a difference-non-difference relation. But in this case also, our question is the same, viz. what is the true significance of this difference-non-difference ? Has it any relation to difference and non-difference ? If this difference-non-difference does not mean the presence of difference as well as non-difference, but it means a distinct kind of attribute, then it may be present either with absolute difference or with absolute non-difference, for it cannot then contradict both of them. In that case it may be said that the cause and the effect are either both absolutely different and different-non-different or both absolutely non-different and different-non-different. In each of the alternatives the logical absurdities of conceiving the cause and the effect as absolutely different or as absolutely non-different would arise. Hence if any conception of the relation of difference-non-difference is to be formed, it must be in terms of difference and non-difference. But we have found that there is no

sense in which difference and non-difference can be related to the same substance without contradicting each other.

The only other alternative that can be suggested is that the cause and the effect are different in one aspect and non-different in another aspect. The effect, before its manifestation, remains undifferentiated in the cause, and after its manifestation also, the causal substance is the substance of the effect; as a substance, therefore, the effect is non-different from the cause. It evolves out of the cause, it exists inseparable from the cause, and at the time of destruction also it merges in the nature of the cause. In this aspect the relation of non-difference exists between the cause and the effect. But the effect, at the manifested state, has certain specific features, which are not present in the cause before its manifestation and after its destruction, and which differentiate it from all other effects evolved out of the same cause. In respect of these specific features, the effect is to be regarded as different from the cause. As the difference and non-difference pertain to the cause and the effect with reference to their two distinct aspects, they do not contradict each other and exist together in their substrata.

But here the question may arise, does the conception of the specific features form part and parcel of the conception of the effect or not? If the specific features constitute the nature of the effect, so that apart from them the effect is not effect at all, then this effect must be conceived as non-existent in the cause before its production and as absolutely different from the cause after its production. If on the other hand the specific features be regarded as accidental attributes of the effect, not constituting its essential nature, then it is the substance of the effect which alone

should be the true effect, and in that case the effect would be absolutely non-different from the cause, not only before, but also after its so-called production. That is to say, in that case the so-called cause would remain unchanged and unmodified substance and there would be no real process of causation and no real cause-effect relation. In both these cases difference-non-difference relation cannot be established and the logical position, as shown above, would be unacceptable to the advocates of the view.

It may be said that it is neither the substance nor the specific features that constitute the effect, but it is the substance as particularised by the specific features that constitutes the nature of the effect and it should be non-different from the cause in respect of the substance and different from it in respect of the particularisation. But this interpretation also does not evade the difficulty. Is the particularised substance different or non-different from the unparticularised substance? If they are non-different, particularisation would be meaningless. If they are different, the relation between the cause and the effect would be a relation of difference, and not difference-non-difference.

Then again, the question may arise, what is the relation between the substance of the effect and the specific features that particularise it? Is it a relation of conjunction or inherence or identity or simple relation? None of them can be consistent with the theory under consideration, and none of them can support the difference-non-difference relation between the cause and effect. Then again, are the specific features different or non-different from the substance? If non-different, the substance remains unparticularised and there is no cause-effect relation. If different, no logical explanation will be available for connecting together the substance and the specific features.

Further, if the specific features are conceived as merely added on to the substance without any modification of its essential nature, it cannot be regarded as a real evolution or production of a real effect. In that case what we experience as the evolution or the production of an effect from a cause would be merely apparent ; consequently what we actually call an effect would have a merely apparent reality or at least a reality of a lower order than the cause, which would remain the unmodified substance.

Thus we find no rational way of establishing the difference-non-difference-relation between the cause and the effect.

According to the theory under discussion, it is held that the entire world is existent in an unmanifest state in the nature of *Prakriti*, the primal Energy. *Prakriti* modifies itself in successive stages for the manifestation from within itself the whole world of effects. During this process *Prakriti* does not lose its identity. Thus the theory of *Prakriti* is closely related to the doctrine of the pre-existence of effects and the difference-non-difference-relation between the cause and the effect. Having considered the validity of the theory of *Pre-existence of effects* and the *difference-non-difference-relation* between the cause and the effect we now proceed to examine the nature of the modification of *Prakriti*.

THE MODIFICATION OF PRAKRITI EXAMINED.

Now, about the modification of *Prakriti*, the primordial Energy. This Energy is taken as the substratum of all these changing forms and it is supposed to remain unbroken through all these changes. Let us examine these conclusions:

(a) **Effects not different or non-different from Prakriti.**

It is stated that these effects are manifested as the result of the modification of *Prakriti*. Now, the infinite varieties of effects thus produced from *Prakriti* are to be considered either as of the same nature with *Prakriti* or of different natures from it. The advocates of the theory cannot consistently accept the second alternative, because it would contradict their doctrine of modification. If the effects produced are different in their essential nature from the cause, then non-existent entities are to be regarded as becoming existent through production. In that case it cannot be said that the effect was already existent in the form of the cause and the cause only transformed itself into the effect.

Let us now examine the first point of view. If these differences of effects are of the nature of *Prakriti*, then how do these arise from it as effects? What is absolutely non-different from some thing cannot be either its cause or its effect, because if the cause and the effect become the same, the very relation of cause and effect cannot exist between them, and even if it is supposed to exist, there should be no means of ascertaining which is the cause and which the effect. Moreover, because in the case of the doctrine of *Prakriti*, all effects are supposed to be the effects of the self-same cause, these effects also would be non-different from each other and there would be no means of distinguishing one effect from another. Thus the diversities of the world would have no explanation, and each of these effects may be regarded as the cause. Moreover, as the cause called *Energy* is unmanifested and as the effect is non-different from the cause, how can the effect be the opposite of that non-manifest

Energy, that is, how can it become manifest ? What is of the nature of sameness with something cannot be its opposite, because what is opposite must bear the mark of difference; otherwise all distinctions will be eliminated. And for this reason the mutual distinction between the three *Gunās* (*Sattva, Rajas and Tamas*) and the '*Puruṣas*' (selves), as approved by the advocates of this view, will be of no avail and the whole world will lapse into one form, and hence there will be the co-existence of origin and destruction. Moreover, because the unmanifest is non-separate from the manifest, the unmanifest will also share the attributes of the manifest, namely production and the like, or because there is non-separation from the unmanifested, the manifest will also have the attributes of non-production and the like as is the case with the unmanifest. Moreover, the eternal Energy cannot be the cause which will give rise to the differences of effects, because it is contradictory to the nature of the eternal to act either successively or simultaneously.

(b) Different interpretations of the modification of Energy and their refutations.

Advocate.—We do not admit the production of any new property in Energy. Energy is called the cause of things, because it modifies itself into the forms of these things, and these things are called its effects, because they are its modifications. Because these modifications rest upon Energy, they cannot contradict their non-difference from it. The modifications resting in one single object cannot contradict their non-difference from the object.

Critic.—Here the question arises : will the modification be due to the loss of the former form of Energy or not ?

If the second alternative is accepted, that is, if modification does not imply the loss of its former form, then there is actually no modification and the term modification itself will be meaningless, because what is called the cause remains as it is without any change whatever. If the first alternative is granted, the question should arise whether the form constitutes the nature of the cause or not. If it is taken as constituting its nature, then the change of forms will mean the loss of the intrinsic nature of the cause, and hence the cause is to be regarded as destroyed and replaced by another thing of quite a new nature ; so it cannot be called its modification. If form does not constitute the nature of the cause, then the change of form may not imply the destruction of the cause, and this change of form of the self-same cause may be called its modification. Now the question arises : will that change of form affect any particular part of the cause or the whole of it. So far as *Prakriti* is concerned, this change cannot occur in one part of it, because it is one undivided Energy not having any division of parts. Nor can there be the modification throughout its whole extent, for in that case the entire *Prakriti* will have to be regarded as destroyed and there will be the production of another thing altogether different from it. Hence it will not be a case of a mere change of form of a previously existent thing, but that of the destruction of the one and the production of another. Hence the modification of *Prakriti* is found to be incapable of being logically established.

Advocate.—By modification, we do not mean the alteration of the nature of a thing. It implies the rise of new characteristics in a fixed substratum, after its previous characteristics have ceased to exist.

Critic—Here the question is : are those characteristics which rise and cease, different from that substratum or not ? If the characteristics are different from the substratum, then the substratum will remain in its original state and will not undergo any modification with the appearance or disappearance of those characteristics. The production and destruction of other things cannot lead to the modification of a thing of an immutable nature. If, on the other hand, these characteristics which become produced or lost are conceived as not separate from their substratum, then, the substratum being regarded as unchanging, the characteristics, which are non-different from this substratum, must also be admitted to be unchanging. This would then mean that to speak of the destruction of old characteristics and the production of new characteristics is self-contradictory. If on the other hand the reverse interpretation be given to this non-difference and the substratum be regarded as nothing more or less than the characteristics, then the conclusion will be that the old substratum is destroyed and a new substratum is produced. Thus, whether the characteristics be conceived as different from the substratum or non-different from it, the modification, as it is understood by the advocates of this view, cannot be logically established. Hence the modification of *Prakriti* is found to be an untenable thesis.

(c) *Prakriti*, whether having parts or having no parts cannot modify.

Moreover, let us ask—is the Energy (*Prakriti*) composed of parts or not ? If the former is the case, then it will be non-eternal and will not be the prime cause, because the parts of which it is composed must be regarded as existent.

prior to this composite entity which should be the effect of their conjunction. The primal cause is one which, it is believed by the advocates of this view, is left over as a substratum after the disappearance of all effects. If Energy be composed of parts, it cannot be accepted as such an ultimate substratum. Further, whatever is composed of parts is liable to destruction by the disjunction of the parts. Hence it will be an entity with a beginning as well as an end of its existence. Such an entity cannot be held to be the primal cause. If in spite of these defects, a composite body be conceived as the ultimate cause, the parts are to be regarded as non-substantial and themselves liable to destruction. The result will be the doctrine of Nihilism. Hence Energy, to be conceived as the Primal cause of the world of effects, cannot consistently be taken as composed of parts. The exponents of this theory must therefore fall back on the other alternative, viz. that Energy is partless. Now what is without parts cannot have modification. No modification is observed without arrangement of parts distinct from the already existing one. Even if it is modified, then because parts are not possible in the partless, the whole Energy will get modified in the form of effects and thus there will not be the Energy different from effects. In other words, the Energy in that case will be exhausted in being modified in the form of effects and will not remain in the form of Energy, in as much as what is wholly modified cannot retain its former state. What is thus modified will necessarily be non-eternal. Besides, in that case, at the time of every successive modification, all previous modifications would be lost and thus there would be no combination of elements (सूत), sense-organs and intelligence, and there would be an impossibility of all normal experience.

(d) Contradictions in the theory of Prakriti as modified.

Moreover, the theory of Energy is based on the view that all effects remain in the cause before their production and after their destruction and that they are not distinct from their cause. So you should not admit that from a cause without form, without sound etc. the world with form, with sound etc. can come forth. Because there is no colour, taste etc. in the partless, there cannot be from it the production of effects like colours etc., or effects having colours etc. If the Energy is formless, then according to your own theory, there cannot be any form in the effects. You hold that where there is contrariety in the nature of things, there the cause-effect relation is not possible. In that case there will be the non-existence of effects before their production. The non-difference of the cause and the effect being admitted, when the effects are with parts, their cause cannot be said to be without parts. Thus, it is shown that the theory that the universe is a modification of *Prakriti* (primal Energy) is groundless.

The Existence of Prakriti Unestablished.

Now let us show that the reasons for the inference of *Prakriti*, the prime material cause, are all fallacious.

(a) The Theory of Prakriti Expounded.

The advocates of this theory prove *Prakriti* or undifferentiated Primordial Energy to be the material cause of the entire diversified world on the following grounds :—(1) because all effects are the manifestations from their subtle state in which they are nothing but an energy (शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेः) (2) because there is in the manifestation the differentiation

of effects from their cause in which they remained undifferentiated (कारणकार्यविभागात्) (3) because, at the time of dissolution, all diversified effects become merged and unified in their cause (अविभागाद्वैश्वरूपस्य) (4) because all effects are measured or limited or non-pervading (परिमाणात्), and finally (5) because the different effects are experienced as having the same nature (समन्वयात्). Of these five grounds, by (1) and (2), it is proved that the unmanifest precedes all manifest effects; by (3) it is proved that the effects revert to the unmanifest. But these three reasons cannot ascertain the causality of primordial Energy, because even by having accepted Intelligence (महत्) and not the primal Energy (*Prakriti*) as the ultimate unmanifest, it may be shown that all effects are preceded by the unmanifest. In order to avoid this difficulty, the reason (4) is given which shows that intelligence (*Buddhi*) cannot be the ultimate unmanifest, because it is measured. The inference, made on the ground of the above four reasons, will demonstrate that there is some unmanifest cause distinct from intelligence, but it fails to ascertain exactly the nature of that unmanifest primal cause, in as much as it may be either the unconscious Energy of the nature of *Prakriti*, or universal consciousness—qualified or unqualified, or something else. The above inference establishes a very general conclusion and does not prove the precise nature of the ultimate cause inferred. Hence to establish the causality of *Prakriti* of the nature of three 'Gunas' the reason (5) is given. The qualities of effects are manifested from the qualities of their cause, and effects become possessed of the qualities of their cause. If threads are white, the cloth produced from these will also be white. So the effects like intelligence, the ego (अहं), the sense-organs, the subtle and gross elements which are of the nature of 'Sattva', 'Rajas', 'Tamas' must have a cause of the nature of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, *Tamas*. The cause

having the nature of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, *Tamas* is thus inferred as the root cause. This is called *Prakriti* which is conceived as constituted of these three *Gunas* in a state of complete equilibrium.

(b) The theory of the *Gunas* as constituting the nature of *Prakriti* refuted.

Now, let us examine whether the ultimate material cause of the world can be proved to be of the nature of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. First of all, it is to be examined whether *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* constitute the nature of the objects of the world. Here we find that there are wide divergences of opinion with regard to the true interpretation of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. In the First Book we have specially mentioned two interpretations for the establishment of the doctrine. The first is that *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* mean respectively self-manifestation, activity and inertia, and the second is that they mean respectively pleasure, pain and stupor. But according to neither of these interpretations can it be proved that *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are the universal properties of all objects. If we enter deeper into the first interpretation (See pages 49-50 and analytical content), it would be clear that these *Gunas* are neither real elements constituting the substances of the effects nor positive characteristics of the effects. They are merely three moments or stages of the modification of a thing. When a thing is by nature subject to modification, then it must have a stage from which modification should start and it must offer some amount of resistance to modification. This implies its inertia, which is called *Tamas*. Secondly, the process of modification implies its stage of activity or change, which is called *Rajas*. Thirdly, the stage at which it arrives as a result of this modification is the stage

of self-manifestation or the realisation of its potentiality. This is called *Sattva*. In whatever condition a body may be, whether mental or material, it is always subject to change or modification, and therefore it must have these three moments. If it is accepted that all things of the universe, mental as well as material, are always changing, then these three *Gunas* may be accepted as present everywhere ; but it would not mean that these are three distinct, but related, constituents of the things. They being really three moments of the process of modification, to regard them as constituents would amount to substantiation of abstract features. The discovery of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* in all things would merely signify the discovery of the fact that all things of the world are changing or modifying. According to the principle accepted by the exponents of the doctrine, we can infer from this only so far that the ultimate cause of the world must be subject to modification. If we advance still further we may suppose that even in the unmanifested state, when these three moments are at an equilibrium, there is some sort of subtle modification going on within it, though on account of the equilibrium this does not lead to the manifestation of any effect. However, to speak of the ultimate cause as having modification does not amount to the determination of any definite nature of it. How far modification can be logically justified has already been examined.

We now proceed to the discussion of the appropriateness of the other interpretation of the *Gunas* and the propriety of the conclusion drawn from it.

(c) Pleasure, pain and stupor as the ultimate constituents of objective existence refuted.

First of all, it is not true that all objects are pervaded by (समाचित) pleasure, pain and stupor, because they are

apprehended as inner and outer. The difference of pleasure, pain and stupor from pots etc., is corroborated by perception in as much as pleasure, pain and stupor are experienced inside and the pot etc., are perceived outside. Thus it is proved that pleasure, pain and stupor do not pervade all objects.

Advocate.—The apprehension of the said difference can be disproved by the help of an inference.

Critic.—No such inference will be accurate, because it will contradict the perception of the difference between the inner mental states and the outer objects.

Advocate.—The said perception is illusory, so it cannot be an argument against my view.

Critic.—The illusory character of a perception is known by its cancellation, but in the present case, no such cancelling cognition is experienced. Nor can it be said that by the said inference it will be cancelled because in that case there will be the fault of interdependence. Besides, the reason for your inference can be cancelled by a counter argument, such as, if pleasure, pain and stupor were the constituents of every object, each of those who experience one sound should experience these three, namely pleasure, pain and stupor in it, but all do not experience them. External things such as sound, touch etc. are not always the cause of pleasure and pain to everyone. The same sound gives pleasure at one time to an individual and at another time the same causes pain to him and over and above the same may produce an opposite effect on another person. So it cannot be said that they have in them, the efficiency to produce invariably pleasure and pain. Its becoming the cause of the production of pleasure and pain, on occasions and not

invariably, cannot be the condition or reason of its being of the nature of pleasure and pain. To be clear: because the object does not always give pleasure and pain, we are not entitled to conclude that it has in itself the nature of pleasure and pain. Moreover, we find that outward things produce desire and hatred though in themselves they are devoid of desire and hatred; similarly, these external things which are not of the nature of pleasure and pain can also produce pleasure and pain. Though not possessed of pleasure, pain and stupor, the same object can produce them, as the production of them is due to the difference of attitude namely attachment and aversion, entertained towards the object by the percipient subjects. The object has not the nature of pleasure and pain in it; if it had, then every person would have experienced it as simultaneously pleasant and painful, because the object is the same for all who see it. Besides, even when an object exists, it is experienced that pleasure or pain is destroyed and produced, so the object cannot be of the nature of pleasure or pain. Over and above, sound, for example, is perceived as the efficient cause of pleasure and pain, and the difference between the efficient cause and its effect needs no emphasis; so the sound is not of the nature of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are of the nature of feeling, and sound etc., on the contrary are not feelings, but extramental objects; hence sound etc., cannot be asserted to be of the nature of pleasure and pain. So the reason No. 5 (समन्वयात्), offered by the advocates of this view, falls to the ground.

(d) The argument from "limitation" to "cause" unsatisfactory.

Now let us examine reason No. 4 (परिमाणत् due to limitations of effects). Here the question is: Is this

limitation spatial, temporal or objective ? If the limitation caused by the specific character of the objects is meant, then as the three *Gunas* and the *Puruṣas* are objects, they will also be possessed of objective limitation and thus the advocate of this doctrine will be forced to admit that they are produced from one material cause. This shows that his argument involves the fallacy of *Undistributed Middle* (अनैकान्तिक or सव्यभिचार). If spatial and temporal limitations are meant, then also his argument will involve the same fallacy as is illustrated in the case of the pot and hail-stone. In these things, spatial and temporal limitations are present and at the same time they have not the same material cause. Earth is perceived as the material cause of the pot and water is perceived as the material cause of the hail-stone. Thus, it is found that things possessed of spatial and temporal limitations are not bound to proceed from one material cause. (The second and third reasons also are likewise faulty). Moreover, if by having seen that the effects like the root and the sprout etc., which are limited in nature and conjoined in one thing are produced from one material cause, you infer that all external and internal effects, being limited in nature, have one material cause, to which they are conjoined, then you should grant such a cause of the three '*Gunas*' also, because in them also there is the limitation of a uniform nature. If by 'limitation,' you mean a fixed numerical measure, then there will be the same fault, because the '*Gunas*' also have a fixed numerical measure. If by 'limitation,' non-pervadingness is meant, then also your argument would be defective. You admit that at the time of dissolution, there is the overpowering or suppression of the three *Gunas* and at the time of creation, there is their manifestation. This suppression and manifestation of *Gunas* are non-pervading and still you treat them as the effects of the *Gunas* themselves ; but if

you are true to your own reasoning, then due to the non-pervadingness of three 'Gunās', you ought to recognise a material cause of them besides themselves.

(e) Perfect or partial similarity of the effect to the cause does not prove Prakriti.

Moreover, it cannot be asserted that because the effects are pervaded by one form, they have one material cause. If there is perfect similarity between the cause and the effect, then there cannot be the difference in their essence (तत्त्व) and as such the differentiation of the cause from the effect would be impossible. If partial similarity is meant, then it has to be admitted that either the essential nature of the cause is to be partially changed or that the essence remains the same while its attributes are changed. In the former case, the essence is to be regarded as composed of parts, so it cannot be the primal cause. In the latter case, the difference between essence and attribute in the nature of *Prakriti* has to be admitted. But this is contrary to their conception of *Prakriti*. Moreover, all the difficulties arising out of the recognition of the modification of *Prakriti* as discussed before will arise in this connection also.

(f) Undivided partless material cause unwarrantable.

Besides, at the time of creation, the universe consisting of innumerable parts is said to evolve out of *Prakriti* which is a unitary substance without division of parts, and at the time of dissolution all these parts are said to be reduced to the unity of *Prakriti*. How can this be possible? Is it to be held that at the time of creation the partless *Prakriti* does not exist and the parts constituting the universe alone exist, or that in spite of the evolution of parts the

partless *Prakriti* exists? In the latter case, the evolution of the world is to be regarded as illusory, since it is contradictory to assert that *Prakriti* is without parts at the same time consisting of innumerable parts. In the former case, *Prakriti* will be subject to production and destruction and hence cannot be the ultimate cause. Both these alternatives are unpalatable to the advocates of this theory. Further, if you are ready to admit that this universe with countless parts, which is created out of *Prakriti* (the material cause), is of an absolutely different nature from *Prakriti*, then your theory will not stand, in as much as in that case you have no right to assert that all effects share the nature of their alleged material cause. Besides, when you admit that the prime material cause consists of the three 'Gunās', how can you say at the same breath that the universe has one undivided partless material cause?

(g) *Prakriti* not established by Perception and Inference.

Moreover, there is no positive proof in favour of the existence of *Prakriti* (cosmic Energy). That perception cannot be its proof is obvious, because it has no perceptible properties. Let us examine if there is any ground of inference about it. As there is no possibility of directly observing it and as it does not belong to any class of things which can be actually observed, the only proof that can be expected is that the recognition of its existence is necessitated by the nature of the effects produced and that it alone can furnish an adequate explanation for the production of the effects and determination of their characters. Now, *Prakriti* is supposed to be originally an equilibrium of three *Gunās*, existing in a completely inactive state and on account of its unconscious nature having no power of

taking any initiative. Even though according to the theory of the pre-existence of effects, all the effects be supposed to be existent in an unmanifested and undivided state in *Prakriti*, the nature of *Prakriti*, as conceived, has nothing in it that can enable it to evolve and differentiate the effects. Hence it cannot supply any explanation for the production of the diversified universe. Thus the attempt to infer the existence of *Prakriti* on the ground of its exclusive sufficiency to explain the creation of the world of effects is futile. Further, even if it be conceded that somehow in that harmonious state modification sets in, this modification is interpreted by them as the disharmony of 'Gunas'. Now it must be admitted that at the time of the disharmony of the *Gunas*, their harmonious state is no more and hence *Prakriti* is destroyed. Being liable to destruction, this *Prakriti* also must be regarded as of the nature of an effect. Consequently the existence of *Prakriti* as the ultimate cause of the universe is not established.

Then again, the existence of *Prakriti* is sought to be established on the ground that the cause must be essentially of the same nature with the effects, and accordingly the world must have as its ultimate cause an entity which is essentially of the same nature with the world. Taking their stand on this principle the advocates of this view hold that all the objects of the world, mental as well as physical, being constituted of three elements, viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, the ultimate material cause also must be constituted of the same three *Gunas*. We have previously shown that they could not satisfactorily establish the theory of the three *Gunas* being the constituents of all objects. But here they have to be asked, what do they really mean by the essential sameness between the cause and the effects? When we analyse the nature of the different kinds of effects,

in the world, we find that they have essential points of difference among themselves. That the advocates of this view also recognise these differences to be essential is evident from their enumerating them as '*tattvas*' (तत्त्व orders of realities). Can we not, according to the principle laid down by them, expect that these essential characteristics of the diverse kinds of effects should be present in their ultimate cause? If not, why should they expect us to accept that only the three *Gunas* imagined by them as present in all effects should constitute the nature of that ultimate cause? If the cause can differ in some essential aspects from the effects, it may differ in others also. Thus from the observation of the nature of the diverse orders of effects in the world, we can discover no ground for inferring that the ultimate material cause of the universe should be one which is the state of the equilibrium of the three *Gunas*. Hence the existence of *Prakriti* is not proved.

Cosmogony set forth in detail.

Let us now expound the steps traced by the advocates of the system, of the evolution of the world of diversities from the unmanifested *Prakriti*. They hold that the state of equilibrium of the three *Gunas* constituting the nature of *Prakriti*, is somehow disturbed, and one of the *Gunas*, viz. *Sattva* becomes predominant at the first state of evolution. Thus the first evolute, viz. Intelligence, comes into being. In this Intelligence '*Mahat*' also the process of modification goes on and the element of *Rajas* becomes more assertive. As the result, Ego (अहं) becomes manifest. In the nature of the Ego, all the three elements, viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, are regarded as almost equally manifested in relation to and struggling with one another. Consequently, when this Ego is modified, three different orders of realities are manifested from it, a particular *Guna* being more

predominant in a particular order. Thus from its *Sáttvic* aspect, the five senses of knowledge are evolved, from its *Rajas* aspect the five senses of action and from its *Tamas* aspect the five objects of the senses. *Manas* or mind also, as the sense of knowledge as well as action, associated with and ruling over all the particular senses, evolves out of this Ego. Thus the subjective as well as the objective factors of knowledge and action are said to be manifested out of the Ego, which is regarded as the material cause in relation to both these orders of effects. The world we know is constituted of these objective factors, viz. sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, and they are known and acted upon through the senses of knowledge and action respectively under the control and guidance of the mind. The objective factors, in their subtle isolated states, are called *Tanmátras* i. e. pure essences of sound, touch etc. But they, being mixed with one another, evolve out of themselves, the *Mahábhutas* or the elementary material substances technically called Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth, in accordance with the predominance of the particular essences of objects, viz. sound, touch etc. Thus, from *Prakriti* down to the *Mahábhutas*, they enumerate twenty-four orders of realities (*tattvas*), which, according to them, constitute the world-system.

Critical Examination.

- (a) **The three Gunas Examined :** they cannot be called three entities or three kinds of entities ; they cannot be atomic, middle-sized or all-pervading.

Not let us critically examine this theory :—

We have already refuted the doctrine of the modification of *Prakriti* and have shown the fallacy involved in

recognising that *Prakṛiti* is eternal and at the same time transformed. Moreover, the question is : are the three *Gunas* only three entities or three kinds of entities ? Take for example, the case of *Sattva*. Is there one and only one *Sattva* throughout the whole universe or are there many individual objects, belonging to a class, called ' *Sattva* ' ? Now, if the former alternative is accepted, then as there would be one and only one ' *Sattva* ', one and only one ' *Rajas* ', one and only one ' *Tamas* ' throughout the universe, each one of them would be all-pervading. Three ' *Gunas* ', being all-pervading, cannot of themselves be variously conjoined and there is also the absence of any other substance that would serve to conjoin them. Hence, there would be the absence of the variety of conjunctions of the three *Gunas* and as a result of this, the infinite varieties of effects would not have taken place. If the ' *Gunas* ' be each merely one individual, then there cannot be their increase, decrease and the like. If the ' *Gunas* ' are taken as innumerable, then it is asked whether they are atomic or all-pervading or middle-sized. They cannot be middle-sized, because they are taken as the root-cause of the universe. Things having a medium shape are non-eternal and hence they belong to the category of the produced. The ' *Gunas* ' cannot be atomic. In that case, they cannot be the cause of ' *Akāśa* '. If the ' *Gunas* ' are atomic, then the effects would be quite different from the material cause and this will mean the refutation of the theory of the pre-existence of effects. In that case, the theory of the ' *Gunas* ' will not be proved at all, because it is but a corollary of the doctrine of the pre-existence of effects. If the ' *Gunas* ' are all-pervading, there will be no action in them and thus it will be contradictory to hold that ' *Rajas* ' is of an unstable nature. If all the causal

substances are all-pervading, then the limitation of effects would remain unexplained.

(b) Intelligence Examined: it cannot be called universal or individual.

Now, let us examine the concept of Intelligence (महत्तत्त्व). What do you mean by Intelligence? Is it universal (समष्टि) or individual (व्यष्टि)? If the former, then the question is : in what sense is it so? The universal Intelligence or cosmic consciousness may mean the aggregate of all individual intelligences or it may mean one Intelligence embracing all individual intelligences. Now, if the universal Intelligence be conceived as the sumtotal of all individual intelligences, then since individuality implies the cognition of the ego as distinguished from other egos, the sumtotal of such intelligences cannot itself be a reality independent of and anterior to these individuals. Hence such a conception of universal Intelligence would contradict their theory of this Intelligence being a separate reality (*tattva*) and the material cause of the Ego. To speak of the forest as a collection of trees is merely verbal, because there is no real oneness; similarly to speak of the universal Intelligence as the collection of all particular intelligences would mean that it has no real existence of its own, but it is merely a verbal expression to denote all these intelligences together. Further, if by Intelligence is meant the power of knowledge, then the only intelligible meaning that we, from our experience, can attach to it is that it is a property of the individual living beings, and it is difficult to conceive how it can exist by itself independently of these individuals. According to this interpretation, the existence of a reality of the name of universal Intelligence without reference to any knowing person appears to be

impossible. The supposition of the assemblage of individual living beings is like the fancy of the assemblage of many knowledges of many persons. Suppose there are ten men and ten kinds of knowledge are produced. Now if anyone says that the assemblage of these ten kinds of knowledge constitutes the alleged universal Intelligence, then his statement will not convey any idea of a reality.

Now, let us show that the universal Intelligence cannot mean the one intelligence embracing all individual intelligences. According to the exponents of this view, the Intelligence is not conscious in its intrinsic character, but it becomes conscious by the reflection of the *Puruṣa* or self upon it. Now, the question arises, is the universal Intelligence related, through that reflection, to one *Puruṣa* or to all *Puruṣas*? If it is related to all *Puruṣas* together, then this universal Intelligence alone has to be conceived as the material cause of all the egos and through them of all subjects and objects. If this can be satisfactorily established, then all their arguments for proving the existence of many *Puruṣas* would be in vain, for there should be absolutely no necessity for the existence of different *Puruṣas* for determining the existence and course of life of different individuals. They have to recognise many *Puruṣas*, because they cannot explain the origin and development and emancipation of individuals except by reference to different selves. Hence consistently with their doctrine, they have to admit that a particular ego (अहं) evolves out of a particular intelligence, related to a particular self or *Puruṣa*. In that case, the intelligence related to one *Puruṣa* must be different from the intelligence related to another. Accordingly, a plurality of intelligences has to be admitted and the existence of one universal Intelligence embracing all individual intelligences cannot be established. Hence if we

are to speak of Intelligence as the first evolve from *Prakriti*, it must be regarded as a general term, indicating a class of intelligences, each particular intelligence being related to a particular *Puruṣa*. But this interpretation also cannot be acceptable to them. If particular intelligences are modified into particular egos and through them particular subjective faculties and objective realities, then there would be different universes for different individuals and there would be no objective world common to all. This is of course contradictory to their conception of the world. Thus Intelligence as the material cause of the world next to *Prakriti* can in no way be established. Besides, they hold that the essence of intelligence consists in the feeling of determination (अव्यवसाय), but one fails to understand how without the ego or before the production of it, the question of such determination can arise at all.

(c) Origin of Intelligence Unintelligible.

Besides, Intelligence is regarded as the first to be evolved out of *Prakriti*. But what is the reason for *Prakriti* being first modified into Intelligence? It is said that at the stage of *Prakriti* all the three *Gunas* were in a state of equilibrium, and that when this equilibrium is disturbed by the *Sattva* suppressing the other two and becoming predominant, Intelligence is manifested. But what is the ground for inferring that *Sattva* should suddenly become the strongest of the three *Gunas* and subdue the other two? No explanation is given by the advocates of the theory, and hence the assertion may be regarded as purely dogmatic. Secondly, if the predominance of *Sattva* starts the process of evolution, what is the reason for *Sattva* being subdued in the later stages of evolution by *Rajas* and *Tamas*, so as to give birth to the Egos and the gross

elements? No satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. Lastly, no reason is given why there should at any particular time be the disturbance in the equilibrium of *Prakriti*, which is necessary for starting the process of evolution. Thus we find that neither the origin nor the nature of Intelligence can be logically determined.

**(d) Ego Examined: Origin of Ego inexplicable ;
Ego cannot be universal or individual.**

The second in the order of evolution is called '*Ahankāra*' or Ego. It is said to be evolved out of Intelligence by the manifestation of a greater degree of *Rajas* in the latter. Now, it has been shown in the previous discussion that the advocates of this theory could not furnish any explanation for the accretion of *Sattva* in *Prakriti* in the first stage of evolution and that of *Rajas* in the Intelligence in the second stage. So the course of evolution remains unaccounted for and mysterious. Then, the question is, what is the true conception of '*Ahankāra*'. Evidently, it cannot be the ego of our experience, because we never experience the ego except with reference to a non-ego, that opposes it and is acted upon by it. In the absence of any counter-entity, it is difficult to form any distinct idea of the ego. But there is no counter-entity or non-ego in relation to the ego of the theory under review, all objects of experience as well as the instruments and vehicles of experiencing them being regarded as produced afterwards by the modification of this Ego. This Ego must be conceived, consistently with the theory, as one in which there is no distinction of subject and object, the knower and the knowable, both of these correlated orders of realities being evolved later by its modification. It is difficult to imagine how there can be even any manifested consciousness in such a state, not to speak of any manifested ego-hood.

Moreover, is this Ego to be conceived as one universal Ego or a plurality of individual egos? If it is taken in the second sense, then these egos being the material causes of the world of objects as well as of the faculties of experiencing them, there should be different worlds for different individuals and there would be no possibility of communication among them. As the advocates of the theory under examination maintain the existence of one common objective world for all, this sense of the ego cannot be acceptable to them. On the other hand, if the ego be conceived as one universal entity, then along with one common objective world, there should evolve from it one common mind and one common group of senses. In that case the evolution of the individual egos with individual interests and individual bondages and emancipations cannot be explained. Hence we do not find any way in which the nature of the ego can be comprehended so that it may be regarded as the cause of the objective world as well as of the innumerable individual minds and groups of senses.*

* "Fichte had maintained that the 'I' could not exist except through the 'Not-I'. He had expressed this by saying that the 'I' goes out of itself and posits a 'Not-I' as an objective content over against which it can act, and in this activity returns to itself with the fulness of concrete Being. It was extremely difficult to understand the nature of this activity; it could not be a process in time; for a mere 'I' without any content whatsoever could not first exist, and from its contentlessness produce a realm of content through which it afterwards came to move. If, on the other hand, the activity of the 'I' is logical, then it is wrongly directed, for it moves from mere reflexion without content, to content. We could understand concrete existence becoming reflective, abstract, and relatively contentless, but the reflective and contentless becoming concrete and full, unless it acted in relation to a content already existing apart from itself, is unintelligible. Thus, neither through a temporal

(e) The proof of Ego being the material cause of the senses and their objects defective.

The next step in the process of evolution, according to this theory, is the manifestation of the senses and their objects from the modification of *Ahankāra* or Ego. The fundamental assumption on which the upholders of this view trace the origin of the senses and their objects to a common cause is that, as they are correlative and inter-dependent, there must be a unity in their source. It is held that only the like can be related to the like. Since the very conception of Eye, Ear, Nose etc. is impossible except in terms of their respective objects, colour, sound, smell etc., and *vice versa*, there must be a unity of essence among them. Their inseparable relation, it is maintained, cannot be explained without admitting that they have evolved out of the same material cause, and as such they have a unity of essence. The Ego is regarded as this material cause.

Now, the first question that may be put to the advocates of the view is, what is the ground of their assumption that wherever there is an inseparable relation, there must be a common cause and unity of essence. The relations that we find are matters of experience. But is there anything in our experience that can supply a ground for such an assumption? On the contrary, we observe in our experience such a variety of relations between substances and substances, between substances and their attributes, between attributes and attributes, between agents and their works, that we cannot trace them to any common material cause,

process nor through a logical process can the 'I' of self-consciousness construct from itself a concrete reality."

(Taken from E. E. Thomas's "*Lotze's Relation to Idealism*"—*Mind*, 1915.)

so far as our experience goes. If we refer to any common cause beyond our experience for finding out the unity, it would involve the fallacy of begging the question, for it is the necessity for supposing a unity that has to be proved.

It cannot be said that it is a fundamental law of our thought to refer to such a unity, for there are various schools of thought that do not recognise the necessity of postulating a unity in all such cases of relation. That the advocates of this theory also do not regard it as a fundamental law of thought is evident from the fact that they do not trace the origin of the relation between *Prakriti* and the *Puruṣas* to their being derived from a common material cause.

Hence unless any other independent proof can be adduced for showing that the senses and their objects originate from Ego, their position is not established.

Secondly, even if any common source of the senses and the objective entities be demanded, how can it be proved that Ego is this common source? Various other hypotheses have been put forward by rival schools of thought, and very cogent reasons are necessary to prove that this is the only hypothesis which can most rationally and most adequately account for the relation between the senses and the objective realities.

Can Ego really furnish a satisfactory solution of this problem, viz. the problem of the possibility of our knowledge of and action upon a really existent objective world? We have noted several logical difficulties in course of our examination of the conception of Ego. If Ego has any intelligible meaning,—if it means what we understand by the

connotation of this familiar term,—then to recognise it as the material cause of the world must imply the acceptance of the theory of Subjective Idealism ; the world is then to be conceived as constituted of the ideas of the subject of knowledge and action, for Ego can be understood only in the sense of such a subject. Apart from the special difficulties arising from regarding this Ego either as the universal Subject or as the individual Subject, the charge of Subjective Idealism, of which the advocates of this theory are so much afraid, remains unrefuted, in whatever of the two senses Ego may be interpreted. If Ego be conceived as an entity, which is neither subject nor object, neither the experiencer nor the experienced, it cannot bear any intelligible meaning even to the exponents of this view.

If, however, they are ready to accept the position that the objective world evolves out of the subjective Ego, then what must be the relation between the senses or the subjective faculties and the objects of these senses ? The natural course should be that through the manifestation of a particular sense, there should arise a particular object. For example, as Ego modifies itself into Ear, this sense of hearing should give birth to sound, and so on. Accordingly Ego should be regarded as the material cause of the senses, and the senses as the material cause of their particular objects. This is of course not acceptable to them, for it would reduce the objects into mere sensations.*

* “ Briefly, the grounds on which Berkeley held that no material thing could exist unperceived were these : He maintained, first, that a thing was nothing more than the sum of its sensible qualities, and, secondly, that it was self-contradictory to assert that a sensible quality existed unsensed. ... But, in fact, we have seen that sense-contents are not in any way parts of the material things which they constitute ; the sense in which a material thing is reducible to sense-

Moreover, in accordance with their doctrine of the pre-existence of the effects in the cause, sound, touch, etc. which are produced from the Ego, must be existent in the nature of the Ego in a subtle state. But even according to their own exposition, the Ego is not characterised by the properties of sound, touch, etc. How then can such objects

contents is simply that it is a logical construction and they are its elements; and this, as we have previously made clear, is a linguistic proposition which states that to say anything about it is always equivalent to saying something about them. Moreover the elements of any given material thing are not merely actual but also possible sense-contents—that is to say, the sentences referring to sense-contents, which are the translations of the sentences referring to a material thing, need not necessarily express categorical propositions, they may be hypothetical. And this explains how it is possible for a material thing to exist throughout a period when none of its elements are actually experienced: it is sufficient that they should be capable of being experienced—that is, that there should be a hypothetical fact to the effect that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, certain sense-contents, belonging to the thing in question, would be experienced. ... The proposition that whatever is perceived is necessarily mental, which forms the second stage in the argument of the Berkeleyan idealist, rests on the assumption that the immediate data of sense are necessarily mental, together with the assumption that a thing is literally the sum of its “sensible qualities”. And these are both assumptions which we have rejected. We have seen that a thing is to be defined, not as a collection of sense-contents, but as a logical construction out of them. And we have seen that the terms “mental” and “physical” apply only to logical constructions, and not to the immediate data of sense themselves. Sense-contents themselves cannot significantly be said either to be or not to be mental. ... “*x* is mental” is not entailed by “*x* is thought of,” any more than by “*x* is perceived”. ... the fact that “*x* is real” does not formally entail “*x* is mental” proves that it is not an *a priori* truth. ... And in general, there is no empirical ground. ... Another argument of Berkeley's is superficially more plausible. He points out that sensations of all kinds are in some degree pleasant or painful, and argues that, as the sensation is not phenomenally distinguishable from the pleasure or the pain, the two must be identified. But pleasure and pain, he thinks,

with new characteristics evolve out of a cause, in which they are evidently non-existent? The exponents of this view sometimes try to explain it by means of the doctrine of mixture or combination. It is experienced that by the mixture of a yellow substance and a white substance, a substance with red colour is often produced, or by the combination of two substances of bitter tastes, a substance with sweet taste is sometimes produced, and so on. In such cases it is not that some absolutely new substance or absolutely new property is produced, but by the combination of the old substances with old properties in different proportions, those new things with new properties, which were unmanifested in them, are evolved out of them. Similarly, by the combination of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* in various proportions, various kinds of substances with various properties may be evolved out of their causes. These *Gunas* are so combined in the Ego that sound etc. are not manifested in it, but by a different combination they are manifested in the effect. Thus there is no inconsistency between the doctrine of the Pre-existent effect and the evolution of of sound, touch etc. from the Ego.

are indubitably mental, and so he concludes that the objects of sense are mental. The error in this argument consists in the identification of pleasures and pains with particular sense-contents. It is true that the word "pain" is sometimes used to denote organic sense-contact, as in the sentence, "I feel a pain in my shoulder," but in this usage a pain cannot properly be said to be mental; and it is noteworthy that there is no corresponding usage of the word "pleasure". And in the usage in which pains and pleasures can properly be said to be mental, as in the sentence, "Domitian took pleasure in torturing flies," the terms denote, not sense-contents, but logical constructions. For to refer to pains and pleasures, in this usage, is a way of referring to people's behaviour, and so ultimately to sense-contents, which are themselves, as always, neither mental nor physical."

(A. J. Ayer's "Language, Truth and Logic," 1936).

But the argument is not strong enough to disprove the inconsistency, and the instances cited have little similarity with case in point. Experience only supplies instances, in which by the mixture of several colours or tastes in different proportions, fresh complex colours or tastes are evolved, or by the combination of several simple substances new compound substances of like nature are produced. We do not find cases, in which the mixture of colourless or tasteless substances originates different kinds of coloured or tasteful substances, or in which the combination of non-sensuous substances or substances having no magnitude or occupying no space originates sensuous substances or substances having magnitude or occupying space. A substance is nowhere found to produce an absolutely unlike substance. At least this is what the advocates of the theory themselves assert. If this is not admitted, then their theory of the Pre-existent effect would have no ground to stand upon. Hence the production of the extramental objective entities like sound, touch, colour etc., from the Ego cannot be established on the strength of those instances.

If it be argued that the Ego is itself a combination of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, and the different combinations of these constituents of the Ego may produce the different effects like colour, taste, sound, etc., then first of all it has to be admitted that it is not the Ego that is their cause, but that the original constituents of the Ego, viz., the *Gunas*, which are their causes. Then the question should be, have these *Gunas* any sensuous properties or not? Evidently they have not. How then can sensuous objects be produced by their combination? Further, mixture or combination is possible only of substances having parts. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are not regarded as substances having parts. How then can they combine in different

proportions, so as to produce diverse kinds of objects. It is also difficult to conceive how the increase or decrease of any one of the three constituents can produce substances of altogether different characteristics. Thus the theory of the combination of the *Gunās* cannot explain the production of the external objects like sound etc., from the Ego.

Then again, sound etc., are regarded by them as the effects of Ego, and as the material causes of Ether and the other material elements. The senses and their objects—the instruments or powers of hearing, seeing, etc., and the objects to be heard, seen—are therefore regarded as preceding in point of existence all the physical elements and the physical bodies. The bodies of all living and knowing beings are universally recognised to be physical bodies, made up of the material elements. Thus in accordance with this theory we are to admit that the senses can exist without the relation of and even before the birth of bodies, and also that colour can exist without coloured bodies, taste can exist without articles of taste, and so on. That is to say, there may be pleasures of taste, sight and touch, without the physical body, whether gross or subtle and consequently without the physical organs of tasting, seeing and touching as well as without the material objects to taste or see or touch. This is, however, a conclusion, which, though logically following from their theory, finds no support in the field of our experience.

(f) The conception of 'Tanmātra' Unfounded.

With regard to the evolution of the objective world, two steps are enumerated. From the modification of Ego, the objective world is first manifested in the form of

'*Tanmātras*', meaning the essences of objects. They are five in number, viz., pure sound, pure touch, pure colour, pure taste, pure smell, which are respectively the pure essences of the five elementary material substances, viz. Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth. These material substances, even in their simple elementary states, are the gross products evolved out of the modification and co-operation of those pure unalloyed '*tanmātras*' or essences. Now, what is the true conception of those essences? Do they ever exist apart from the material objects, of which they are regarded as the essences? So far as our experience goes, sound, touch etc., are always found to be the properties of material objects, or they may more appropriately be described as the different modes, in which the external objects affect our particular senses. Thus in accordance with our actual experience, sound, touch, colour etc. ought more properly be described either as the attributes of the material objects or the products of the material objects or as the sensations produced upon the senses by the material objects. At any rate, they presuppose the existence of material objects. How then can it be conceived that they are the sources or the material causes of those material objects.

It may be argued that the universal essences of things are logically presupposed by their changing non-essential attributes, and the gross material objects with varying non-essential attributes must be logically conceived as following in the order of evolution from their underlying universal essences. Now, even accepting this as the principle of evolution, in order to apply it, the advocates have to show that sound, touch, etc., are really the essences of those objective realities and that they can have existence as real substances independently of those of which they are essences. If essences mean merely the essential attributes of

things, they must be inherent in the things and cannot be conceived, by reason of their being more important than the other attributes, as existing by themselves apart from the things. If on the other hand the essences are not essential attributes, but really existent entities and the material causes of those things, then there must be independent proofs of their real objective existence. That sound, colour, etc., cannot be perceived by the senses as existing independently apart from relation to the material objects, is evident to everybody. There is no ground for inference also, because inference must start from the concrete material objects in relation to which alone they are experienced, and their independent existence can be inferred only on the assumption that these objects are the effects of those essences. This would evidently be begging the question.

Then, again, what is the proof that sound, touch, etc. are really the essences of all material things? To accept them as the essences of things should logically imply that the essential reality of all material things of the world consists in their relationship to the particular senses, and that apart from their relation to the senses they have no essence and no real existence. Sound, touch, etc. cannot be conceived except in terms of sense-impressions; if they are the essences of the objective world, the world also would be reduced into sense-impressions. Thus the extra-sensuous existence of the world would be lost.

Further, sound, touch, colour etc. as such are never experienced by the senses even in relation to the concrete material bodies. We hear particular sounds, we see particular colours, and so on. Sound, colour etc. are general terms, to signify those particular sounds, colours etc. which

are the real objects of sense-perception and from which they are conceptual generalisations. What then is the guarantee for the real existence of these '*tanmātras*,' which common-sense cannot conceive except as mere generalised ideas ?

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD AS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE RELATED TO PRAKRITI EXAMINED.

We have so far examined the validity of the doctrine that one unconscious *Prakriti* is the material cause of the world of effects without any reference to the efficient causality of God. The School of Philosophy which is mainly responsible for the enunciation of this doctrine maintains that *Prakriti* spontaneously manifests and evolves itself into this world of effects and that there is no necessity of recognising any self-existent God to move it or to regulate its actions. It believes in the existence of countless individual Souls which are eternally associated with it by way of some inexplicable indiscrimination and in the interests of which the evolution of *Prakriti* occurs.

Other schools of philosophy and religion have sought to take full advantage of this doctrine of the material causality of *Prakriti* and its mode of explaining the evolution of the world-system out of it ; but they do not agree that *Prakriti* can independently manifest itself from its unmanifested state and produce and sustain the world-system. They hold that *Prakriti* being an unconscious reality a self-conscious and omniscient Being is necessary to move it and to guide its actions. Hence the existence of God as the efficient cause must be admitted to account for this world-system.

Now, in the preceding chapter we have elaborately examined the conception of God as the efficient cause of

the world. We have found that no satisfactory answers were available to questions such as whether God is bodiless or embodied, what relation is there between God and the world, what motive actuates God in regulating this universe, etc. The logical difficulties which were found to be involved in the conception of God as Doer and Regulator equally vitiate the arguments of these schools as well. Further, the relation between two such independent realities as God and *Prakriti* can in no way be rationally established. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the doctrine of God as the efficient cause of the world with *Prakriti* as its material cause is not logically established.

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